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**Monism, Multiculturalism and
Pluralism from
Social Exclusion and Inclusion
Perspectives**

**Edited by
Mrigendra Bahadur Karki**

**Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies
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The Editor

MONISM, MULTICULTURALISM, AND PLURALISM FROM SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION PERSPECTIVES

Mrigendra Bahadur Karki

Nepal has been a seething cauldron of political change for almost 20 years now. Tectonic political changes have occurred in Nepal over the last six decades.¹ The political system has gone through five major transformations in this period. Before 18 February, 1951, Nepal was governed by an autocratic Rana family dictatorship. It was highly hierarchical, authoritarian, and ritualistic (Gellner 1997). Hindu *sastras* and *dharmastras* (epics) were sources of state laws that gave a progression of Sanskritization (Sharma 2004), and syllabus of formal education. After the successful democratic revolution of 1951, Nepal enjoyed a monarchical democracy until 1960. Constitutionally, this opened up various political and social avenues for collective and individual opportunities in various forms of activism, and economic advancement.

From 15 December, 1960 until 8 March, 1990, under the Partyless Panchayat system,² Nepal again reverted to a traditional monarchy. It promoted modern education, rule of law, and economic development (Gellner 1997). Nevertheless, it banned the multi-party polity, outlawed oppositional activism, and continued the ideology of the integrative³ Nepali nationalism⁴ model of the Rana regime. In response to the massive student movement raised in 1979, King Birendra announced a referendum that gave a locus of public discourses. The 49-day long Peoples' Movement-I (enormous street demonstrations) of 1990 threw out the Panchayat system, consequently reintroduced the parliamentary constitutional monarchy. Most significantly, for the first time, constitutionally the sovereignty shifted to citizen from the King.

The 1990's democratic polity provided a legal space for activism, contentious politics and social movements; consequently ethnic organizations, regional movements, civil societies, Dalit groups, and women movements, to name a few, are proliferating as new alternative intermediaries, somehow replacing the role of political parties in mediating between people and the state (see Karki 2010 and 2006, Gellner and Karki 2007 and 2008). Consequently, post-1990, the political parties of Nepal started to set up ethnic, regional front organizations to recruit and halt the ethnic or regional vote bank. Similarly, the democratic government concentrated on the issues of legal disparity, historical exclusion and marginalization for example the rights based issues of indigenous nationalities, Madhesis, Dalit, and women that motivated activists and academicians to focus on the agenda. The process and environment produced new consciousness in Nepali polity. Post *jana andolan* II (2006), ethnic, caste, religious and regional identities emerged as core of the political theory. For example, identity based political parties considerably won the CA election. The theory of social exclusion and inclusion has

appeared powerfully in Nepal these days (See Oommen 2010, Gurung 2007).

The political process and social environment facilitated as well as created a challenge to develop a model of federal structure. The political parties yet are indecisive about how to deal with these emergent collective identities and meet their demands. The Constituent Assembly (CA) was dominated by the communist parties with 61.56 percent. However, the CPN-UML has been working together with NC – the second largest and one of the oldest democratic parties of Nepal in various issues. For example, these parties have been advocating for the inclusion of pluralism in the new constitution. On the other hand, interestingly, the Tarai Madhesh parties are ideologically non-communist, however, they emerged carving their political space through identity polity and grievances. The identity has been one of the powerful ideologies (or mechanism) of the UCPN (Maoist). Thus, the Tarai Madhesh parties and UCPN (Maoist) have been working together in various issues i.e. protection and preservation of identity as well as coalition partner of the government. Interestingly, the theoretical orientation of identity parties is 'multiculturalism,' which supposes that collective identity is fixed, hard and permanent.⁵ But according to the Maoist's philosophy of Marxism, Leninism and Maoism, all subjective and objective worlds keep transforming.

Nepal is a country of minorities of more than a hundred social groups. The traditional differences in these groups' cultural script has produced separate agency. The Maoist incorporated the content of social discrimination, alienation and exclusion in their political agenda. Post-Jana-Andolan II, the Nepali state has taken ownership of the diversity through legal, social and political recognition in horizontal line, i.e. providing public holidays for all ethnic festivals. Even though the Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007 allocated the CA seats on the basis of ethnicity and regional identity now political parties are indecisive about how to deal with 'ethnicity' and 'other form of collective identity.' The Maoist party (all existing Maoist parties who believe in the thought of Marxist Leninist Maoist (MLM)) accepts social pluralism but rejects political pluralism. The Maoist has been guided by monism⁶ (dialectical materialism) in its political philosophy. The Nepali Congress (NC) accepts pluralism⁷ (see Giri 2010, Lekhak 2011) but has to elaborate whether 'collective' identities or 'individuals' is its unit of analysis of pluralism. How individual and collective identities would be negotiated with each other? The Communist Party of Nepal Unified Marxist and Leninist (CPN-UML) accepts monism as its philosophical orientation, however, now it accepts both social and political pluralism (see Gyawali 2010 and 2011).

In the midst of all of this political and social foment and change, Nepali society has become, and is continuing to become, a politicized society. Reformations, transgressions, and contention have been the basic features of Nepali polity, activism and social movements. 'The structure of group differentiation' has been contested by the policy of 'parallel ethnic

structure'⁸ in the changing socio-political settings. Nepal is a tapestry of more than a hundred different castes and ethnic groups, like about eight dozen linguistic and various regional groups, and many of these groups are now becoming politically active. It seems as though almost every day new activist groups come up into existence. In addition, there are the traditional political parties based on their respective ideologies.

Whether of the notions monism and pluralism powerfully generated a debate for their inclusion in the new constitution or not may be a question, but the agenda was discussed during the promulgation of the Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007.⁹ In the draft constitution, every 'word,' every 'sentence' was embedded with intentionality, and was but under meticulous surveillance of polity. However, the discussions have been recurring upon predisposition to doctrinal repertoire of Maoist¹⁰ leaning toward *jan sambidhan* (people's constitution) and democratic polity. How does a new constitution define *loktantra* (democracy)? What sorts of directive principles will be espoused in the constitution? These questions, which to a great extent pave a political trajectory of Nepal, are yet to be answered. Of the dozens of contentious issues, the notions of 'monism' and "pluralism" have robustly emerged from the constitution drafting process.

In order to address this issue, three alternatives are projected: the first is pluralism. It has been claimed that it is an indivisible component of *loktantra*, and therefore, it must be guaranteed in the state's directive principles. Second, the monists (dialectic) argue that as pluralism is a political ideology, it can't be written in the state's constitution. Third, the constitution should be silent in this issue. Nevertheless, it created contention among the big parties who got divided into two conflicting poles. The Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (UCPN (M)) refused to embrace pluralism in the new constitution. On the other hand, the second and third largest parties of CA, the Nepali Congress (NC) and Communist Party of Nepal/Unified Marxist and Leninist (CPN-UML) advocated for pluralism. For example, UCPN (M) leader Dev Prasad Gurung (see The Himalayan Times 2010) said, "Whether or not the new constitution is drafted, we never accept pluralism." (See also Vaidhya 2007 [2063 BS], 2011). Contrary to this, NC leader Ram Chandra Paudel (See The Himalayan Times, 2010) said his "party is determined to employ the principle of pluralism in the new constitution." (See also Giri 2010, Gyawali 2010, Oli-Sharma 2011, Deo 2010, Lekhak 2011). The mnemonic causation (systematic structural exclusion, alienation, and discrimination), perceived justice, equality, opportunity structure and threat under the evolved political process sparked collective identities into the 'crease of politics.'¹¹ A tectonic pressure has grown up from social groups to the political parties to include their conflicting agenda in the new constitution even though the CA is dissolved. In such circumstance, a pertinent question may arise: how are the Nepali political parties dealing with the evolved political process?

Special Issue

The special volume attempts to engage with philosophical and theoretical issues of current Nepali political discourses through the writing of a senior political leader and academicians. Mohan Vaidhya alias 'Kiran,' who is chairperson of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist, defends the doctrine of monism. However, he distinguishes, between its two branches. First, idealist monism, he rejects all of its proponents. This form of monism has been employed by autocratic king, military dictator, and the religious rulers. Second, dialectical materialism, it developed with the thought of Marxism, Leninism and Maoism (MLM). Two-line struggles offer a space for people to locate and explore their problems and hardship. He rejects the notion of 'ethnic group' to the indigenous people of Nepal and proposes the notion of 'national' to deal with their all forms of discrimination. According to Vaidhya, the problems related with cultural and national diversities will be solved by the dialectical and historical materialist world outlook.

Anand Aditya, in his article 'Rediscovering Marx: the man and his mission behind the myths of revolutionary change' attempts to discuss the Marxist theory relative to Marx's life history. He sketches in a chart the revolutionary violence across the world as inspired by the Marxist theory to set up a proletariat rule. Similarly, he shows how the Marxist theory transformed Russia during Lenin and Stalin. Most importantly, he stresses that theories are relative, not neutral to time, space and movement. Anjoo Sharan Upadaya presents ethnic identities in the political and social process. She critically analyses the undercurrent theories of ethnonationalism. According to Upadaya in South Asia it occupies archetypal mobility. Similarly, Govinda Bahadur Tumbahang maps out the linguistic status of Nepal and stresses on the importance of linguistic pluralism to promote, preserve and respect ethnic diversity in Nepal.

Mrigendra Karki analyses the philosophical orientation of Nepali polity – monism, multiculturalism and pluralism – in relation to a collective identity.¹² He shows a political process is in interaction between these three contending worldviews with reference to collective identity and its scales sift.¹³ Consequently, political parties, with unresolved oedipal conflict in conceptualizing identity, deviate from each other.¹⁴ The process, according to Karki, has brought out new or formerly peripheral properties of political ideology to the core and pushed the core to circumference. He argues that before *jana-andolan* II, the differences between the political parties and identity groups were hushed so that they could together remove the then regime. But now gradually the gap is widening between these allies in relation to defining *loktantra*. Karki presents initially the Maoist had owned the collective identity issues to recruit these groups in their political agenda. However, the world outlook differs between the Maoist, collective identity groups and those political parties who believe in pluralism.

Notes

1. I have used some paragraph from my previous article in this section (see Karki 2009 and 2010).
2. In response to the students' massive street protest national referendum was held in 1980.
3. The concept "integrative" has borrowed from Paul Brass (2005:10-11) by 'integrative Nepali nationalism', the study indicates to a policy of mono-linguistic, mono-regional, mono-dress. It is a more or less continuation of Ranas' policy.
4. By the term nationalism, in this context the study indicates to both notions: to refer to the process by which ethnic groups and communities are mobilized for action to attain political ends, and attempt to generate loyalties are developed to the state (Brass (2005:9-10)).
5. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Politics the term 'multiculturalism' emerged in the 1960s in Anglophone countries in relation to the cultural needs of non-European migrants. It now means the political accommodation by the state and/or a dominant group of all minorities cultures defined first and foremost by reference to race or ethnicity; and also by reference to nationality, aboriginality, or religion (see Oxford dictionary of politics 2009).
6. Monism, according to Oxford Dictionary of Sociology (2009), is any philosophical theory which states that all being may ultimately be referred to a single category. Historical materialism is often described as monist because of its emphasis on determination by the economic base. The term is also applied more loosely to any causal account that attaches sole importance to a single explanatory factor.
7. Pluralism is both a technical term in political science, and an evaluative word for a form of government, often used as a defence of what might otherwise be called liberal democracy or representative democracy. Literally, a belief in more than one entity or a tendency to be, hold, or do more than one thing. In the late nineteenth century, pluralism was applied to philosophical theories or systems of thought which recognized more than one ultimate principle, as opposed to those which were 'monist'. (see Oxford Politics Dictionary 2009)
8. According to Paul Brass (2005:11) Donald Horowitz suggest two ethnic policies for multi ethnic countries: 1) The structure of group differentiation, where ethnic group relations are characterized by hierarchical relationships in which one group is 'superordinate' and another is 'subordinate', 2) parallel ethnic structure: where all ethnic groups have equal status.
9. Ramesh Lekhak, who was a member of Interim Constitution Drafting Committee 2006, says (an interaction on March 2012) the Maoist representative were divided in this issue. Krishna Bahadur Mahara was positive to include pluralism saying that since "we have signed on 12 point agreement it would not make any difference but next day Dev Prasad Gurung highly opposed saying that is against to our political doctrines."
10. The author, in this paper, has not differentiated amongst the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), Communist party of Nepal and Nepal Communist Party of Nepal in its philosophical doctrine.
11. Recently in Nepal, political parties are evolving through social movements ie Madhesi Janadhikar Forum a Madhes based social organization developed as political party post-2006 and secure fourth position in the CA election of 2008.
12. Three perspectives prevail to deal with these emerged in this issue: i) single identity federalism, ii) multiple identity federalism, and iii) non-ethnic federalism.

13. I borrowed this concept of "scales sift" from McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001). Here I have used this notion in terms of a concept development from both horizontal and vertical augmentation.
14. Political parties have been explicitly expressing their position in the discussion on the new constitution drafting. The Maoist is advocating for the multiparty system while in the leadership of Nepali Congress most of the parties are lobbying for multiparty polity with the guarantee of pluralism in the new constitution. Similarly, most of the proposed names and boundaries of the federal states, of Nepal, are demarcated following to identity (ethnic) attributes.

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CULTURAL AND NATIONAL DIVERSITIES AND DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

Mohan Vaidya

Abstract

Nepal is a semi-feudal, semi-colonial and neo-colonial country with multilingual, multi-national and multi-cultural diversities. Along with the oppressed classes like workers and peasant, women, Dalit, indigenous nationalities and the communities from the backward regions have also been oppressed since long by feudalism, imperialism and expansionism in Nepal. There have been struggles for long time now to defend national independence, establish democracy and address the basic needs of people's livelihood. Some of the people prefer to use the terminology, ethnic diversity, to denote the diversity witnessed in the various indigenous communities in Nepal. However, this terminology cannot exactly grasp its sense. The correct terminology to meet its essence is national.

Today, different classes, communities, organisations and political parties have been presenting their opinion to solve the people's problems on the basis of their world outlook. Here we will attempt to present solution to the problems of Nepal and the Nepalese people on the basis of dialectical and historical materialism. First of all, it will be appropriate to begin with the philosophical questions.

Monolithism, Pluralism and Materialist Dialectics

Materialist dialectics is the philosophical system of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. It firmly stands against all sorts of metaphysics including monolithism and pluralism. The basic law of materialist dialectics is the law of unity of opposites. Comrade Mao had had a significant contribution in developing, bettering and enriching the law of the unity of opposites against monolithism and pluralism. Our party has been grasping it firmly and working hard to develop this principle further.

The struggle of materialist dialectics against monolithism and pluralism is not merely confined to the two-line struggle within the communist movement. Its boundaries have spread to the wider sphere of nature, thinking and the class struggle. The roots of development of monolithism, pluralism and materialist dialectics are linked with a long tradition of history. Also, they are related with present and the future as well. They

encompass a great and long journey of ideological struggle. The central point of debate, discussion and study of all of these issues is the law of unity of opposites.

Some people mistake that monism is monolithism. In fact, monism and monolithism are not the same. Monism is of two types: idealist and materialist. To think of an idea or a matter only as the source of absolute idea or the world is monism. The idealism considers that absolute idea or thinking is the ultimate source of the world and the materialism considers matter to be so. Looking at from this angle, idealism and materialism are just two opposites; nevertheless, both of them are monist. Monolithism is not a synonym for monism. The Marxist philosophy is against idealist or metaphysical monism but not against dialectical materialist monism. Dialectical materialism is evidently a monistic world outlook. Idealist or metaphysical monism ultimately ends up in monolithism. The concept that regards both the material and mental elements as two parallel sources of absolute idea or the world is dualism. Likewise, the concept that regards numerous material or non material elements as the source of absolute idea or the world is pluralism. The materialist dialectics stands against the idealist monism, dualism and pluralism as well.

Is the unity of opposites possible? How does the unity of opposites look like? Does one divide into two or two combine into one? While answering these questions, there have been sharp debates among monolithism, pluralism and materialist dialectics.

Monolithism is the theory and system of absolute unity. It does not accept the existence of opposites or contradictions in an entity. According to this, one permanently remains one; one never divides into two. According to the concept of monolithism, an object remains without motion, development, change and transformation. The monotheism of feudal religious philosophy and monism of Vedanta philosophy are like this. The monolithism has seriously influenced the world communist movement too. Comrade Stalin, though he was mainly a dialectical materialist, had been a victim of monolithism time and again. Anwar Hoxa sided with this monolithism and ultimately slipped into dogmatorevisionism. In the Nepalese communist movement, a real representative of monolithism is Mohan Bikram Singh.

Pluralism is the theory and system of *Anekantabada*. It never agrees with unity in diversity. According to pluralism, objects are absolutely and mutually independent as a complete unit. Though there is thesis and antithesis between opposites, they never reach to a synthesis. The opposites

fight with each other, tire out and ultimately two combine into one, but there is no qualitative transformation of one into another. It is in fact and after all a compromise and parallelism. It is based on the principle of competition among bourgeoisie. Pluralism is a bourgeois philosophy. The real representative of pluralism is Trotsky and the theoreticians of Euro-communism, in the international communist movement. While in the Nepalese communist movement, the real representative of pluralism is the UML group.

The materialist dialectics stands against monolithism and pluralism both. The fundamental law of materialist dialectics is the law of unity of opposites; it is also called the law of one divides into two. It is prevalent in the realm of nature, society and thinking. It scientifically unveils the relations of production, class relations and social contradictions of the past society. The law of unity and struggle of opposites embodies that unity and struggle exist simultaneously in every object and process; it regards that unity is relative and struggle is absolute and admits that the opposites qualitatively transform one into another. Against the monolithism that emphasizes only on thesis and the pluralism that emphasizes on compromise between thesis and anti-thesis, the materialist dialectics embodies not only thesis and anti-thesis but also synthesis or a qualitative leap.

Both monolithism and pluralism are metaphysical world outlooks. The monolithism prevailing in the communist movement does not accept the existence of motion, contradiction and opposites in an object, society and party and, as a result, it cannot see development, change and qualitative leap in them. It regards theory as a dogma; there is no creativity in it. It practices bureaucracy not democracy in the organization; does not give place to discussion, debate and synthesis; imposes one's own views everywhere and rejects the existence of class and two-line struggle. On the other, pluralism always emphasizes on diversity, difference and decentralization in every object, process, society and the party. In the name of so-called creativity, it charges the baton of empiricism upon theory.

Contrary to unified and centralized leadership and the ideological unity, it spreads pollution of factionalism, scepticism and anarchism. It brings in an endless series of discussion, debate and antithesis and completely negates synthesis and qualitative resolution of the contradiction. It changes the party into a jumble of factions, not to a unified and disciplined party. Monolithism and pluralism are such philosophical principles that provide service to and fulfil the interest of different reactionary classes.

Monolithism serves feudalism, absolute monarchy or military dictatorship. Monolithism is totalitarian. Pluralism is bourgeois world outlook. It serves the bourgeoisie. Parliamentary system is its objective. Although the parliamentary democracy had played a progressive role in the course of its struggle against feudalism, there is no such role whatsoever at present and it sides with anarchism, vulgarism, vulgar utilitarianism and extreme individualism. Today, the pluralism and its goal, the parliamentary system, have degenerated into the monopoly of imperialism and with the development of globalization it has transformed into monolithism and fascism. Both of these world outlooks stand against the interest of the proletariat and broad masses of the people. These philosophical trends that sneak into the communist movement, serve the reactionary classes. They are such trends that obstruct revolution and serve the counter-revolution.

The materialist dialectics serves the proletariat and the masses of the people against these two trends. Therefore, it is necessary on our part to propel the ideological struggle forward against monolithism and pluralism and thereby establish the materialist dialectics to another new height.

In order to forcefully develop class struggle, uninterruptedly continue revolution and prevent counter-revolution, the forceful ideological struggle that comrade Mao waged against monolithism, present in comrade Stalin, and the pluralism, prevalent in the opportunists including Trotsky, deserves a special historical significance. In the critical situation, when the monolithic dogmato-revisionism on the part of Hoxa and the pluralism on the part of Russian revisionism and Euro-communism had seriously damaged the world communist movement, the Nepalese communist movement too turned its victim. In this situation, we suffered from both monolithism and pluralism. Both monolithism and pluralism remained dominant in Nepali communist movement. In this complex situation, our party played and has been playing important role against both of these trends to enrich materialist dialectics. The unprecedented development of the great people's war was the result of this. We have certainly tendered new dimensions to the struggles against monolithism and pluralism in the two-line struggle of our party. But it does not mean that the struggle against monolithism and pluralism has ended. These wrong trends will try to sneak into our party in the days to come with various covers. Therefore we must be serious in it.

Dialectical Materialist Monism

Dialectical and historical materialism is the philosophy of monism. It has developed amidst a long historical process of struggle against the systems and philosophical principles that include idealist monism, dualism and pluralism. The fundamental law of materialist dialectics is the law of unity of opposites. It is also called the law of unity and struggle of opposites, law of contradiction and the law of one divides into two. There has been relentless struggle in the world communist movement and also the Nepalese communist movement while studying, understanding and applying the principles and systems of dialectical materialism. The dialectical materialist monism has been persistently developing amid this struggle.

In the course of appraising the whole international communist movement and comrade Stalin, and waging struggle against Khrushchev's modern revisionism, Euro-communism and the dogmato-revisionism on the part of Hoxa, our glorious party, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist, has been enriching further the dialectical materialist monism and its fundamental law, the law of unity of opposites. How to understand monism, dualism, triadism and pluralism in this situation and context? What does the unity and struggle of opposites mean? What is monolithic unity and homogeneity? What is the difference between unity of opposites and monolithic unity? There is a need to undergo deep study and have clarity on these questions. This article attempts to draw attention to it.

Monism, dualism and pluralism are the main principles of philosophy. The principal that regards the primordial element, cause and source of the world to be only one is monism, that regards the same to be two is dualism and many is pluralism. Monism and pluralism are of two types, the idealist and materialist.

Idealist monism regards only one among the absolute idea, consciousness, spirit, pure being, Supreme God or personal experience as the only primordial element of the world. According to this, the view that the world has been created by that very idea, that the material world is the reflection of absolute idea or the shadow and illusion of the Supreme God, that it apotheosizes the entire things by saying that every law, theory, norm and value are the products of that very absolute thinking is the characteristic of idealism. Its epistemology is founded on fideism, priesthood and fatalism. Shankaracharya, Parmenides, Plato, Berkeley, Schelling and other monotheists are the main proponents of idealism.

There are three types of materialism. They are: spontaneous, mechanical and dialectical. The spontaneous materialism is the old materialism of

India, China and Greece. The mechanical materialism is the philosophy of bourgeoisie and it is metaphysical. The improved form of materialism is dialectical materialism. To regard that matter is the only basic element of the universe and the consciousness develops from it is its speciality. Heraclitus, Didero, Feuerbach and Marx are the proponents of materialist monism. The dualism regards that both matter and consciousness are the primary elements. Descartes and Kant and mainly the latest Shankhya philosophy are the representatives of dualism. Pluralism considers that primordial elements are numerous. Charvak philosophy and Greek atomism fall under the stream of materialist pluralism while Leibniz's monadism, Bertrand Russell's logical and William James' empirical pluralism etc. fall under the stream of idealist pluralism. The developed form of materialist monism is the dialectical materialism propounded by Marx. Against the Marxist materialist monism, Duhring and Bogdanov favoured idealist monism, Yang Hsien-chen favoured dualism and the entire revisionists supporting Euro-communism favoured pluralism. Many dualists and pluralists are agnosticist.

The triadist concept of development had taken birth in ancient Greece and Hegel had fully developed it. According to this concept, the development of an entity takes place in three stages. The triadist formula that represents this concept is – thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The negation of negation is based on this very triad formula.

On the triad based on Hegel's idealism i.e. negation of negation, Marx says, "Wherein does the movement of pure reason consist? In posing itself, opposing itself, composing itself; in formulating itself as thesis, antithesis, synthesis; or, yet, in affirming itself, negating itself, and negating its negation" (Poverty of Philosophy, p. 48). It is known to all that Marx had erected Hegel's idealist dialectics based on pure reason on the ground of materialism. Marx's concept on development is based on dialectical materialist monism, not on triadism.

Marx and often Engels have provided in some context the examples of triad or negation of negation. Based on it, some have accused Marx of being a triadist, but it is not true. As Lenin says, "The central logic of Engels, according to objectives of materialists, is correct assessment and presentation of historical processes, and focus on dialectics, and nothing other than focus on dialectics. Examples illustrating the triad are nothing other than remnants of Hegelianism--from which scientific materialism originated--and style of expression." Also in the Nepalese communist movement, there have often been weaknesses in understanding thesis,

antithesis and synthesis and unity-struggle-transformation as triadism, not as the law of unity of opposites, as remnants of Hegelianism or style of expression. We must be cautious on it.

Two mutually opposing systems that interpret the dialectical unity, duality, pluralism and monolithic unity have been struggling. They are dialectics and metaphysics. The real proponent of dialectics is Heraclitus. He used to see motion, change, destruction of the old and the construction of a new in every entity. He said, "Everything is and is not simultaneously." In opposition to this, a metaphysical philosopher who saw everything motionless and static was Parmenides. He said, "It is not possible to be and not to be at a time." Similarly, the Nepalese philosopher Gautama Buddha was dialectical. He believed that everything was momentary, non-eternal, and dynamic. He said, "Everything exists and does not exist too." As opposed to him, monist Vendatis mainly Shankaracharya regarded that everything was static and motionless.

The metaphysics accepts that the opposite categories like identity and difference, necessity and chance, cause and effect, universal and particular, whole and part are in static, rigid and motionless condition. Contrarily, the dialectics considers them in the sense of motion, change and transformation of one into another. The metaphysics considers identity in the sense of absolute identity and difference in the sense of absolute stationary. Absolute identity means homogeneity and absolute stationary means antinomy. It amounts to building a strong wall between the opposites and rejecting the transformation of one into another.

To consider unity is absolute and abstract is to understand it as monolithic unity and it is monolithism. It is also idealist or metaphysical monism. Here the existence of opposites, difference and struggle are completely negated. Similarly, to regard differences and opposites as static, extremely antinomic and impregnable is duality, plurality and it is pluralism. Monolithism and pluralism are two opposite banks of a river; they are two extremes. Monolithism cannot tolerate difference and pluralism cannot tolerate unity.

The characteristics of metaphysics are subjectivism, one-sidedness, abstractness and motionlessness. To negate the material world and to roam in subjective imagination is subjectivism. To see either only negative side or only positive side and fail to see entire aspects of an entity is one-sidedness. To consider every object as a creation of thinking, to see it in a motionless and static condition and to ideologically negate the real content is abstractness. At odds with this, the characteristics of materialist dialectics

are objectivity, multi-sidedness, concreteness, dynamism and totality. The materialist dialectics recognizes the existence of material world; conceives the material world of contradiction and agrees that contradiction emerges in thinking as its reflection in mind. The basic law of materialist dialectics is the law of unity of opposites. It conceives of unity in struggle and vice versa.

Dialectics is of two types: idealist and materialist. To conceive of contradiction in thinking, impose it in the material world and move along thinking to thinking are the characteristics of idealist dialectics. Hegelian dialectics was like this. Contrarily, to see contradiction in the material world, to agree that contradiction in the material world, as its reflection, creates contradiction in thinking, to go from material world to the world of thinking and vice versa are the specificities of materialist dialectics. Marxian materialist dialectics is like this.

Dualism sees opposites in an object, but it regards them as static and motionless. It accepts thesis and antithesis but completely rejects synthesis. Let's see how dualism is, through Kant, "In the war between opponents, the one in the offensive always wins and the other in the defensive always loses. In such wars, the strategy is to tire the opponent rather than inflicting wounds. When both have tired out, they realize that they are fighting for nothing and they separate as friends." (Western Philosophy, Chandradhar Sharma, p. 203). Hence, it is clear; dualism does not agree that there is synthesis between thesis and antithesis. In this sense, it becomes a reconciliatory philosophy. In the same manner, pluralism also does not admit synthesis between two opposites, the thesis and antithesis. This is also a reconciliatory philosophy.

Engels has postulated three laws of dialectics, they are: the law of transformation of quantity and quality to one another, negation of negation and the law of unity of opposites. According to Lenin, the unity of opposites is the crux of dialectics. Mao, criticizing the three parallel laws of dialectics by Engels as triadism, regarded that the unity of opposites was the basic law of dialectics.

Mao is against the metaphysical monism i.e. monolithism that regards the unity of opposites as the monolithic unity. Criticizing the monolithism prevalent in the philosophy of Stalin and Soviet Union and favouring materialist dialectical monism, Mao says, "Those who all the time talk of monolithic unity and do not talk about struggle, is not Marxist-Leninist. Unity is achieved in the midst of struggle, and it can be achieved only in this way. It applies to party along with classes and among the masse. The

unity transforms into struggle and it again leads to unity” (Mao Tse-Tung Unrehearsed p. 108).

Not only this, he had had a strong theoretical attack upon pluralism also. In the beginning of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution, his saying, which follows, on the fundamental law of materialist dialectics based on unity of opposites is worth noting, “Transformation from the quantitative to qualitative change and the negation of negation are both unifications of contradictions. However you argue, they are still struggles of opposites. Dialectics can be made monistic, never pluralistic.” (Selected works of Mao Tse-Tung, Vol 9, p. 406). It may seem to someone that materialist dialectic is not monistic. It is wrong. The materialist dialectics stands against monolithism, but not against materialist monism. It is clear from the aforesaid Mao’s words that materialist dialectics is based on monism and firmly stands against pluralism.

The two quotes from Mao can be summarized as follows:

First, Mao has included the transformation of quantity to quality and negation of negation under the law of unity of opposites. What it means is to accept the law of unity of opposites as the fundamental law of dialectics and oppose triadism, which places other two laws in parallel with it.

Second, Mao has said that unity and struggle of opposites are such things that go on simultaneously. It teaches us to correctly grasp the dialectical unity between opposites and oppose monolithism that does not see struggle or difference in unity, the dualism that does not see unity in duality, difference, diversity or plurality and pluralism and as well triadism that gives a triad picture of thesis-antithesis-synthesis.

The aforesaid quotes from Mao are related to and centred on the law of unity of opposites, the fundamental law of materialist dialectics. Presenting the dialectical concept on the law of unity of opposites, Lenin says, “Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical,—under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another,—why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another.” (Collected works, Vol. 38, 109).

Here, Lenin has specially emphasized on the need to perceive opposites not as static, dead and mutually unchanging but as living, contextual, moving and transforming into one another. Moreover, he has highlighted on the importance of how opposites are united at certain situations and how opposites through gradual transformation get united in another situation.

These views of Lenin are against monolithism, dualism, triadism and pluralism.

By opposites we mean the opposing aspects and categories in physical, mental and social world such as cause and effect, particular and universal, relative and absolute, being and thinking, theory and practice, grief and joy, life and death, truth and false, good and bad, proletariat and bourgeoisie, war and peace, thesis and antithesis etc. These all are, according to Lenin, moving and living, not dead and static. Opposites get united at a certain process of development, and at others transform one into another and get united again.

Mao has said that the whole process of unity of opposites propounded by Lenin is accomplished in two conditions. He says, "All mutually opposing elements are interrelated, and not only that in one specific situation they coexist as one unit but also they transform into one another at another special situation. This is the complete meaning of unity of opposites" (Mao's collected works, Vol. 1, p. 609). According to what Mao meant from this quotation, the opposites are united for their independent existence in the first phase of development. In the next phase of development, the opposites change qualitatively with respect to one another and get united again in a new way. What must not be forgotten here is that unity is relative and struggle is absolute. This holds true for both conditions of unity of opposites.

When looked at in total the aforesaid views of Lenin and Mao on unity of opposites, what is clear is that the monolithism, which does not see struggle or difference in unity, dualism and pluralism, which do not see unity in difference or diversity and the metaphysics of all sorts, which see the opposites as static, dead and unchanging are all one-sided and unscientific. Similarly, the triadism that conceives of thesis-antithesis-synthesis as triad and not as the unity of opposites is also wrong. According to the law of unity of opposites, first the thesis and then antithesis cannot occur separately in the process of development. At one condition, struggling with each other, the opposites like thesis and antithesis get united. At another condition, transforming one into another, they get united in the form of synthesis. According to materialist dialectics, struggle between opposites is the contradiction between thesis and antithesis. This is the first phase of unity of opposites. Materialist dialectics does not stop right here, and it reaches to the second phase of synthesis from the first phase of contradiction between thesis and antithesis. It means: qualitative

leap, rupture in continuity, transformation of opposites into another and new unity in the new basis. This is the real meaning of unity of opposites.

After the death of Mao, our party has contributed to enriching the law of unity of opposites. The political document put forward by our party in the second national conference says, "The evaluation that Mao made is directed against the right revisionist traitors who completely negated the contributions of comrade Stalin and also the dogmato-revisionists who portrayed in a positive way even the blunders that Stalin had made. In the world communist movement, Trotsky, Tito, Khrushchev etc. remain in the first line and Anwar Hoxa of Albania in the second. One thing that should be kept in mind here is that the Euro-communism, in the name of opposing Stalin's monolithic concept and bureaucracy, started criticising the unified dialectical materialist science of Marxism from the bourgeois anarchist pluralist angle" (Great Leap Forward: Inevitable Need of History, p. 9-10).

The grasp, application and development of dialectical materialist monism, is based on the objective of correctly understanding the problems of class and the two-line struggle and properly resolving them. After the death of Mao, our party has strongly opposed the dogmatic and pluralist revisionism basing on the goal of correctly understanding the new problems related with class and two-line struggle, by taking lessons from the past weaknesses and organizing and carrying out revolution in a new way. In this context, our party has enriched and developed the law of unity of opposites amid the struggle against monolithism and pluralism.

According to idealist monistic world outlook, the universe is the creation of Supreme God. This universe has been created according to divine wish. The omnipresent and an undivided divine existence is the absolute truth. On world, this kind of view is found in monist *Vedanta*, Christian and Islamic monotheism etc. It is a fatalistic outlook of feudal medieval era. Strongly criticising this view, mechanical materialism portrayed a mechanistic picture of the world and realised that the world was material one but failed to see it in motion. And the mechanical materialism ended up embracing God as an almighty that drives the world. The bourgeois philosophies, the dualism and pluralism too, perceived the world in a mechanical and un-interrelated way by mixing both idealism and materialism together. Pluralism viewed the world as a multi-verse, not as a universe. Qualitatively different than all these world outlooks, the dialectical materialism, the philosophy of the proletariat, has proposed the world picture in a radically new way.

Dialectical materialist monism considers that only a matter with motion is the primary cause and source of the world. According to Engels, the universe is a unified system and its real unity is in its materiality. The material unity of the world is proved by the study of matter. On the matter with motion, Engels says, "Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be. Motion in cosmic space, mechanical motion of smaller masses on the various celestial bodies, the vibration of molecules as heat or as electrical or magnetic currents, chemical disintegration and combination, organic life -- at each given moment each individual atom of matter in the world is in one or other of these forms of motion, or in several forms at once. All rest, all equilibrium, is only relative, only has meaning in relation to one or other definite form of motion....Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreateable and indestructible as matter itself" (Anti Duhring p. 100). The material unity of the world is justified by the fact that the matter and its mode of existence are both un-creatable and indestructible, both of them are the ultimate causes in themselves, the different forms of motion in nature transform one into another and both are identical and universal.

This concept is based on the law of conservation and transformation of energy. This law stands strongly against the mechanical-collection of independent particles of Newton's matter, the first divine impulse that set the universe into motion, the Descartes' machine, mechanical determinism of Laplace and plays a crucial role in portraying a picture of the world in motion. Lenin had said, "The universal principle of development must be combined, linked, made to correspond with the universal principle of the unity of the world, nature, motion, matter, etc. Motion is the unity of continuity (of time and space) and discontinuity (of time and space). Motion is a contradiction, a unity of contradictions" (Vol. 28, p. 254-256). This quote from Lenin presents the outline of material unity of the world on the basis of universality and unity of matter in motion, situated in space and time and science has confirmed it well. Mao's concept of particularity and universality of contradiction is also based on it.

Repudiating the concept of indivisibility of atom, the dialectical picture of the world, its existence and the process of development appeared further lively amidst the process of development and investigation of relativity and quantum theory that had developed in the process of further division of gravitation and electricity, magnetic field, electron, proton and neutron. By interpreting quantum in a wrong manner, there had also been a number of

efforts to separate the light particles from their waves, practice pluralism and agnosticism and negate causality and necessity. However, finally the success achieved in relativity and in the process of investigating and developing further the unified quantum theory the correctness of the dialectical materialist world outlook, which portrays the picture of development of the world, has been justified further.

Marx had said, "Thinking and being are thus certainly distinct, but at the same time they are in unity with each other (Manuscripts on Economics and Philosophy, 1844, Hindi, p. 129). This is dialectical materialist concept of Marx on the question of thinking and being. This statement stands for the dialectical unity between thinking and being, against the abstract unity and homogeneity and, the static difference and strong antinomy.

The question of unity of thinking and being is a fundamental question of epistemology. It is related to the theory of reflection of knowledge. It is the question of whether or not the physical world can reflect in human mind and whether or not the material world is knowable for the human being. Furthermore, it is also a question of whether there is unity between laws of physical world and mental world, between theory and practice and between saying and doing.

The terminology 'being' mentioned in the unity of thinking and being is a common term for different kinds of philosophers. Idealists conceive of being as a spirit, thinking, experience or God and on the contrary, materialists view being in the form of a matter and the material world. Therefore, the unity of thinking and being has become absolute unity for the idealist monists. They say, "Being is thinking and thinking is being." For them, unity of thinking and being is the unity of thinking and thinking, and unity of spirit and Supreme God, it is an abstract unity. It is not the knowledge of material world but it is spiritual knowledge only. Duhring had said, "To unite the elements of thinking into a monad is the crux of thought." Engels saw an impossible imagination of Hegelian illusionary consciousness in this statement. Bogdanov said, "Thinking and being, social consciousness and social being are identical." Lenin strongly attacked this view, calling it idealist monism.

Similarly, vulgar materialism also views unity of thinking and being or that of consciousness and matter in the sense of homogeneity. According to it, thinking is an image of a matter. This is also monolithism. Contrary to it, according to Marxist concept the sense of unity between thinking and being is to have harmony between thinking and being, and thinking to be in accordance to being, not the homogeneity between them. According to

Engels, unity of thinking and being, unity between concept and reality are two close but parallel lines which travel alongside but they never meet. Engels said, "When reason and carbonic world become identical to each other, that day development will end" (Marx-Engels collected correspondences 1844-1895, p. 358). In this sense, what should be understood here is that the unity between thinking and being is a dialectical unity, not some absolute, uniform, or abstract unity.

Similarly, for dualism, thinking and being or consciousness and nature are parallel primal elements, and there is so much difference between them that they cannot influence each other. It means that the opposites: matter and consciousness cannot unite, the physical world cannot reflect in the mental world and the world cannot be understood in laws and so can never be changed. Yang Shien-chen said, "There cannot be unity between thinking and being." This view in fact was Kant's agnosticism and dualism; it was Bernstein's dualism and revisionism. In the realm of epistemology, it was based on revisionism, was against Mao's concept of matter to consciousness and consciousness to matter and the revolutionary theory of active reflection.

According to materialist dialectics, there is dialectical unity between being and thinking, and between theory and practice. The real world is dialectical, contradictory and it reflects in human consciousness with full of contradictions. The dialectics of the real world becomes that of mental dialectics. There is unity between the laws of thinking and being. There is unity between world and consciousness and there is unity between the laws of world and laws of consciousness. The world is the comprehensive whole of the matter in motion and it reflects in thinking. Its essence is: active reflection of the world into consciousness and revolutionary transformation of the world by consciousness.

This is a brief study of dialectical materialist monism. What is clear from this is that materialist dialectical monism is against monolithism, dualism, triadism and pluralism. This study should be accepted not as a display of intellectual exercise but should be seriously grasped in the sense of providing solution to the problems of revolution.

National and Cultural Problems and their Solution

In the process of studying the entire problems of internal and external oppression, the cultural and national problems also should be studied. In order to seek solution to the problems based on cultural and national

diversity, first it is necessary to discuss briefly the forms and states of such problems.

Although a small country, Nepal has been inhabited by people of different races. Nepal is a confluence of mainly Aryans and Mongolian races along with Australoid and Dravidian ones. In the long historical process, there has been miscegenation between these diverse communities.

There are more than three dozen of nations or nationalities in Nepal. They are also called indigenous nationalities. Magar, Gurung, Tamang, Rai, Limbu, Tharu, etc., come under indigenous nationalities of this kind. Newars also come under the national community, and among indigenous nationalities the Newars are the most advanced. Moreover, in Newars there is a mixture of many sub-nationalities. All these national communities have their own language, culture and religion. All of the nationalities have been oppressed by high caste chauvinism of hilly Khas. Hence, the form of oppression against the indigenous nationalities is mainly national oppression, which is often linked with lingual oppression too.

Along with this, there is also regional oppression in Nepal. Along with *Madhesi* people the people from *Seti-Mahakali* region have been suffering from this kind of oppression. This kind of oppression has some features of national oppression too. The oppression against *Madhesi* community is also based on language. This oppression is perpetrated by hilly high caste chauvinism.

There are not only national and regional communities in Nepal, but also other communities, which are based on caste. Nepalese caste system is based on Hindu religious *Varnashrama* system. According to this, there are mainly four castes in Nepal, namely Brahmin, Chhetri, Vaishya and Shudra. Brahmins are the highest caste. Studying and preaching; interpretation, analysis and instruction of the norms and values of Hindu religion and priesthood are Brahmins' main occupations. Chhetris' occupation is to run the state power. Vaishya's occupations are agriculture and trade. Shudra is considered to be the lowest caste and it is divided into numerous sub-castes such as Kami, Damai, Sarki, Badi, etc. Kamis are also known as Vishokarma. Kami, Tamota and Sunar fall under Vishokarma, who make various tools and ornaments. Damais do tailoring and play musical instruments on various occasions, including at weddings. Sarkis make their living by sewing shoes. Gaines maintain their livelihood by playing *Sarangi* around villages and entertaining people with songs. Badis make their living by performing various dances. This type of caste system is the result of Hindu religion and feudal system. People under the Shudra

caste have been victims of untouchability, which is a grave social blemish in the Hindu society. The Shudras are often known as Dalit too. Caste system is prevalent in South Asia, including in Nepal and India, but there is no such system in other countries of the world. The oppression upon Shudras is feudal Brahminist oppression. Generally, this oppression is expressed in cultural form. But, in essence, the Dalit community has transformed into the rural proletariat and this oppression is based on class. This is becoming apparent not only in cultural field but also in economic, political and social realms.

There are different religions prevailing in Nepal. They are: Buddhist, Jain, Hindu, Islam, Bon etc. Buddhism is Nepal's own product. Buddhism had developed under the name of a Nepali philosopher Siddhartha Gautama. This religion has spread to India, Sri Lanka, China, Japan, and others, and it is also a world religion. Jain religion has a lesser influence in Nepal. Hindu religion is the product of India. Its origin is related to Vedic period and Brahmin religion. The texts including Manusmriti are its foundations. There are also various sects in Hindu religion. They are: Vaishnav, Shaiva, Shakta etc. Islam is the religion of Muslims and it came to Nepal from Arabian countries via India. Bon is also called natural religion, and it is also Nepal's ancient religion. It is based on shamanist tradition. It has been famous in Khas community as well as various indigenous nationalities from ancient times. In the later period, Christian and Sheikh religions too have entered into Nepal. There has been oppression by Hindu religion upon other religions. The nature of religious oppression has been expressed by the declaration of Hindu religion as the official religion of the state of Nepal and its hegemony over other religions. The Muslim community has been the most sufferer of oppression by Hindu religion.

Women community also have been oppressed for a long time by patriarchal oppression in Nepal. Oppression upon women community is harsher among Brahmin and Chhetri, the followers of Hindu religion. Women in the indigenous nationalities seem to be less oppressed. The form of oppression against women is feudal patriarchal oppression.

Class oppression is the major form of oppression in Nepal. Various oppressed communities including workers and peasants have been oppressed by the comprador and bureaucratic bourgeoisie and feudal class and the foreign reactionaries as well. This oppression is related to the defence of national independence, establishment of democracy and

realisation of the basic problems of people's livelihood. The form of aforementioned oppression is ultimately class oppression.

Diversities based on nationality, caste, religion and gender and class can also be presented in the form of diversity based on speciality and identity. Only by understanding correctly the particular nature of the speciality and identity of all concerned can the correct solution of the related problem be sought out.

There have been three different viewpoints that conceive the cultural and national diversity in Nepal. They are monolithism, pluralism and dialectical materialism. The monolithism is based on idealist monism. The monolithism has been supporting feudalism in Nepal. King Prithvi Narayan Shah in his *Divya Upadesh* had said, "Nepal is a garden of four *Jats* and thirty-six *Varnas*." In other words, Nepal is a country which is divided into four big Varnas like Brahmin, Chhetri, Vaishya, and Shudra along with their sub-divisions in various castes. This statement by Prithvi Narayan Shah seems poetic. He unified different parts of Nepal; this is a positive aspect. However, he exercised feudal monopoly upon various subjected tribes and nationalities. Almost from that time onward, Nepalese state power became unitary and these various tribes and nationalities became victims of feudal oppression. The current debate of federalism based on national identity is related to freedom from such oppression.

There are some specialities of pluralist thinking in the history of Nepal. The *Anekantabad* of Jain philosophy is regarded as a form of pluralism and there is some influence of Jainism in Nepal. But, in the modern sense, the entrance of pluralism in Nepal is an entirely new phenomenon. In the present era, pluralism has become a bourgeois world outlook and it has been supporting bourgeois state power. Today, some political parties, including Nepali Congress and UML advocate pluralism. However, their pluralism does not base on federalism with national identity and opposition to feudal unitarism and monolithism.

Dialectical materialism is the world outlook of the communist parties. With the establishment of the Communist Party, it entered into Nepal. When the dialectical materialism is used to study history then the historical materialism comes into being. In this way, dialectical and historical materialism becomes a world outlook. The dialectical and historical materialism is a monist world outlook. It stands against monolithism i.e. idealistic monism and pluralism both. The dialectical and historical materialism advocates people's democracy, socialism and communism.

For a long time now, oppressed classes, women, Dalits, indigenous nationalities, Madheshis, Muslims and people of the backward regions including workers and peasants have been struggling for their rights and liberation in Nepal. There have been mass struggles, peasant struggles, armed struggles etc. and the decade-long great People's War led by CPN (Maoist) has been the last link of all these struggles in Nepal. In the period followed by the initiation of peace process, the process of writing constitution through the Constituent Assembly is on. There have been serious debates on what type of new constitution should be written. However, the Constituent Assembly has now been dissolved and the process of writing constitution has not been completed.

In order to resolve the chronic problems mentioned above, our party, the CPN-Maoist, has taken decisions to write a constitution based on the People's Federal Republic. Besides, it has resolved in this course to solve the problems faced by indigenous nationalities, Madhesis and the communities from the backward regions.

Thus, federalism based on identity, theoretical acceptance of the right of the nations to self-determination, national autonomy, proportional inclusive representation in all the apparatus of the state and prerogatives are necessary to solve the problems, the indigenous nationalities, Madheshis and the people from backward regions have been confronting. Similarly, all of the languages spoken as mother tongue in Nepal should be accepted as national language and multilingual policy should be exercised by bringing to an end the domination of one language upon others.

The problems of women, Dalit and Muslim communities can be solved by the provision of privileges. Privilege is a system of compensation but not reservation. In order to make democracy a genuine democracy, proportional representation of working class and different strata of oppressed communities in all apparatus of the state is a must. For this, corresponding electoral system should be constituted.

The problem of religious oppression can be solved by constituting a secular state. Nepal has been declared a secular state at present. It must be institutionalized. Oppression against the religious minorities including Muslims will end through such provisions.

In total, in order to solve these problems, it is, on the one hand, necessary to oppose monolithism i.e. idealist monism and pluralism and on the other firmly follow and apply dialectical and historical materialist monism.

An astonishing feature in Nepal is that those who advocate pluralism oppose identity-based federalism, right of the nations to self-determination, national autonomy, prerogatives, proportional inclusive representation and special rights etc. In this sense, there is, not difference or opposition, but agreement and uniformity between pluralists and idealistic monists of Nepal. Along with this, pluralism is looked at in analogy with multiparty competition here. But this is wrong. We accept competitive multiparty system among friendly forces while pluralism is unacceptable to us.

At present, we are in the stage of new democratic revolution. In order to solve the problem of peasantry, necessary attention should be paid to enact revolutionary land-reform by bringing feudal land ownership to an end, liberating peasantry from the landlord system and implementing the slogan of land to the tiller in practice. Likewise, in order to solve the problems of workers and the landless people, food sovereignty, residence, education, health and employment should be acknowledged as the fundamental right and the state must take its responsibility. In total, only by defending national independence, establishing people's democracy and resolving the basic problems of people's livelihood can the new democratic revolution be accomplished in Nepal. Only through this will the problems based on cultural and national diversity and class oppression be solved.

Here, what should be made clear is that the theoretical acceptance of right of the nations to self-determination does not mean, in any way, disintegration or collapse of the nation. We have been for nation's sovereignty, territorial and regional integrity and national independence. And we are against imperialism and expansionism.

The question of unitarism and federalism is based upon particularity and relativity of every country. This does not mean that communists in every country support federalism and oppose unitarism. It is clear that Federalism in Soviet Russia and unitarism in People's Republic of China had been agreed with in their context. Communists by bringing to an end of all sorts of discrimination and oppression and ultimately the state power aspire to establish humanity in the world. Communism is a new humanism.

Conclusion

An elaborate discussion has been made here on monolithism, pluralism and dialectical materialism. The ideology of every class and community is linked with world outlook. Therefore, this kind of study will certainly help to understand the subject matter deeply.

Also, discussing the problems related with cultural and national diversities on the basis of dialectical and historical materialist world outlook, it is attempted here to present their solutions. Obviously the solution is the attainment of national independence, establishment of people's democracy and resolution of people's problem of livelihood. In the present context, this is the only correct and scientific solution.

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REDISCOVERING MARX THE MAN AND HIS MISSION BEHIND THE MYTHS OF REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE¹

Anand Aditya

Abstract

'Rediscovering Marx' probes into the life story of Karl Marx, whose theories for more than a century and half have prompted human minds and actions to start revolution in almost all regions of the world in the pursuit of social transformation and social justice. If one objective here is to unveil the persona that Marx was and the growth of Marx as a thinker, another is to identify the course that the Russian Revolution took in the deviation that it suffered in the course of the Soviet interpretation and the change that Marxism underwent after Lenin and Stalin entered the scene. Since the toll that political violence took in that course setting a critical precedent for a number of revolutionary movements in many parts of the world was an enormous one, the paper dwells especially on this part of the analysis to highlight the various dimensions of revolutionary violence and the controversies that remain to be explained. The last part of the paper focuses on certain myths that still linger in comprehending Marxism and could be of help in explaining why a number of the early anticipations made by Marxists failed to materialize in the rapidly changing context of the global scenario. This analysis brings up Marx as a radical humanist whose mission was to change the world to usher in social justice through the upliftment of the toiling masses.

My son is 22 years old. If he had not become a Communist at 22, I would have disowned him. If he is *still* a Communist at 30, I will do it then.

George Clemenceau (1841-1929), French Prime Minister, upon being told that his son had joined the Communist Party

In much of the world today, Karl Marx epitomizes the love story of Deolinda, a girl from Mozambique. One day, as she returns home sporting the badge of the philosopher on her bosom, she faces the scowl of her father. Not knowing the figure had died nearly a century before and taking him to be a foreigner his daughter has met recently, he chides her, "Never again do I want to see this fellow's snout sniffing your bra." The daughter meekly removes the badge but does not forget every night to retrieve it from a box under her bed, before closing her eyes, to "kiss the thinker's fleecy beard."²

Mia Couto, the author of the story, sees Mozambiquan Marxism as a variant of cargo cult.

For many, indeed, Marxism has become a cargo cult – for those who use it to acquire power and retain it, those who misinterpret it for one or another reason, and those for whom it is a panacea for various political ills. Regarded as much the child of his time as the ‘father of communism,’³ Marx developed a theory interpreting history and the events of his time in his own ways, which became Marxism-Leninism with the emergence of the Soviet Union, prompting one author to claim that Leninism is the Marxism of the 20th century and that “without Leninism, there can ... be no Marxism as a living guide to understanding the laws of life and for revolutionary actions.”⁴ The Marxist political system ones ruled more than a third of the world’s population across four continents and in one sense, 19th century could well be called Marx’s century, which is what students of the Agricultural Academy of Berlin wrote to Engels on March 18, 1983, four days after his death. Marxism got reincarnated as Marxism-Leninism-Maoism in Asia, and as if the ideology still needed more names, for *Sendero Luminoso* in another hemisphere, it became Marxism-Leninism-Maoism-Gonzalo Thought and after 2002 ‘Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the Thought of Three Represents’ in China.

Idolized as much as hated, maligned as well as misinterpreted, Marxism has riveted the world’s attention like no other ideology has. Ranking globally as best-sellers, a number of Marx’s works are still avidly read, discussed, and applied because many of his ideas proved powerful enough to breed revolutions convincing the minds of whole generations, particularly the young. Who does not remember what a Swedish King told his minister? In the Deolinda story, one could see the girl as a metaphor for the youth and her father as the arch-feudal ruling regime. The dream that Marx left ultimately became a millenary dream turning into a global tidal wave sweeping away empires and scores of regimes installing new ones in their place, but also leaving a toll of violence of epic proportions.

Who was Marx and what did he intend? Thirteen decades after his demise with his second centennial just six years away, the time seems appropriate to take a look back at the person Marx was and the persona he became in the political memory of the world community. Such a lookback becomes appropriate particularly in view of Dominick La Capra’s contention that “We have systematically misread all of Marx,” a point John Evan Seery’s probe into the crypto-ironist in Marx tends to vindicate.⁵

One could, of course, visualize Marx in more than one way – as a political visionary, as a philosopher, as a strategist, as a polyglot, as a critic, as a prodigious columnist who could produce 500 articles in one single decade, and as an economist par excellence. But he is best remembered as a

revolutionary thinker, who wanted to change the world. It is this multi-dimensional character of the man that makes appraisal immensely difficult, not least since a substantial part of his works saw the light of the day long after Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung added to and reinterpreted what he had written.⁶ One wonders how Marx would have taken all this.

Economistic Marxism also ran into trouble as the 60s arrived. Even as Herbert Marcuse, the key philosopher of the 1968 student revolt, challenged hierarchy and consumerism, rejecting the planning and rationality of modernist Marxist revolutionarism as well as Soviet Communism and Capitalism in the same breath as totalitarianistic, many others joined the chorus of the 'New Left' who regarded economic equality as inadequate and believed in transformation of the existing mode of authority relations, cultural revolution, and hierarchy in all forms. But it was Gregory Calvert, president of the New Left Students for a Democratic Society, who put it most clearly when he said, "Revolutionary Movements are freedom struggles born out of the perception of the contradiction between human potentiality and oppressive actuality," [rather than for acquisition of the material goods].⁷

Still, in Germany, the home of Marx, Marxism can be seen to have made its deepest inroads over the past one and half a century. Polls tell us that at least 30% of the secondary and university students supported communist ideologies; and in 1971, no less than one fourth of the youth in West Germany under thirty sympathized with the Red Army faction, about one-seventh of whom were found even willing to help in an active way.⁸

The hibernation of Marxism post-Soviet collapse and China's about-turn have prompted some to read too much in the collapse prophesying the end of ideological clash, even the end of history, but the resurgence of Marxists in power in Latin America (Bolivia, Nicaragua, Venezuela) suggests the ideology endures.⁹ By late 2008, *The Capital* was reported to have become a best-seller, and even in Australia, the communists who had deregistered in 1990 were said to be registering again.¹⁰

Marx thus did change the world in deliberate and inadvertent ways, and is still effecting change in ways substantial or surficial, and subtle and subliminal, but in many ways, it was probably a change he may not have intended, or he least thought advisable, and with approaches that probably would have been hardly acceptable to him. Much of the appraisal of Marx in that sense becomes related to the changes that state revolutions have brought in their wake and the impact they have left. Some of them may still be underway. Critics may in that course deem him responsible – through both the theory that he produced and the revolution he preached – directly or indirectly, responsible for all that happened in the name of Marxian Revolutionary Violence, even for what did not or could not happen. All of that, however, is not the burden this exercise takes up, nor does it wish to

bite more than it can probably chew. The purpose here is a far more simple one: a political profile of Marx's personal growth, the role his ideas played in the Soviet revolution, and the problems behind some of his key promises underlying their praxis. The Soviet case is taken here because it was the first historic implementation of his ideas to foster revolution and use power to bring social change through a political party and the state. The next objective is to explain some of the myths that surround the four basic concepts in the Marxist ideology – State, Power, Class, and Proletariat.

Rationale and Scope

My reasons for choosing the theme at this point are as much theoretical as practical. Theoretically, like many others, I feel less convinced by some of the propositions globally proclaimed, elaborated, and discussed about Marxism. The *class* and *power* myths constitute just two of these propositions. There is, moreover, a whole set of assumptions that are being more and more questioned apart from the failure of quite a few predictions that Marx and the Russian communists made a number of which are by now familiar to any serious student of communism. No less significant is the background that Marxism has offered to stage a decade-long so-called People's War in Nepal, which has claimed a considerable toll of human lives. Such a toll apart, another question is related to the overall efficacy of the whole violent effort, even its efficiency, in effecting a genuine transformation of Nepali society.

The world's political and economic literature is now familiar with terms that Marx developed, and popularized in his works – dialectical materialism, contradiction, class struggle, relations of production, superstructure, social consciousness, and property relations – which now are a part of the global political lexicon and without which political analysis may now look incomplete.¹¹

Indeed, with widely celebrated intellectuals such as Pablo Neruda, Jean Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, Harold Laski, Andre Gide, Beatrice Webb, and George Bernard Shaw turning supportive or sympathetic to what was happening in the Soviet Land, it is not difficult to understand why the Russian Revolution became popular. While thus it is difficult to imagine a world today without Marx and Marxism, what is equally true is the stark and steady erosion of the ideology after the mid-fifties and onward.

What could explain this trend?

In trying to probe the decline, this paper makes a preliminary effort to look into the personal growth of Marx as a student and scholar, then it proceeds to assess the time and context when Marx was born, struggled,

and developed his theory to announce his eschatological pronouncement on the impending death of the Bourgeoisie, Capitalism, Private Property, Class, Politics, and, hence, also the State, and then takes up the unfolding of political violence in Revolutionary Russia, concluding with certain myths and misconceptions that still linger around the application of his ideas. The purpose here is not so much to explain Marxism as to present a quarry of problems that beset the praxis of his theory in concrete global, national, and local situations.

But since a fuller investigation of the concept of revolution would necessitate a much larger study,¹² this exercise limits itself to only some of the key events of the Russian Revolution and the sequence of their flow, in analysing the theoretical plausibility of Marxist approach to revolutionary transformation in a post-Marxist world order and the myths lingering around that ideology.

Youth and Education

Parented by an able, widely respected lawyer father, who was not only well read in the leading French thinkers of the 18th century and was known for his liberal political views and free-thinking on religion as also free from orthodox dogma, one who, moreover, had adopted the Lutheran faith renouncing Judaism, probably to escape the restrictions Jews were then being subjected to in Germany, young Marx grew to respect his father so much that he is said to have never parted with his father's photograph. The Elder Marx pinned great hopes in his son, grooming him for a career almost prophetically 'for the good of mankind,' words he once wrote in a letter to his son.¹³ Trier, the town where Marx was born and lived till age 17, was not untouched by the social movements then sweeping the whole of Germany and the stark disparity of the life of misery lived by the urban poor could have hardly escaped young Marx's notice, compared to the prosperous townsfolk, certainly not the socialist theories circulating around, or even the pamphlets issued by Ludwig Gall, one of the first German socialists. Marx was still in his teens then.

Marx, as a youth, must have noticed, too, that both his father, Heinrich Marx, and his gymnasium teacher Johann Wyttenbach (headmaster) remained under police surveillance, the former for his views on political representation (he was a member of an illegal republican club), the latter for his liberal beliefs in progress and enlightenment and his dedication to teaching the young these values.

Johan Steininger, an adherent of materialism, was another teacher – of physics and mathematics – who was under the regime's radar because they had doubts about his "patriotics [sic] frame of mind."¹⁴

While this explains why Marx, upon graduation (in 1836), refused to say a goodbye to the deputy-headmaster, Vitus Loers, who in his eyes was not only reactionary, but was specially assigned to supervise the political activities of students, his school-leaving essay 'Reflections of a Young Man on the Choice of a Profession' says more. A signal of the stand teenager Marx would take later in his life on the deterministic influence of social-material relations on human life that he believed began to be established before one is in a position to determine them, making such a choice difficult, that essay embodies young Marx's budding zeal to serve men, avoid egotism, and find happiness for millions.¹⁵

Under such circumstances, the youth was bound to grow as a radical. Indeed, a child raised on the diet of Voltaire, Locke, and Diderot could hardly have grown otherwise.¹⁶

In this context, a comparison of young Marx with young Lenin may be in order. While the two bore some similarity in their background – both enjoyed good relations with their father and both were good pupils – the latter's guiding principles of upbringing, as the Headmaster reported at the end of his schooling, were religion and rational discipline. Could the headmaster, Fedor Kerensky, have ever anticipated that his own pupil on whom he had reposed so much of faith, would decades later overthrow his son and the liberal provisional government?¹⁷

Marx hated moralistic preaching and gave tuppence for popularity, but was generous to a fault. He stood explicitly against social planning; thus it was ironic that in the bid for revolutionary transformation of Russia the Soviet state heralded a phase of Five Year Plans that Marx could hardly have imagined. In analysing similar discrepancies that later arose, a distinction must, therefore, be made between the infallible icon of Marxism that Marxists the world over have made of Marx so far and the historical Marx. It was certainly Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels who formulated the basic ideas and theories of what they themselves designated as 'Scientific Socialism,' which later took on the name 'Marxism'. But in the last hundred and fifty years, diverse schools of Marxist thought have sprung up, interpreting and explaining Marxism in their own ways. Second, there is little unity on the weight to be given to the economic factors in their deterministic role on social and political change. Third, alternative explanations have also been forwarded to explain such change. Fourth,

neither Marx nor Engels produced a blueprint in detail on how a post-revolutionary society would be or could be organized. In fact, considering Marx's well-known reservation against social engineering and planning, it is hard to be sure he would have taken up such a task. Fifth, Marxist political parties have produced and used a wide range of different strategies, choosing from which will not be easy. Sixth, the revolutionary regimes that have followed after Marx's demise have experimented in widely and wildly different ways that again make it extremely difficult to agree on. Then there also lingers the global debate between socialism in one country versus worldwide movement, a debate that culminated in the rift between Stalin and Trotsky. All this renders, as mentioned already, an adequate appraisal quite difficult.

The Time and the Context

Any meaningful appraisal of the role of Marx and Marxism can certainly not ignore the time the man was born in and the relevance of his writings and his struggle to the situation that was then unfolding all over Europe and elsewhere. In one sense, the life-span of Marx almost coincides with the most dramatic six decades of the 19th century from 1818, the year of his birth to 1883, the year of his demise; it is a political odyssey of sorts. The 65 years in between can by no means be regarded as a long span of life, which is less than two-thirds of a century. A number of historical personalities have certainly lived a longer life, but only few can compare with him in the stature acquired by Marx, both while he lived, and particularly after he died,¹⁸ in the impact he has left on human minds. Paul Johnson, for instance, says, "Karl Marx has had more impact on actual events, as well as the minds of men and women, than any other intellectual in modern times."¹⁹ Exiled for a gesture which would certainly have been ignored today, from Germany, his land of birth, France, as well as Belgium, he was to pass more than half of his life in London where he would embark upon the *magnum opus* of his life – *The Capital*. Would Marx have chosen England as his second home, had he foreseen the long political odyssey he was about to embark upon? Today it is hard to imagine Marx sans his domicile in Britain, and one is left wondering what would have happened if the government of Britain had also followed the decisions of sister regimes in the continent to declare him a *persona non grata*. Would the world's political literature miss his magnum opus? Would he have found an alternative place of asylum to complete his studies on industrial revolution

whose first home was England, which somehow became a haven for many other political exiles such as Peter Kropotkin? The most likely answer is no.

In explaining the influences on Marx it is now usual to recall German philosophy, French revolution, and British economy, but in connecting Marx to the social and political context of the times, at least four points must be remembered. The first one is the miserable condition under which workers worked in the factories, in Britain as well as in the countries in Europe. Since the Americas were half a world away and the economic and political situation there was in more than one way different from the environment in Europe, naturally, it was the proximity of the kaleidoscopic turn of political events around that kept Marx's mind engaged. The political ethos in Europe, moreover, was one where he grew in, and struggled and it was the phenomena there he had closely witnessed in many of which he was often a direct participant.

The second element, with a critical bearing upon Marx is somehow more personal – the resistance of the three ruling regimes which found in him an unacceptable persona, a gadfly who as early as 1848 – in his prime of youth – had thrown the gauntlet to declare revolution, in theory as well as action. A pamphlet that he wrote together with his friend and co-atheist Bruno Bauer led to his being informed by the government that he would never be permitted to teach at any German University. In the 1830s and 1840s, "democracy," says Terrell Carver, "was by definition a revolutionary movement, and perforce, advocating it under authoritarian regimes was illegal or at least quite risky," adding "all his life he was against Blanquism, the strategy of the coup masterminded by the small band of conspirators," and that he "was neither the theorist nor the practitioner of the party, and his hands were never very dirty." Carver also regards Marx's methods as an activist as more democratic than average.²⁰

The third one, of course, was the authoritarian nature of most of the rulers – Prussian, German, Russian, French, and Belgian, to name just the most prominent among many others – to whom democracy and constitutional government were anathema and who stood against liberalization of the autocratic nature of their mode of governance in any form. In this regard, one could hypothetically venture a proposition: *The more repressive the regime, the more radical the protests likely to emerge.* Indeed, the events transpiring during the 19th and the 20th centuries strongly vindicate this point, and the radicalization that Marxism assumed in the diverse regimes of Europe more or less supports it.

The fourth, but not necessarily the final, element that shaped the Marxist course of political thought was the response of the middle class, the Bourgeoisie of his time, who, whenever the context arose, tended to side with the rulers of the day – as an opportunist class – and did not bat their eyelid when rebellion was crushed brutally leading to frequent massacres and mayhems. The carnage that followed the Paris Commune uprising took a toll of the lives of 20,000 workers. There were many others. This also explains Lenin's visceral hate for the Russian bourgeoisie. His views were poisoned in early life by the inability of his mother in the course of her visiting her condemned son in gaol to find a company. In fact, the bourgeoisie in those days maintained a craven attitude toward the aristocracy and the tsarist state, reflected in the impression recorded in the first Russian Social Democratic Party program: "The further east in Europe one proceeds, the weaker, more cowardly, and baser in the political sense becomes the bourgeoisie and the greater are the cultural and political tasks that devolve on the proletariat."²¹

Essentially, it is these elements that got factored into the attitudes and perception that Karl Marx developed and which surface clearly in any diagnosis that he makes of the political events of his time – about Society, Bourgeoisie, Civil Society, State, Workers (Proletariat), Class, Labor, Capital, even Revolution. Not every epigram that litters his exhortation was necessarily his own creation,²² but with his eye for the short pithy sentence, says Paul Johnson, he produced powerful aphorisms to highlight some of his statements. It was, in fact, the poet, journalist, and the moralist combined with his enormous will that made Marx a formidable writer. In understanding his critique of a number of the key concepts that kept him engaged throughout his life, it is thus important to keep in mind the role these four factors played in conditioning his analysis.

Possible Sources of Deviation

While one can imagine many other ways in which an ideology may undergo change, three typical situations come to mind that can set in such a transformation:

1. Interpretation
2. Accretion
3. Application

One major problem with the evolution of Marxism lay in the fact that a substantive part of Marx's works saw the light of the day decades after he died.²³ But the Russian Revolution had already started and Lenin's arrival

on the scene and later, Stalin's emergence, played no small role in altering the course that Marxism was taking. In this context Erich Fromm makes a point of direct relevance here:

... it seems that politicians and newspapermen have never as much as glanced at a line written by Marx, and that the social scientists are satisfied with a minimal knowledge of Marx.²⁴

Considering the claim that "Communism as such has little appeal for the poor, the oppressed, or the exploited," and that it is rather "to the educated, and particularly to the students-intellectual," and considering also that "a great majority of the leading communist personalities were recruited as students,"²⁵ the significance of interpretation of an ideology is difficult to overstress. Since the two other ways – accretion and application – are left for only a few to do, it is through interpretation that includes mass communication and dissemination along with it that the largest part of the socialist-communist constituency has grown. Did Lenin interpret Marxism the way Marx intended? Did Stalin, and after that Mao Tse-tung and others of that line follow the way Marx had originally desired?²⁶ These are the two questions that still agitate countless minds, but for which there are no clear answers.

Next to interpretation, the role of accretion is of no little significance, evident from the names that have been appended to Marx – Lenin, Mao, even Gonzalos. But the most dangerous deviation appears in the application of Marxism when a state and its key actors adopt the ideology to utilize it to achieve certain ends they set when they come to power, or before they attain power. The revolution in the Russian empire after 1917 and the events that followed there during the Soviet era (1917-1991) offer a classic specimen of the utilization of Marxist ideology. Chart 1 allows one to see the debate that it triggered on the use and forms of political violence. Time and space do not allow details on the intensity, magnitude, and geographical extent of political violence, but it is clear that even if some of the claims are exaggerations or blackwash, what stupefies the observer is the sheer intensity, form, and magnitude that political violence assumed when it became a tool of vendetta in the hands of a political party in power.

Apotheosis and Vilification

Compared to Marx, very few world figures in history probably have become as much an object of praise or a butt of criticism and hate in their own lifetime and later. As youth, Marx was compared with the Greek figure

Prometheus.²⁷ Mayakovsky wrote a paean appreciating his discoveries, but long before that Karl Friedrich Köppen had dedicated his book to Marx, in 1940 when Marx was just 22 years old. Many among the young Hegelians saw in him their idol, like Moses Hess did, as the greatest living philosopher.²⁸ Then there was also Hermann Lopatin, an admirer, who came to see him in London in 1870. Three days after his demise, on 17 March 1883, *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, an Austrian newspaper, wrote: "Karl Marx must be ranked among the most important and the most outstanding contemporaries".²⁹

Stuck between the apotheosis of Marx and his vilification, the common observer is left in a fix, wondering where the reality lies – in the two extremes or somewhere in between. For, at another end of the spectrum are believers for whom Marxism is little more than a set of failed predictions made by a dangerous revolutionary, hounded out justly by the regimes of the day. There is no dearth of literature that looks clearly designed to blackwash what he thought, wrote, and did. Communism for this school of thought is its "greatest enemy," "a conspiracy to enslave the world for the benefit of a small, power-hungry elite," a "world threat," whose "moving appeal is not to the poor and hungry ... [but] chiefly to certain intellectuals and for some sons of the wealthy". "Communism [for them] means the abolition of human dignity," ... [and] "is death."³⁰

This school of thought also portrays Marx as a "psychopathic personality" [who] hated the Jews with the violent hatred of a man who had been torn from Jewry at an early age, as "a man of great ego and arrogance who was compelled to try to dominate others," and was both "intolerant and over-ambitious," "a complete failure in his personal life," with inability to compete in the world.³¹

This same school also refers to the 'conflict' Karl supposedly had with his father. Even his daughters are claimed to have been victims of his 'callous neglect'. But evidence tells us otherwise. He is depicted as a son who had such a warm relationship with his father that he is said to have always carried a photo of his father in his pocket, and Friedrich Engels, at his death, is reported to have buried it with his body in grave.³²

And, then, there are also comments left by Mikhail Bakunin on Marx: 'egotistical to the point of insanity,' a label that appears to acquire plausibility till one goes deeper. Bakunin's revulsion stemmed from more than one source. As an Advocate of Proudhon's anarchism, which was against organized political struggle, Bakunin stood for the abolition of the *Right of Inheritance* which to Marx was not a *cause* but only an *effect* of the

social order and hence abolition of this juridical superstructure was a lesser priority that posed a ‘foolish’ menace to the proletarian movement. After their first clash in Basle (6-11 September 1869) over the question of the state and political struggle, their next confrontation came in 1871 on November 12, after the Sonvillier Circular, a product of the Bakuninist Congress which declared its opposition to the London Conference resolutions, proclaimed complete autonomy and separation from political struggle and opposition to all authority, and was probably intended to take over the leadership of the International.³³ Bakunin’s relations with Nechaev were already there and it was easy for Marx to effect his expulsion from the International removing its secretariat from Europe to New York where it collapsed.

Marx, in a nutshell, had no dearth of critics and opponents, but as Engels said at his graveside, “had hardly one personal enemy.”

Chart 1: A Timeline on Political Violence in Russian Revolution

1861	Serfdom abolished by Tsar Alexander III who also establishes <i>Zemstvos</i> as local centers of power and approves <i>Judicial Independence</i> as the first step toward Rule of Law.
1869	Sergei Nechaev defines a revolutionary as one with pity for nothing and consumed by the single passion of revolution with all links to the society broken, living only to ensure the destruction of society.
1870	Bakunin believes even revolutionary action has to submit itself to fundamental moral constraints. Pyotr Tkachev, a Russian revolutionary, proposes extermination of all Russians over 25 years, because, in his opinion, they are incapable of carrying out his revolutionary ideal.
1872	Marx expresses his hope that Revolution could take a peaceful form in UK, USA, and Holland, a view developed further by Engels (in Preface to the 2 nd edition of <i>Class Struggles in France</i> , published in 1895).
1881	(1 March) Tsar Alexander II killed under a sentence passed by People’s Will.
1887	(1 March) Alexander I. Ulyanov (Lenin’s elder brother), makes an attempt with four others on the life of Tsar Alexander III and is executed.
1902	In <i>What is to be Done?</i> Lenin proposes a new form of revolutionary party of professionals linked in an underground

	structure of almost military discipline, adopting Nechaev's model, different from the German, French, and British socialist organizations of the day.
1914	Lenin makes a break with the 2 nd International (when almost all socialist parties rally around their respective governments), prophesying the imperialist war would turn into civil war and concluding that the socialist movement is not yet strong enough to counter nationalism and that it would be necessary to regroup the forces to prevent a return to warfare. After two years, when the prognostication materializes, confirming Lenin in his belief, Russia enters its revolutionary phase.
1917	(February) 'Bourgeois' Democratic Revolution elects Constituent Assembly.
1918	(4 January) The 1 st Constituent Assembly, elected by universal suffrage, dissolved; Lenin holds on to the belief that the revolution would spread to all countries involved in the war – literally, Britain, France, Germany, USA, apart from Russia; Massacre of Romanov Family (with the Politburo left in ignorance); after summer peasants rise in rebellion. (August) Karl Kautsky, an eminent Marxist, who puts humanism before his Marxist beliefs, notes that terms like 'capitalists,' 'bourgeoisie', and 'counter-revolutionary' are entirely elastic, allowing those in power to exclude anyone they want from humanity, rules out a repeat of French-style revolution of Western Europe and sees 1917 as the last bourgeois revolution rather than as the first one and distinguishes dictatorship from democracy as two irreconcilable systems, the former characterized as forcible suppression of discussion (in <i>The Dictatorship of the Proletariat</i>). ³⁴
1919	Maxim Gorky writes to Lenin protesting persecution of intelligentsia; in response, Lenin condemns the bourgeois intelligentsia as second-rate intellectuals and lackeys of capitalism, refusing to equate them with the intellectual strength of the people.
1920	Leon Trotsky argues for dictatorial concentration of state power entirely in the hands of the proletariat and setting up of a transitional extraordinary regime with <i>force</i> as the deciding factor.
1921	New Economic Policy initiated after the Kronstadt Mutiny and peasant unrest.
1922	Gorky disapproves of the Bolsheviks' methods;

	Alexander Shlyapnikov, a Bolshevik leader, in the 11 th Party Congress, tells Lenin that he (Lenin) has affirmed that proletariat as a class in the Marxist sense does not exist in Russia and congratulates him for managing to exercise dictatorship on behalf of a class <i>that does not actually exist</i> (emphasis added); ³⁵ Show-Trial staged for Socialist Revolutionaries.
1923	Isaac-Steinberg, People's Commissar for Justice (Dec. 1917-May 1918) and a left Socialist Revolutionary allied to the Bolsheviks, speaks on the 'methodical system of state terror' (revolutionary violence) used by the Bolsheviks, justifying use of violence to bring about the end of violence, arguing there is no other way.
1924	Thomas Masaryk (founder of Czechoslovakia in 1918) criticizes the culture of violence adopted by the Bolsheviks, comparing them with the Czars, unprepared for a positive, administrative revolution, taking pleasure in murder and destruction with doctrinal fanaticism.
1925	"RSFSR," says Mikhail V. Frunze (1885-1925), "is the only state in which power belongs to labor.... a workers' and peasants' state in which the working class has the leading role." ³⁶
1925-26	Stalin adopts 'Socialism in One Country,' approach.
1929	State policy shifts to the Left.
1930-32	Dekulakization: Measures to exterminate the Kulaks as a class.
1930	(2 November) Gorky aligns himself with Stalin in his letter to Romain Rolland, defending the workers' class war against the intelligentsia. Mayakovsky, author of the play <i>The Bedbug</i> , a satire on communist life, commits suicide, after becoming increasingly disenchanted with communism. ³⁷
1931	Gorky: "... if the enemies do not surrender, it is up to us to exterminate them." Later, in the course of the 'Industry Party Trial,' he opines that a worker-and-peasant regime should stamp out its enemies like lice and in 1932, in a letter, advocates class hatred, even favoring the experiments on human beings in 1933.
1932-33	Great Famine of Ukraine; resistance to forced collectivization kills millions.
1936	Gorky dies (18 June)-at the height of the purges; Genrikh Yagoda is head of the G.P.U. (the secret police).

1937-38	Height of Purge; 1.8 million people arrested and nearly 690,000 killed, including 98 persons out of the 132 members and candidate members of the CPSU Central Committee elected at the 17 th Congress (i.e., 70%) who were arrested and shot. ³⁸
1938	Yagoda confesses to having murdered Gorky.
1940	Trotsky assassinated by Stalin's henchman in Mexico.
1943	(April) Germany discovers bodies of 4,500 Polish officers buried in mass graves in Katyn. A Red Cross Commission concludes they had been killed by Soviet Troops in 1940. Until 1989, the massacre was attributed to Germans.
1952	Jean Paul Sartre: "any anti-Communist is a dog."
1953	Boris Suvarin and Boris Nikolaevsky label Stalin the century's Caligula.
1953-64	Khrushchev Era: CPSU unfolds a program promising establishment of communism within 30 years.
1956	Khrushchev unveils the excesses committed by Stalin (February 24-25). Hungarian uprising; Jean Paul Sartre leaves Communist Party. May 1956: A. A. Fedeyev, Chief Prosecutor of creative intelligenetsia during the Great Purge and a talented writer, commits suicide.
1966	Trial of writers Andrei Sinyavski and Yuli Daniel for publishing works critical of the regime.
1967	Liberal historian A. M. Nekrich condemned and expelled from the Party: His <i>June 22, 1941</i> critical of the efforts made by the successors of Khrushchev's regime to restore Stalin to respectability.
1969	In a press conference in Washington, Peter Kapitsa supports the theory that the Soviet and American systems would someday converge.
1968	Czech uprising. Later Earnst Fischer denounces the Soviet intervention and publicly declares that all European Communists are morally and politically bound to sever their ties with the Soviet leadership in Moscow.
1978	Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
1991	USSR dissolved.

Class struggle degenerates into class war

If Chart 1 allows a quick look into how the Russian Revolution took its course, it also shows how the class struggle transformed itself into class war. The one element that clearly stands out here is the *Myth of Inevitability of Violence* that got woven into that process. The year 1918 turned out to be the year of a clear parting of the ways between Marxism and Leninism that gave a new interpretation to it to promote revolutionary action. That separation was influenced no little by the momentum that the great war brought to impinge upon the course the events began to take and the cutthroat tensions that the struggle between the February revolutionaries and the 'proletarian' protagonists of the October Revolution found themselves locked into before the war would run its full course. The aftermath of that struggle was a division that also split the socialists and communists on a century-long polemics which still survives. It was during this phase of the revolution, too, that Lenin developed his theory of the Vanguard Party as also his theory of Imperialism and together with Trotsky invented the idea of a 'permanent revolution,' based on the Russian case. The latter even saw the civil war as unfolding the world over, but this was not to come, a struggle between revolutionary proletariat and counterrevolutionary democrats, which would end up, as Khrushchev believed, burying the capitalists. What happened was never prognosticated and what was prognosticated never materialized. The proletarian war not only failed to globalize itself; in its place, as everyone sees, a fourth wave of democracy is now sweeping the world. That the Soviet state dissolved disgorging the 15 republics and that, too, without a single drop of bloodshed, a single life lost, and a single battle fought, may have sent Khrushchev rolling in his grave.

If generalizing from the Russian experience to the global level constituted one problem in the way the Bolshevik leaders took in their style of inferencing, it certainly was not the only one. A more critical flaw probably was the economism that colored their outlook, the tendency to reduce almost everything down to one single dimension. Reality, however, is rarely uni-dimensional. This, again, leads us back to the classical dialectic set up by Marx himself between consciousness (will or mind) and matter, between superstructure and infrastructure. Put somewhat crudely, it was a form of compartmentalization, and compartmentalization hardly represents the total reality. The place of the theory that proclaims that fundamentally, physical forces represent and determine the reality of the universe is now being taken by a whole new set of theories and paradigms.

In trying to explain this gap, Jeremy Seabrook identifies a certain dissonance between Marxian diagnosis and prognosis – from his ability to describe the way things *were*, Seabrook argues, Marx extrapolated the way they *must be*.³⁹ Such an attempt to deduce an objective ethics from happenings natural, historical, or otherwise becomes problematic because this is the way natural and historic fallacy occurs – the tendency to draw moral conclusions from natural and historic phenomena. Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s example of the turkey that has been happily fed for a thousand days is instructive. It thinks everything will be fine on the next day, and the Wednesday before the thanksgiving, the unexpected, the unthinkable happens – the same hand that fed it so long wrings its neck. Because we know something about the past does not necessarily mean we know something about the future.⁴⁰ If Kropotkin’s attempt to deduce an objective ethics from nature’s observations was a typical specimen of the naturalistic fallacy,⁴¹ Marx’s propensity to draw futuristic ethics from history was an instance of historic fallacy, a premise that is unfalsifiable, and unfalsifiable premise is, by definition, unscientific, says Karl Popper.

This apart, there are problems in a number of areas related to Marxist theory as well as praxis.

Before taking up these problems head on, it will be relevant here to recall what Lenin said in Zurich on January 22, 1917 in a meeting of socialist youth. There he had expressed strong doubts that he would “live to see the decisive battles of this coming revolution.”⁴² The rise of Bolshevism from its humble beginnings to a formidably unchallengeable power within a matter of almost four decades (1879-1919) was thus not just a historic accident. It was the outcome of the evolution of revolutionary doctrine, tactical rationalizations, and profound changes in the orthodox Marxist theory developed to suit the Russian context.

False consciousness: The failure of Marxist predictions in the western countries generated rationalization and political distortions by Marxists and Marxist parties to explain why the things did not happen the way they were prophesied to happen by Marx and his followers. The idea of *False Consciousness* was invented which pointed to the inability of the workers to take cognizance of their real position and behave accordingly. It was easy then to put the blame on the protagonists of capitalism who were accused of spreading confusion to obfuscate the reality, rendering it impossible for the workers to see their real interests and role (as a kind of conspiracy theory).⁴³

Aid theory: Lenin's declaration that the proletariat could not attain full consciousness without the aid of bourgeois intellectuals was, in all likelihood, a prop to create a basis for a new elite class.⁴⁴ In confrontation to the Mensheviks' soft stand on gradual revolution for which they were prepared to wait, believing in a spontaneous cause, the idea of 'permanent revolution' developed by Parvus and adopted by Trotsky during and after the 1905 revolution was followed. The idea was to combine the bourgeois-democratic and proletarian-socialist groups and telescope the two together, which brought forth the theory of minority dictatorship. Lenin, who with Plekhanov had repudiated the role of peasants in the 90's, now reclaimed it to bring socialist revolution. And thus, the industrial backwardness of Russia came to be used as an opportunity rather than the hindrance that it was in the orthodox Marxist Theory. Hence, wrote Lenin: "A necessary condition for the victory of the socialist revolution ... is the close alliance of the working and exploited peasantry with the working class – the proletariat – in all the advanced countries."⁴⁵ Thus, if Bolshevism's 'goal culture' (a term coined by anthropologist Anthony Wallace) remained utopian, its 'transfer culture,' says Frederick C. Barghoorn, became Machiavellian and pragmatic.⁴⁶ In short, "Marx who turned Hegel on his head, was himself turned on his head."⁴⁷

Party-state: A second shift in the original theory after the substitution of the *proletariat* by *intellectuals* was the replacement of workers by party to render Dictatorship of Proletariat into Dictatorship of Party.

Personal coterie for aggrandizing power: Since the dictator cannot rule alone, by himself, a third shift occurred in the form of the personal coterie – closest to the head of the ruling regime. This emerged clearly in the form of repression through regulatory organs like the Cheka, NKVD, and KGB and the political and administrative agencies closest to the head of state or party secretary. Concentrating power in his own hand, Stalin at the same time dispersed power among his subordinates. Not just that. In the drive to consolidate the regime's authority, Statism was exalted, in virtual repudiation of the theory of the withering away of the state, and reversing the primacy of the base over the superstructure.⁴⁸

Both Marx and Engels were far from clear about whether the working class should take control of the state peacefully through elections or by forcible use of violence.⁴⁹ It was this ambiguity that gave a convenient scope for the would-be protagonists of revolution to use the latter approach,

if the former one failed, to attain their goal. Lenin's success in grabbing power and paralyzing the Constituent Assembly encouraged those who later wanted to take the violent route with a demonstration effect that would multiply the exercise in many parts of the world in the days to come.

"A class is a group of people who share the same relationship to the means of production and who therefore develop a distinctive view of themselves and of the world"⁵⁰

This theory of *Class Consciousness* presumes that groups that share the same relationship to the means of production develop an identical distinctive view of themselves and, second, that it must be a polarized identity, more or less invariably. But, given that humans maintain a multiple kind of identity, the idea does not look very plausible, since the solidarity of groups' self-image is shaped and determined by more than one factor.

Since, too, as a theory of political economy, Marx's ideas were almost solely based on power, it is not certain that he fully took consideration of the fact that power is not a value-neutral element, or even that every process of acquisition of power (here I am not referring to Empowerment, which can result from the process of capacity building and entitlement of certain basic rights) has a propensity to alter the nature of the object itself. Power in such a context is likely to affect one or more kinds of changes in whoever acquires it. The paper returns to the issue later in some detail when it deals with power as a myth.

All said, despite the majestic power Marx assumed over the imagination of intellectuals and revolutionaries all over the world,⁵¹ Jurgen Habermas (1929-), probably the most well known and prolific of the second generation of critical theorists and celebrated for his communication theory, believes that "Marx did not properly understand democracy," criticizing him for "attempting to reduce social life simply to the realm of work and labor." Habermas envisions a deliberative democracy where "a government's laws and institutions would be a reflection of free and open public discussion and a democratic process of decision making after an open discussion of ideas free from domination" and "a public sphere that mandates the existence of independent voluntary associations of citizens and political structure that permits the unrestricted disseminations of information and ideas." Habermas also suggests that "evolutionary structural differentiation (rationalization) of productive forces interacts

with, establishes limits for and creates possibilities for the development of communicative action, but does not strictly determine this action."⁵²

Although the Russian Revolution of 1917 gave a new urgency to the issue of working class,⁵³ it also ended up sidelining the active role of that class as a process in which the replacement by the middle class bourgeois intellectuals of which Lenin and his party colleagues were a substantial set of representatives, and later by the political party itself played no small role. In the bid to create a new man, the Soviet system, argues Johan Galtung, ended up producing what he calls *Homo stalinensis*, a hybrid of *Homo russicus* and *Homo sovieticus*.⁵⁴

Violence comes full circle

In an almost Nechaevist vein, Trotsky did not flinch from setting the terms of the revolutionary struggle saying that the question about the life or death of the bourgeois and who rules the country would be decided not by reference to the paragraphs of the constitution, but by the employment of all forms of violence.⁵⁵ Could Trotsky have ever foreseen the fate that was to befall him nineteen years later, in Mexico? Another case is the fate of Bukharin who had exulted that his old party comrades Zinoviev and Kamenev had been shot like dogs. He was himself shot dead less than two years later. These two cases apart, it hardly needs to recall the fate of Yagoda and Beria, the masterminds of the greatest purges in the revolutionary history of Russia, that underscores a certain poetic justice in the orgy of violence they unleashed and the sequence of counter-violence they ultimately fell victims to. Noam Chomsky suggests that the Leninist mode of acquisition of state power beneath a façade of concern for the welfare of the masses to create a properly managed regime and society controlled by revolutionary intelligentsia has had great appeal for the intelligentsia.⁵⁶ After Lenin, Stalin not only reversed the New Economic Policy, but also unleashed political violence full scale under the garb of a revolutionary doctrine, not just to defend the state which had come out victorious against the White Army, but also to consolidate his power against the Nazi menace which had raised its head in the West.⁵⁷ This style of political cleansing was borrowed by the inheritors of revolutionary violence in other parts of the world – particularly Asia. But they did more. They were eminently successful in inculcating a pedagogy of Manichean hatred against the bourgeoisie among the 'proletariat', unleashing violence in all forms possible. After all, does not the Bible say: "One who is not with me is against me"?

Violence thus became the road to revolution not just during the Comintern Convention in 1919 in Moscow – the 3rd International – that attracted 60 delegates from 19 nations, designed to foment worldwide proletarian revolution that then appeared imminent with worker unrest spreading all over Europe, but also the path to be followed by all standard bearers of the ideology.⁵⁸ This International succeeded the Marxist-dominated second International (f. 14 July 1889 in Paris after the first International set up by 391 delegates from 20 countries failed) which was dissolved during the World War I after disagreement surfaced among the various member parties about whether to support the war efforts of their countries. From its very start, it was dominated by Bolsheviks, its key founders being leaders of the Moscow-based Bolshevik Party – Lenin, Nikolai Bukharin (died five years later, in 1924), and Grigori Zinoviev (both eliminated during the Purge of the late 30's). With member parties pressured to conform to the Russian model and those balking at violent revolution excluded, it was not difficult to obtain a pledge from the members for a commitment to the Soviet state and agitation at home on its behalf. The Comintern was disbanded by Stalin in 1943.⁵⁹

The Third International established communist parties in a number of countries with its policy and tactics aimed at winning over the majority of the working class to the side of the communist parties. After its dissolution by Stalin in 1943, international communist movement has continued to work out new forms of relations in bilateral, multilateral, and regional meetings, and conferences.⁶⁰

How enforced sojourn abroad can modify one's views comes out clearly in the change that came in Eduard Bernstein, who was in England from 1888 to 1901. From 1896, his forays against orthodox Marxism appeared in a number of articles in *Neue Zeit*. Marx, to him, appeared too willing to accept revolutionary violence and in predicting the crisis of capitalism and immiserization of workers where he was proved wrong. For Bernstein, full communism was less important than social reform. But Lenin had only contempt for the Bernsteinian genre of revisionism, which faced a torrent of criticism from the leading figures of the Second International, although it found a good deal of support within the Social Democratic Movement. And, as the war came in 1914, it found the Marxist leaders totally unprepared. Principle was sacrificed for pragmatism. The International was dead.⁶¹

Did Marx preach violence?

Marx did believe that socialism cannot be brought into existence without revolution,⁶² but did he imply violence? There is considerable debate on whether Marx explicitly advocated violence and, if so, in what particular ways. It seems, too, that the heat generated in course of that debate has not yet cooled down nor has it produced enough light to illuminate us on this major controversy. If indeed, Marx explicitly advocated violence, then Marxism could be held responsible, partly, for encouraging violence in the name of revolutionary democratization. In this context, the data offered by Nicholas Werth look interesting: the political executions carried out under Czarist rule in Russia, that is, between 1825 and 1917, which is 92 years or almost a century, stood at 6,321, most of them carried out during the revolutionary years of 1905-1907, compared to 15,000 in mere two months in the fall of 1918, not to speak about the deaths that ensued in the next three decades of Stalin's rule that run into six digits (Collectivization Famine, Great Purge, Gulag, and so on).⁶³

Stephane Courtois says that Marx accorded violence little attention and that the violent resolution of conflict was seized from the ambiguities in some of his writings by the believers in the approach to violence. Marx himself was "extremely critical of the disastrous experience of the Paris Commune and the resulting bloody repressions." Courtois further notes, in 1972, Marx had even expressed his hope that "the revolution could take a peaceful form in America, England, and Holland."⁶⁴

Are class war and violent revolution inevitable?

For Immanuel Kant, democracy was a remedy for 'eternal peace', but even after him, particularly in course of the development of international theory in the 20th century, a number of thinkers have come forward with their own concepts to explain why and how peace can be maintained and war avoided in the course of social transformation. Richard Cobden (1903) stressed relations between people. Karl Deutsch (1957) focused on security communities and transnational ties between societies. Ernst Haas (1958) emphasized international integration. More or less in the same vein, David Mitrany's functionalist theory of greater interdependence between countries (1966), John Burton's Cobweb Model (mutually beneficial pattern of cooperation, 1972), Herman Kahn's increasingly sensate and humanistic culture (1972),⁶⁵ Robert Keohane's and Joseph Nye's general theory of complex multi-level interdependence of multiple actors and branches of governmental and transnational relations between non-state individuals and

agencies (1977) follow, more or less, the same line, as do the ideas developed by Michael Doyle(1983), Richard Rosecrance(1986), Pat Devine (model of 'Negotiated Coordination' as the form of planning for 'self-governing society,' 1988, in *Democracy and Planning*), Bruce Russett (1989), the Peace Studies around the World (PSAW, a nine-month academic tour of 20 countries in 1989 around the world envisioned by Johan Galtung),⁶⁶ James Rosenau (1990), Anthony Giddens (Third Way, 1998), and Daniel Deudny and G. John Ikunberry (Theory of Structural Liberalism, 1999). It is in this same context that Peter Calvert suggests the idea of class war has outlived its usefulness (1982) and Andre Gorz says the working class is no longer central to radical change.⁶⁷ All over the world, pacifism is now on the rise and there is the resurgence of human rights movement. A third generation of peacekeeping, called Multi-Dimensional Peace Support Operations (PSO), is at work as are organizations such as the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC). One report even claims that apart from dramatic decline in authoritarianism over the past quarter century, there is also a noticeable, sustained decline in the number and death tolls of armed conflicts.⁶⁸

This is why Jeff Goodwin prognosticates very few of the socialist movements in the foreseeable future "will be practically revolutionary in the sense of seeking to recast radically whole societies by seizing state power through extra-parliamentary though not necessarily violent means but more mass movements for 'social justice' with regime transitions and democratic revolutions, on the other hand with greater likelihood to occur.⁶⁹ Even more definitive, in that regard, is Jeffery Paige, who asks: "Does revolution have a future?" and says, "The answer to this question depends on the definition chosen. If revolution means the violent seizure of power though [sic] class-based revolts from below the answer is almost certainly no It could well be, on the other hand, that a deepening of the currents of human rights, the increasing assertiveness of the formerly suppressed gender, ethnic, age and class groups and the rise of the global south may bring the world to a kind of revolutionary transformation in consciousness, lived social experience and power relation seen previously only in particular national societies."⁷⁰

Announcing that the third wave of change is already underway, Alvin and Heidi Toffler prognosticate that the advent of software will displace hardware and knowledge will drive economy, not the other way.⁷¹ Indeed, the displacement of manual work by mechanical work and the latter by mental work lends considerable plausibility to their argument.

Counterpoised to the Marxist class-based and violent mode of social movements, now there is also a whole array of *New Social Movements* (NSMs), particularly since the late 1960s, which include the ecology, gender and animal rights, peace and other kinds of issues in their agenda for social transformation that are neither clearly ideological, nor class-based, nor even strictly economic.⁷²

Of special interest in the context of social transformation is the Third Wave of change that the Alvin and Heidi Toffler talk about in their book *Creating a New Civilization*. According to them, the three principles that will dominate the 21st century are: Minority Power (plummeting poverty line is likely to make the poor a minority), Semi-Direct Democracy, and Decisional Division (Super- and sub-State levels of decision-making) that would maximize the level of people's political participation.

The IT revolution, moreover, that has followed, has killed distance, connecting people globally to weaken, probably irretrievably, the hold of despots and dictators on power. The Facebook revolution also is signaling a major power shift – from the elite (Track Two) to the people (Track Three). What puts the new wave apart from its predecessors is that it combines street activism with online activism. For the first time in the history of political revolutions, the page is becoming the central command rallying the people forward, pushing them past the psychological barrier, and for the first time, too, in the history of democratic movements, protests are moving forward without a leader. If the mass upheaval still underway in the Maghreb underscores a lesson of perennial value, it is that dictators may disconnect everything else, including themselves, but they cannot keep people disconnected for ever. The Arab Spring not only challenges violence as a way to bring change or counter corruption, but may well prove to be the final nail on the coffin of dictatorship of every kind – of Pope, of Prince, of Party, of Proletariat, in short, of dictatorship in any form and shape, an individual person's or in an organized form. Dictators everywhere stand on the way out.

Counter-arguing Marx and applying the Hegelian formula as thesis to the Industrial Revolution and to capitalism versus socialism as antithesis, Will and Ariel Durant, too, have contended that the antithesis would be a synthesis of capitalism and socialism; in other words, convergence, which is what this observer suggested to a visiting delegation of the Soviet in the mid-80's at the Department of Political Science, Tribhuvan University. Adding, in a Kiplingesque Vein, that "the fear of capitalism has compelled socialism to widen freedom, and fear of socialism has compelled capitalism

to increase equality," the Durants even prophesy that "the twain [the East and the West] will meet."⁷³

A Case for Mythoclasm

The Russian aberration on the praxis of revolutionary violence apart, Marxism is not without certain problems in its theoretical frame. Let me try to explain only four of them here. The first of them is related to the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, which enjoins that the proletariat should be given all powers during the transition to communism. But, would such a transfer of all powers to the proletariat really bring the transformation of the state and society? Power was probably visualized by Marx as a capacity that could presumably be used properly by the workers in the stage of socialism claimed to have been achieved by the Soviet State in the mid-30's.⁷⁴ But what happened? Even more to the point, were the workers really in rule in Russia or did somebody else rule? And, what kind of rule it was?

The Power Syndrome

Can power be neutral? Is it always benevolently usable by those who wield it? If history so far is any guide, the conclusion is bound to be a negative one. The exercise of power in real life circumstances, whether by an individual citizen, a group such as a political party, or an institution like a government or even the state, implies the use of one or more of the diverse forms of power resources – organizational capacity, numerical support, competence, expert knowledge, control of information, occupation of certain social positions, control of the instruments of force, and reputation for power.⁷⁵ Obviously, retention of all the resources of power in one hand is not an easy proposition: The larger the diversity of the resources, the more difficult is likely to be the sustained retention of power by one individual and group. Such a difficulty apart, the nature of power is such that each of its components betrays a tendency to fuel the other ones. To illustrate the point, one may take up Rudolf J. Rummel's power equation: $\text{Power} = \text{Interests} \times \text{Capability} \times \text{Will}$,⁷⁶ where a growth in capability is likely to push up the urge for both will and interests, the same holding true for the two other elements. This propensity of power was probably best depicted by Albert Camus when he announced in his celebrated work *The Rebel* (1951): "The slave begins by demanding justice and ends by wanting to wear a crown. He must dominate in his turn." Again, "Every revolutionary ends up by becoming either an oppressor [when he gets power] or a heretic."

Power in the communist ideology is regarded as something that the proletariats have only to acquire and use it to change the world. The reality is hardly that simple. Power is rarely neutral and valence-free. A kind of power syndrome sets in. Once acquired, it starts its own impact on its object. The acquisition can trigger one or more of the following five trends:

- Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
- Power blinds and discommunicates its object. If the inability of Stalin to follow on the signals on the eve of the Nazi attack on the Soviet state emanating from both Tokyo and Berlin, and take the right decision was one historic instance of the failure that power brings, another, closer to home, was the electoral loss suffered by Indira Gandhi at the height of Emergency when she herself was in command. History offers ample instances of such power failures.
- Power also addicts. The more power an individual obtains, the deeper the propensity to acquire more power. The process of gravitation toward more power starts working. The Czarevitch in Russia wrote in his diary on his father's assassination that he was not prepared to be Czar, but after he was crowned, he (Czar Nicholas II) became a different person, ordering his officials to open fire on a peaceful procession in 1905. That this universal gravitation of power ultimately unravels itself is the central paradox of power which explains why absolute dictators often end up losing it.
- Along with the aforementioned symptoms, the powerholder tries to uphold his position through some kind of legitimacy or rationalization of the status quo.
- Longer the habit of exercising power and authority, greater the possibility of exercising power in autocratic and domineering ways. Even otherwise, reminds Bertrand Russell, "Pride of dominion, unwillingness to decide disputes otherwise than by force or the threat of force, is a habit of mind greatly encouraged by the possession of power."⁷⁷

The class myth

The negation of class by Marx, in all likelihood, was a reaction to two things: the hegemonic authority and power wielded by state in his days, after the rise of the Westphalian order, and the violence and destruction wrought through its use as also Hegel's apotheosis of state as 'God's march upon earth'. In any serious consideration of his abolition thesis, the question is thus bound to rise: Is class a plain attribute easy to alter or

something else? Marxism regards class as something which will be eradicated in course of time. This goes against what everyday experience teaches us. Class, instead of being a simple attribute or part of human nature, most likely, is an instinct, probably deeply ingrained in the human physiology itself, let us say, even genetically, which makes it very difficult, if not virtually impossible, to abolish or eradicate it altogether, if not to alter. Although opinions may vary on the modifiability of human nature (read Bertrand Russell on the theme⁷⁸), instincts can be classified as primary (or basic) and secondary, and the class instinct, in all likelihood, would fall into the first category, like all basic human instincts. In fact, it may be one of the universal biological instincts, because it is observed in many animals, even insects, such as ants and bees (the latter have queen bees as their leaders with others as followers). Dogs barking at ragpickers but letting well-clad gentlefolk pass by is a familiar scene.⁷⁹

This is not all. The Marxist analysis reduces class to economic category, but the fact stands that there can be as many classes as there are values. Such functionality of class based on value implies that even after the hypothetical dissolution of economic class other kinds of classes based on education, health, social status, power can subsist and conflicts would linger.

The proletarian myth

Is the proletariat a homogeneous element and does it remain frozen over time? Experience says it is neither. Over time, it is bound to change and it does change. The demography of the industrial proletariat of the 18th century hardly resembles the proletariat of the West where the size of the manual workers has steeply decreased. This is due to the historic shift that took place – from the manual workers to the mechanical ones. But in the days ahead, going by the projections that Alvin and Heidi Toffler give us, a further massive shift is likely to be there from mechanical to mental workers, thanks to the IT revolution which is already underway in large parts of the world, including here in Nepal, irrespective of the status of industrialization. Mere growth of education and urbanization is enough to expedite this greatest of human revolutions. The size of the Russian intelligentsia grew two-fold between 1959 and 1967 and student enrollment between 1914 and 1969 rose 35 times in the Soviet Union. Such a rise of the middle class appears to be a global phenomenon, not limited to any one country and can be attributed to the upward evolution of the former workers, that is the proletariat as also the peasants rather than the other

way. One clear consequence of that process is the emergence and massive rise of service-workers in the last few decades; we could call them *Serviceriat*. In the near-universal tendency of the proletariat to grow upward and become middle class acquiring its habitus – the norms, attitudes, and behavior patterns of the middle class, one can also notice the emergence and growth of what may be called the international middle class whose transnational character and cosmopolitan values distinguish them as a category by itself. In such a rapidly changing context, the term 'comprador bourgeoisie' is also likely to fall gradually into disuse as globalization intensifies.

The dictatorship myth

When the theory of dictatorship of the proletariat was devised in the Marxist ideology, hardly anyone could have foreseen that it would transmute itself into another kind of dictatorship – dictatorship of the party. This can be explained in terms of two paradoxical trends discernible in the evolution of political parties. Parties that abjure violence and arise under a system of parliamentary democracy often become monopolistic in relation to power and even if they maintain democratic procedure in their relationship within the parliament, they tend to grow more autocratic inside. One familiar instance is the case of the various political parties in Nepal where, internally, almost every political party worth the name has turned out to be family-based and autocratic. The most 'revolutionary' among them has failed to convene even its General Assembly over the past two decades. Secondly, the revolutionary parties also tend to subvert and try to strangle the parliamentary form of government which gave them support formerly.⁸⁰

These two parallel processes of power aggrandizement and subversion went hand in hand not only in the Bolshevik party that took power in Russia, but can be noticed also here in Nepal. They will do it by means fair, if possible, foul if necessary, and will even try to fit the facts to their theory. If they do not, they will change the facts.⁸¹

What marked the CPSU apart from other parties of the day was that it became Party-State and in place of the dictatorship of the proletariat, it was the dictatorship of party that ruled there. Compared to its Soviet predecessors, that got even banned in Russia afterward, the Maoist party in Nepal stands differently: it can probably claim itself to be more *international* in having donned its name from China's leader (Mao) and in shaping its 40-point demands, which it seems to have forgotten now, from Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles (*min-zu*: doctrine of Nationalism; *min-quan*:

democratic doctrine of Popular Sovereignty; and *min-sheng*: Economic Doctrine of Livelihood). Even in the title of their periodical one can smell a clear borrow-over from Lenin's *Iskra* (Spark) that got reincarnated here as *Jhilko*.

Rounding up

Karl Marx was against moralistic preaching, yet was, says Paul Johnson, in one sense, “a strongly moral being,” one “who was filled with a burning desire to create a better world.”⁸² Explicitly against social planning, he was proven wrong on a number of his anticipations – including the growth of proletarian movement as a majoritarian movement, even on the idea of immiserization of workers. He berated the importance of politics, yet he made the most penetrating probe into the capitalist system of his time. He may have been wrong in some of his sociological and psychological preconceptions, but the onus of his whole analysis lay in revealing and materializing the kingdom of freedom, for all humans alike. In fact, Marx, who was consistently an internationalist and for whom nothing human was alien, and who argued for a ruthless criticism of everything existing (ruthless in the sense that the criticism should be afraid neither of its conclusions nor of conflicts with the powers that be), is said to have first called his dialectical theory *humanism* and to have given it the name historical materialism only later. Ernst Fischer even claims that understanding of the humanity in all human beings is the foundation of Marx's thought.⁸³ Scientific Marxism may not be valid, not even his historicism; but as a radical humanist who conceived of human freedom as the development of the whole human being, his fierce protests against the social oppressions and crimes of his day secure for him, says Karl Popper, “forever a place among the liberators of mankind.” One may disagree, but Popper has a point to make.

He also rejected the role of human will in overcoming given circumstances, and a fundamental tension between voluntarism and determinism does pervade almost the whole of the Marxist project, yet Marx himself was quite convinced of the capacity of humans to change the given circumstances.⁸⁴

“After Karl Marx,” say Norman Dorsen and Prosser Gifford, “we cannot any longer ignore the social vector in the construction of human consciousness.”⁸⁵ Despite all the dehumanization the abuse of power has caused in the hands of the political and economic ruling classes, by uncovering the roots of human evil doing, a new potential for human good-

doing can be revealed and the post-Marxist understanding of the social vector of human consciousness can be utilized to understand better the flow of energy between the private mind of the individual human being and the public mind of society, which is the collective consciousness. There is thus no reason why the consciousness of the individual human being should not or rather cannot transcend and take power over the self-constitution of society.⁸⁶

Are social transformation and revolutionary change possible without political violence? This remains the perennial human puzzle and the abiding quest for the 21st century as well. In a recent speech at Columbia University in New York, Aung San Suu Kyi says it is possible. Then what went wrong with the revolutionary paradigms of the past two centuries? The key problem was the violence-based model of revolutionary change – the belief in the use of hard power, force, and coercion which lay behind the extremely wasteful, inefficient, inhuman, and crisis-prone exercises directed at changing human society. The whole of the 20th century is there to bear witness to this point. Whether advances in the theory of peace and conflict in this century can turn the erstwhile model of **machtpolitik** into something more positive and creative remains to be seen.

A whole century separates Deolinda of the short story from Marx: one is just a plain female from far away Africa, another historic icon for millions, including Deolinda, who barely knows her icon, yet, like many others, fervently adores him. The contrast between the two could hardly have been more stark. Still, the two have something in common – Deolinda is a votary and Marx, a visionary, of social change, a mission that has unleashed waves and waves of revolutionary transformation and may continue to do so in the foreseeable future.

History tells us of many who have tried to change society – each in their own way. Marx stood apart from them all in the tenacity he possessed. Writing to Paul Lafargue, his son-in-law, in August 1876, he wrote:

“You know that I have sacrificed everything I had to the revolutionary battles. I do not regret having done so. Quite to the contrary. If I had to begin my career again, I would do the same Only I would not get married.”⁸⁷

The last sentence hides the personal agony and the utter despair of Marx's life, an agony born of a certain paradox in the life of the philosopher who started with the dream of changing the world and changed it in his own way, but was unable to change the circumstances of his own life conditions. Such paradox can be noticed in the lifestory of many other

souls who strove to change human society – from Socrates and Lincoln down to Gandhi.

The important thing to remember about Marx is that neither age, nor ailments, nor half a life of exile in utter destitution, nor even the direst of family adversities⁸⁸ deterred him. With unwavering faith and unflickering zeal, he kept going, losing almost everything in the pursuit of his mission. It was the triumph of human will over the most inhuman circumstances.

Notes

1. The author thanks Manoj K. Bachchan for the critical help extended in course of drafting this paper.
2. David Priestland, *The Red Flag*, p. 566.
3. Leslie Holmes, *Communism A Very Short Introduction*, p. 1.
4. P. N. Fedoseyev, *Karl Marx: A Biography*, p. 606.
5. John Evan Seery, *Political Returns: Irony in Politics from Plato to the Antinuclear Movement*, pp. 242-243, 254, 255, 257.
6. Even Franz Mehring, whose *Karl Marx: The Story of His Life* appeared in 1918, that is, 35 years after death of Marx, and the result of long research and was appreciated widely as a work by a prominent philosopher, historian, and left-wing German Social Democrat and Founder of the Communist Party of Germany, is said to have had no knowledge of a number of important works of Marx, such as *The German Ideology*, *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, and the *Economic Manuscript of 1857-1858*, and certain biographic facts; quoted by P. N. Fedoseyev et al., op. cit., p. 14.
7. Priestland, pp. 450-459.
8. Priestland, pp. 464, 465.
9. Goldstein and Pevehouse, *International Relations*, p. 90.
10. Holmes, p. xiii.
11. In *A Guide to Communist Jargon*, R. N. Carew Hunt offers a list of 50 such terms related to communist revolutionary phraseology.
12. Peter Calvert, *A Study of Revolution* (Oxfam: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 4., quoted by Charles Tilly in his contribution 'Revolutions and Collective Violence,' in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, *Handbook of Politics*, Vol. 3 (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1975), p. 522.
13. Fedoseyev, p. 22.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 22.
16. Robert L. Heilbroner, *The Worldly Philosophers*, p. 129.
17. Priestland, p. 74.
18. *Das Capital* is regarded as one of the most quoted books of the world; also by 1973, Marx's works had been published in 101 languages of the world.
19. Paul Johnson, *Intellectuals*, 1992, p. 52.

20. Terrell Carver, 'Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,' in Peter Baehr and Melvin Richter, *Dictatorship in History and Theory* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 2004), pp. 106-108.
21. Priestland, pp. 75-76.
22. "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" came from Blanque, "The proletarians are nothing to lose but their chains" from Marat; "Religion as the opium of the people" from Heine; "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need" from Louis Blanc; and "Workers of all countries unite!" from Karl Schapper. Johnson, p. 56.
23. For a detailed explanation on this issue, the reader is referred to *How to Read Marx* by Ernst Fischer (Delhi: Aakar Books, 2008).
24. *Marx's Concept of Man* (New York : Ungar, 1966), p. 1.
25. This is what Dr. Fred Schwarz argues in *You Can Trust the Communists* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1961), p. 17.
26. On the harm allegedly done to the revolutionary liberation struggle of the peoples by Maoism, read P. N. Fedoseyev, op. cit., p. 613.
27. Fedoseyev, p. 9.
28. Ibid., p. 28.
29. Fedoseyev, p. 588.
30. F. L. Kluckhohn, *The Naked Rise of Communism*, p. 12.
31. Kluckhohn, p. 23. Marx's diatribes are famous – against William Weitling (1846), Proudhon (1846), August Van Willich (1850), Ferdinand Lassalle (1862); even the modality of his research has not failed to invite a certain measure of controversy throwing up questions on the corpus of literature he has left, from Bruno Hildebrand, 1848 down to Louis Althusser, 1969. See sJohnson, pp. 62-69.
32. Fedoseyev, p. 21.
33. Fedoseyev, p. 454.
34. In his angry rejoinder, Lenin (in *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952) dubs the state 'a machine for the suppression of one class by another' and explains the nature of revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat as "rule won and maintained through the use of violence by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie ... unrestricted by any laws" (pp. 32-33, 20); Martin Latsis, a Cheka leader proclaims: "We are exterminating the bourgeois as a class" (1 November 1918, cited by Sergei Melgunov in *The Red Terror in Russia*, Berlin, 1924).
35. The taunt was directed at Lenin's proclamation to become the representative of the numerically weak Russian proletariat, an appropriation of a symbol that would later become common to all communist regimes in Europe, Asia, and the Third World.
36. In 'A Unified Military Doctrine for the Red Army,' in the *Soviet Art of War: Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics*, eds., Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, p. 31.
37. Payne, p. 235.

38. 'Khrushchev Reveals Some of the Crimes of Stalin' (February 24-25, 1956), in *A Treasury of the World's Great Speeches*, ed., Houston Peterson (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), p. 828.
39. Seabrook, p. 37.
40. Jan Oberg, 'Peace Research and the Black Swans: A Congratulatory Essay,' in Jorgen Johansen and John Y. Jones, *Experiments with Peace*.
41. Peter Marshall, op. cit., p. 337.
42. Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled*, p. 31.
43. Seabrook, p. 36.
44. Ibid., p. 37.
45. V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 328, quoted in P. N. Fedoseyev, p. 608.
46. Frederick C. Barghoorn, 'Politics in the USSR,' p. 318
47. Fainsod, p. 38.
48. Fainsod, pp. 109-110.
49. W. Phillips Shively, *Power & Choice: An Introduction to Political Science* (Boston: McGrall Hill, 2003), p. 31.
50. Ibid., p. 28.
51. Seabrook, p. 51.
52. Tim Delaney, *Contemporary Social Theory: Investigation and Application* (Delhi: Pearson Education, Inc., 2005), pp. 245, 249.
53. Seabrook, p. 54.
54. Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Democracy and Civilization*.
55. Trotsky, *Defense of Terrorism*, pp. 83, 86, tr. H. N. Brailsford (London: Allen and Unwin, 1921).
56. Milan Rai, *Chomsky's Politics*, p. 148.
57. The first of the five 'tasks for the future' for Germany, listed by Hitler to Colonel Walther von Reichenau (4 December 1932) on the eve of taking power - "overcoming Marxism and its consequences until they have been completely exterminated," and the Nazi Fuehrer's exhortations on behalf of **Lebensraum** in his *Mein Kampf* (1925) and his **Drang nach Osten** (drive to the east) call may have steeled up Stalin's determination further to go strong in his zeal for violence.
58. The year 1919 turned out to be a watershed year in more than one sense. The year of Versailles Treaty also brought up the Spartacist Revolt that ended in the execution of both pro-putsch Karl Liebknecht and critic of Bolshevik tactics Rosa Luxemburg by the Freikorps in a carnage of 1200 Berliners; the 3rd Afghan War and Afghanistan's independence; the Red Year in USA (bloody race riots and a red scare that led to deportation of thousands of leftist immigrants to the Soviet Union); founding of the American Communist Party; division of the American left; foundation of the Fascist movement (March 23) by Benito Mussolini, a former socialist who saw violence as the surest road to radical change based on an elite vanguard; end of Emiliano Zapata's bloody crusade for agrarian reform in Southern Mexico in a hail of bullets (April 10);

- Bela Kun's coup and subsequent ouster in Hungary; as also the Amritsar carnage in India (April 13).
59. Turner Publishing, Inc., *Our Times: The Illustrated History of the 20th Century* (Atlanta, 1995), p. 140.
 60. Fedoseyev, pp. 610-612.
 61. Priestland, pp. 55-60.
 62. Johnson, p. 59.
 63. Martin Maria: Foreword in *The Black Book of Communism*, eds., Stephane Courtois et al. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. xviii. In 1961, Khrushchev even proposed erection of a monument to memorialize the victims.
 64. Stephane Courtois : "Conclusion Why?" in *The Black Book of Communism*, p. 729.
 65. Herman Kahn, B. Bruce-Briggs, *Things to Come* (New York : The MacMillan Company, 1972), pp. 9-10.
 66. Jonathan D. London, '1989: A Journey with Johan Galtung, in Jorgen Johansen and John Y. Jones, eds., *Experiments with Peace: A Book Celebrating Peace on Johan Galtung's 80th Birthday* (Oxford: Pambuzka Press, 2010), pp. 170-178.
 67. Andre Gorz, *Farewell to the Working Class*.
 68. *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century* (University of British Columbia: Human Security Centre, 2005), pp. 7, 17.
 69. Jeff Goodwin, 'The Renewal of Socialism and the Decline of Revolution', in *The Future of Revolutions: Rethinking Radical Change in the Age of Globalization*, ed., John Foran (London: Zed Books, 2003), p. 63.
 70. Jeffery M. Paige, 'Finding the Revolutionary in the Revolution: Social Science Concepts and the Future of Revolution,' in John Foran, op. cit., pp. 27, 29.
 71. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *Creating a New Civilization* (Atlanta: Turner Publishing Inc., 1995), p. 70.
 72. Timothy C. Lim, *Doing Comparative Politics: An Introduction to Approaches and Issues*, New Delhi: Viva Books, 2007), p. 241.
 73. Will and Ariel Durant, *The Lessons of History* (Bombay: Hans Publishers, 1968, Indian Reprint 1977), pp. 66-67.
 74. Fedoseyev, p. 621.
 75. Gordon Marshall, *Oxford Dictionary of Sociology*, p. 520.
 76. R. J. Rummel, 'Triadic Struggle and Accommodation in Perspective,' in Ilpyong J. Kim, ed., *The Strategic Triangle: China, the United States and the Soviet Union*, p. 256.
 77. Russell, *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1980, Reprint 1989), p. 45.
 78. Bertrand Russell, pp. 29-30.
 79. At this point, Edward O. Wilson's Consilience ("jumping together" of knowledge by the linking of facts and facts-based theory across disciplines to create a common ground of explanation, or combining of social and natural sciences) and his concept of culturgene can probably be of some help (defined as "any change in gene frequencies that alters culturgene frequencies in such a

- way that the culture gene changes the gene frequencies as well.")Delaney, pp. 17-33.
80. K. K. Sinha, *Towards Pluralist Society* (Calcutta: Writers' House, 1957), pp. 164, 165.
81. Ibid., p. 169.
82. Johnson, ss p. 72.
83. Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, p. 122.
84. Ernst Fischer, *How to Read Karl Marx*, p. 151.
85. *Democracy and the Rule of Law*, p. 24.
86. Ibid., p. 25.
87. Fedoseyev, p. 255.
88. See, for a moving description of his life of privation and misery in London, P. N. Fedoseyev, op. cit., pp. 252- 255; also Paul Johnson, op. cit., pp. 73-78.

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ETHNONATIONALISM AND THE SOUTH ASIAN CONTEXT

Anjoo Sharan Upadhyaya

Abstract

Ethnic identities have of late come to assume a rightful social and political status on par with, and often closely linked to class and national organizations. It attracted a great deal of scholarly attention in the past and continues to be one of the most frequented areas of scholarly inquiry in contemporary social sciences. In the first part of this paper, I have attempted a critique of the various theories that have been developed to analyse this unfolding, and in the second part I briefly delineate the various fundamental causes that generate, accentuate or modify ethnonationalism in South Asia, in particular, with the object of identifying certain theories that can be helpful in explaining this present day phenomenon. Finally, my attempt is to explain the various techniques adopted by various states across the world and recommended by scholars and practitioners to accommodate these ethnic aspirations. I have primarily located my inquiry in the south Asian context.

Introduction

Ethnonational movements¹ have been a major source of challenge for contemporary states. Till about three decades ago, it was considered that restive ethnic identities causing instability due to dissatisfaction with the existing political arrangements will soon be a thing of the past, as these identities will 'melt' in the cauldron of Nationalism. The nation state was regarded as the supreme reference point for loyalty of the individual citizen, and all her other loyalties to religion, languages, caste, region, culture, descent were to be subsidiary or even subsumed to this primary loyalty. Not long ago the cultural uniformity of nation states was seen as a normal phenomenon, to be emulated by other nation states in the making. According to this norm, each nation was at liberty to preserve, promote and propagate its own unique culture, history and ideology. The privilege of identifying or constructing such unifying national identity was bestowed upon the majority community and the minorities were expected to conform. This construction of a national identity based on ethnic homogeneity was accomplished by a wide spectrum of techniques ranging from cultural assimilation to ethnic

cleansing. So overwhelming was the emphasis on singular national identity that the multilingual and multiethnic empires such as the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires were questioned on their legitimacy and even regarded anomalous and absurd by the protagonists of Nationalism.

Ever since colonialism came to an end by 1960s, the focal point for statesmen was to "build" a strong "nation" and of the scholars to suggest ways and models to achieve the same. No sooner than the newly emergent states of Asia and Africa came into existence, it became increasingly evident that the sub-national or ethno-national loyalties were gaining in strength and popularity, making demands on the socio-political structure of the state, as well as on the international society. Contrary to what was expected, ethnic identity, ethnic consciousness, and subsequent ethnic conflicts did not disappear in the post-colonial regimes. In many cases, they became stronger, so much so, that ethnic mobilization could no longer be considered some sort of archaic, pre-modern, primordial, or non-rational form of social action. In the heightened mobility of the globalized world, the trend of cultural uniformity gradually gave way to an emphasis on attesting and enriching diversities. The volcanic eruption of ethnic conflicts in the post bipolar world has made it imperative not only to acknowledge the diversities but also to ensure that they remain secure about their identities and the state does not come in the way of their enrichment. In fact, their goal remains not only to be supported by the state agencies but also to have a legitimate share in the state apparatus.

Thus, ethnic identities have come to assume a rightful social and political status on par with, and often closely linked to class and national organizations. So widespread has been the phenomenon that in a research paper of certain objective and spaces, its wider enumeration may not be feasible. However, to keep things in perspective, in case of South Asia, all major South Asian countries have had to face the emergence of ethnonational claims: the Tamil, Kashmiri, Sikh, and Naga in India, the Tamil ethnonationalism in Sri Lanka, the Pakhtoon, Baluch and Sindhi in Pakistan, the Chittagaon Hill Tribes and the Biharis in Bangladesh and more recently the Tharu, Limbu, and Tamang, to name a few, in Nepal, are amongst some of the major ethnonational assertions in the region.

This phenomenon naturally calls for a detail analysis. Needless to say that it attracted a lot of scholarly attention in the past and continues to be one of the most frequented areas of contemporary social sciences. In the first part of this paper, I attempt a critique of the various theories that have been developed to analyse this unfolding, and in the second part I briefly delineate

the various fundamental causes that generate, accentuate or modify ethnonationalism in South Asia, in particular, with the object of identifying certain theories that can be helpful in explaining this present day phenomenon. Finally, my attempt is to explain the various techniques adopted by various states across the world and recommended by scholars and practitioners to accommodate these ethnic aspirations.

The Theorists

Marxist Explanation: One of the earliest attempts at explaining this phenomenon came from Karl Marx and his contemporaries who took the stand that such conflicts were a passing phase of capitalist society, essentially irrelevant to the class struggle and certain to be engulfed by class warfare and proletariat internationalism when the latter developed (Pettman 1979: 105-135). Lenin, whose doctrine was far in advance of other Marxists in its coherence and realism, asserted that it is due to the capitalist expansion that linguistically unified and politically united territories develop a propensity for forming nation states. Marxists could then capitalize on capitalism's more mature influence, which was the demolition of national boundaries it had earlier created in favour of an international unification of capital, politics and science. However, as history evidences, mature aspects of world capitalism have not followed in the predicted sequence, nor have the nation states merged in truly potent cosmopolitans (Vaidyanath 1971).

The Modernist: Marxists were followed by the first set of 'modernizationists' and the 'melting pot' theorists (Oscar 1952; Myrdal 1944; Enloe 1973).² Ethnicity, according to these theorists, is associated with premodern stages of development and with primordial and prerational sentiments. The premise on which these theorists built their arguments was that such cultural, linguistic and ethnic affinities leading to ethnonational problems would 'melt' away with the completion of the modernization processes.

In 1950s, when these theories were projected, the world was at an unusual juncture. In the United States the challenge to 'melting pot' from the political mobilization of recently urbanized Blacks was not yet materialized. In Europe too, by the end of the Second World War, states were formed to coincide with nations. Boundaries were redrawn and large-scale population displacements and exchanges had occurred, but it was hoped that soon these new boundaries would assume the status of single identity national boundaries. In Asia and Africa, the unitary doctrine of anticolonial nationalism was still in the ascendant. Although, the force of mobilized

communalism was clearly seen in the tragic events attending the partition of India, yet such events were mere aberrations because they occurred relatively in isolation. Nationalism seemed to be the carrier of historical progress. The 'ethnic problem' was considered as having been 'solved.' Hence, the emergence of the theories, which regarded ethnicity as a primitive factor in politics.

However, it has been argued convincingly that if modernization led to lessening of linguistic, cultural and religious consciousness, then the phenomenon of ethno-nationalism would not have been on the increase in the more advanced and modernized societies as has been the case presently.³ In place of ethnic attachments being diffused and dissolved, ethnic assertions have been on the increase. The continued assertion of ethnic pluralism in the USA, the Irish and the Scottish ethnonationalism in the UK, the issues of autonomy versus self-determination in the Quebec area of Canada, the breakup of the former Soviet Union and the emergence of Kosovo along ethnic lines, have falsified the presumptions of the modernizationists. In South Asia too, ethnopolitical assertions have come from quarters that were comparatively more advanced and modernized. For instance, the Sikhs of India, or the Tamils of Sri Lanka constitute a comparatively industrialized section in their respective states.

Internal Colonialism: Another theory which gained greater popularity in the sixties is closely related to the Marxists. It is broadly defined as the theory of 'internal colonialism.' The chief proponents of this theory have been Thomas Nairn, Michael Hechter, Gonzalez Casanova and Rudolph Stavenhagen (Nairn 1977; Hechter 1975; Gonzalez Casanova 1965; Stavenhagen 1965). According to this theory, minority nationalism is caused by the uneven development within the states, the core communities using their superior political and economic position to exploit the peripheral communities. This theory was specifically developed in contexts of Latin America, the United Kingdom and more recently South Asia. The framework adopted by the Marxists of the second generation had, over a period, gained greater popularity and is defined as the neo-Marxists, and the core periphery theorists.

Within the neo-Marxists, reference ought to be made to the 'second group.'⁴ They argued that due to capitalist world economy and imperialist state expansion, differential distribution of state resources among various ethnic groups had occurred. This had heightened ethnic struggles making them more prominent than class struggles (Wallerstein 1979:187).

The other group within this broad category is that of the 'core periphery,' and 'internal colonialists.' This sees nationalism as a response to the uneven development of the modern world (Orridge 1981).

The internal colonial model has had limited salience. Biafra in Nigeria and Katanga in Congo derived some of their strength from the relative prosperity and not deprivation of these regions (Phillips 1984; Olorunsola 1972). Neither does this theory provide an explanatory framework for the ethnic violence in Sri Lanka or the turbulence in Punjab state of India. On the contrary, there were situations where above mentioned conflictual conditions existed for long, yet conflicts did not break out.⁵ However, one does discern some of the conflict prone areas fulfilling the requisites of 'internal colonialism,' e.g. Bangladesh, Baluchistan and to some extent Assam.

It was the second generation of the modernizationists who drew attention to the strength and endurance of ethnic and cultural loyalties. The works of Daniel P Moynihan, Nathan Glazer, Walker Connor, Cynthia Enloe and Ernest Gellner (Glazer and Moynihan 1975; Connor 1967; Enloe 1973; Gellner 1984), the better known of these theorists, appeared in the late sixties and the early seventies. According to these theorists, politics and political organizations play a crucial role in the modification and manipulation of group identities (Brass 1974; Das Gupta 1970; Gopal 1966). These theorists also gain strength from the primordialists who hold that ethnic identities are not chosen but given, an assertion that stands validated in more number of cases than negated. Cultural attachments form integral part of identity, which continue through life in ways that may not always be very evident but continue to provide impetus for social and political mobilization.

By now, it has become evident that these theories attempt to explain the resurgence of ethnonationalism only partly. They provide valuable insights towards the understanding of ethnic conflicts. However, it is clear that the state of explanatory theory is far from satisfactory. The phenomena examined here are quite varied and therefore recalcitrant to generalisations. There is as such no theory, which can offer a comprehensive set of generalisation or a general pattern into which the various variants of ethnic conflict in scores of countries can neatly fall. Some help may perhaps be extended in this direction by highlighting the factors responsible for the resurgence of ethnonationalism, especially in South Asia which has a most varied complex interethnic group interaction.

The Causes

At the outset, it is evident that unless there is a threat, perceived or real, either to the relative position or to the very continuance of its identity, no ethnic group assumes an ethnonational character (Jones 1986).⁶

Substantial body of data, which is available supports the proposition that material increases in social communication and mobilization tend to increase cultural awareness and to exacerbate interethnic conflicts. The cultural isolation in which an ethnic group could formerly cloak its cultural chasteness from 'perverting' influences of other cultures within the same state is fast eroding as a consequence of the increasing state activity and improvement in the quality and quantity of communication and transportation media. Consequently, there is a near universal desire to protect the cultural identification, which they feel threatened, as a result of the growing state activity. This is true of the tribal as well as the urban ethnic units. The presence of the state in the day-to-day activity, even in the remotest of areas, is increasingly felt. The progress of modes of communication from printed to the audio and now to the visual has had, in a way, a disintegrative effect. For example, the audio-visual transmission spurs reactive tendencies in different ethnic groups who also demand such rights as time for their own folk songs, dances, etc. on the radio and television at prime time (Connor 1972). Moreover, the discriminatory practices adopted by the state, the continued neglect or mishandling of the initial demands for linguistic accommodation, regional autonomy, equity in education or in employment avenues, etc. turns the self-conscious ethnic group into an active ethnonational movement.

Let us take the case of linguistic accommodation. The **linguistic question** is a particularly sensitive issue in most of the polyethnic states of South Asia. Each ethnonational group is conscious of its internationally sanctioned human right to establish its own schools, receive education in its mother tongue, use its own language in official business and to be able to develop its culture in print. Not all states accept it as a matter of domestic policy, causing active resistance from ethnic minorities. It would not be gainsaying that India has, to an extent, solved its linguistic problems by the creation of 'linguistic states' and adopting the three language formula. Thus the linguistic problem currently no longer takes the centre stage in India, as it does in Pakistan and Sri Lanka (Stavenhagen 1986).⁷ In Nepal too, language and its recognition remains a major plank on which much of the ethnic assertion rests. In southern Nepal, mostly known as Tarai or Madhes, Maithili, Bhojpuri, Awadhi are the lingua franca. However, Hindi that can be understood and spoken by almost all these people from the plains and can serve as a common

language, is yet to receive official recognition. A denial of these demands has often led to a further assertion of the ethnic identity rather than a fading away of the same.

Then, there have also been instances when the state, instead of acting as an arbiter between communities, has acted as an agent of one and a **dominant community**. Much of the Sindhi, Pakhtoon, Bengali and Baluch resentment in Pakistan is due to the Punjabi dominated Pakistani state. Same is true of the Sinhalese dominated Sri Lankan State, giving rise to frustration and resentment amongst the Tamils. The state apparatus in South Asia is becoming increasingly heavy, making the state actors all the more visible. When these actors adopt practices that are biased in favour of the dominant community, solution to ethno-political demands can hardly be hoped for. In Nepal, the dominant Brahmin-Chetriya (Bahun-Chetri) hill elite's insistence on recognising their own cultural practices as the singular markers of nationalism generated diverse ethnonational inclinations in the country.

The situation becomes even more complicated as the ethnonational groups seek legitimacy of their demands in the general acceptance of **the principle of self-determination**. Despite the fact that this principle remains to be evasive and subject to diverse interpretations, it has assumed immense popularity in modern times as the democratic basis of state formation and territorial settlement. Therefore, it would be in order to discuss this principle at length here.

The idea of the right to self-determination emerged in the eighteenth century from the fundamental human aspiration of people to choose their own form of government, as manifest in the American Proclamation of Independence and more significantly through the French Revolution. Since then it has taken roots and spread to other parts of the world. It has appeared in correspondingly different social movements and has been incorporated in various resolutions of the United Nations and those of other international agencies. At the end of the First World War, the principle was adopted to reformulate state boundaries within Western Europe. After the Second World War, it led to the end of the overseas empires. The resurgence of Afro-Asian independence owes a great deal to this idea: let the people decide their own political destiny. It is this principle that extends legitimacy to any self-differentiating people, simply because it is a people, should it so desire to rule itself. It has induced minorities in Europe, North America, Africa, Asia and Latin America, to question the validity of the present political borders. This factor has been of special relevance to South Asia as it has witnessed the creation of an independent state of Bangladesh as a consequence of

successful assertion of the right to self-determination.

These movements gain further momentum by an **international climate** that is equally conducive for small as well as the mini states. The rise and growth of the mini and microstates have acted as the most important factor which has encouraged small minority groups to entertain big political ambitions. The size of the country's population has ceased to bear any relationship on either its economic self-sufficiency or its military security. The global political environment makes it more unlikely that a militarily weak polity will be annexed by a larger power. Even in diplomatic disputes, size no longer remains to be a detrimental factor. The temptation therefore to continue to be a part of a big state no longer remains strong.

Another factor that has been conducive to the growth of ethnonationalism has been that of **external support**. To begin with, there are private groups or organizations of the same ethnic group living in another country, which for one reason or another have an interest in extending help. This has been true of almost all the major ethnonational movements of the world. For example, people of Irish descent in countries such as the United States and Australia have given material and moral support to the Irish cause in Ireland and United Kingdom. In South East Asia, some assistance for the Malay minority in Southern Thailand appears at times to come from segments of the Malay community in Malaysia. The Kachins of Burma have depended to some degree on support from their ethnic brothers on the Chinese side of the border. Expatriate Sikhs, settled in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom extended more than material and moral support for their ethnic cousins in India. So was the case with the Tamils of Sri Lanka who have received shelter and support from their kin in India. The Madhesis of Nepal definitely receive moral and material support from their brethren across the borders in India. This support has been mainly nonofficial. However, the ethnic groups have exercised pressure on their respective governments to pursue the interests of their coethnic groups in alien countries, with their governments.

There is yet another aspect of the role of the external agency in influencing the occurrence of ethnonational movements. Governments that are hostile to their neighbouring countries, render assistance of sorts to these ethnic movements. Sikhs and Kashmiris of India have depended to some degree on support from the erstwhile hostile governments of Pakistan. Similar moral and material assistance from other quarters also cannot be ruled out. Therefore, much depends on the mutual relations between the concerned governments. This happens despite the international norms being

highly critical of such interventions. However, Bangladesh came into existence due to its own internal problems with Pakistan. It has now been universally accepted that secessionists' demands succeed only when they are genuinely felt from within the region concerned, and cannot be generated from any outside power. Yes, foreign powers do play the role of catalysts when these movements reach a certain point in their own trajectory. In case of Bangladesh, this was possible due to the vulnerable political geography of the erstwhile state of Pakistan and also the fact that the genocidal nature of suppression of the ethnic conflict in East Pakistan accorded legitimacy to a contiguous and powerful patron, India, to justify its active participation on moral and legal grounds. Nevertheless, Indian action was openly condemned in the UN and but for the veto exercised by the Soviet Union, India would have found it extremely difficult to sail through. Recent Indian intervention in Sri Lanka, for various evident reasons, did not evoke any official criticism. This goes to prove that international responses are by and large qualified and tailored to suit the international security requirements as well as the regional balance of power.

We can thus conclude that foreign assistance to the ethnonational groups has in no case been the cause of their eruption; neither do they succeed in the fruition of the movement. However their involvement does go a long way in making the movement more formidable and intractable for the home state.

The Solutions?

Thus, we see that in the context of South Asian ethno-national movements various factors play an important role. Amongst them the institutions of power and authority have played the most crucial role, as inter-ethnic group cleavages have been basically political and these conflicts have been essentially conflicts for power sharing.

Naturally then, there is a need to look at options that are beyond the making of separate independent states. One major arrangement is that of Federalism. It is known to be a model that successfully accommodates diversities that are mostly territorial. Though instruments of federalism have by far succeeded in countries like the United States of America and Canada the general assumption is that the various units that established these states were initially artificially carved out to ensure administrative efficiency. In the case of Canada, in certain regions, lingual cohesiveness pervades. In countries like Switzerland where the lingual, religious and socio-economic diversities rarely coincide with the cantonal boundaries, peaceful cohabitation under the federal polity has so far been possible (Mathias 2005:5).

As mentioned earlier it is Federalism that is preferred to Unitarianism and Parliamentary system to Presidential system to protect diversities. Though institutions are prone to change with polity and therefore there is no guarantee of protection of diversities *only through institutions*. As Habermas has asserted that Institutions of constitutional freedom are only worth as much as a population makes of them. None the less it is through federalism that some amount of solutions to important problems, for example of harnessing self-interest, preventing factionalism, assuring that choices reflect long-term perspectives are reached. Federalism is a 'pragmatic, prudential technique', the applicability of which depends upon the particular form in which it is adopted, or even upon the development of new innovations in its application. It is also that long after the immediate need for establishing a federal polity is met that the institution remains relevant and useful.

The challenge however, is faced when these plural identities have a certain non territoriality about them. It is therefore under this situation that the case for exploring techniques to maintain, nurse and nourish cultural, socio- economic and religious diversities arise. In India for instance there are all kinds of diversities: Territorially based (Kashmiri, Marathi, Jharkhandi), non territorially based (Muslims, Parsi, Christian, Budhists,) Linguistic (Maithli, Bhojpuri, Urdu) Regional (Uttarakhand, Vidarbha, Gorkha) ethnic identities are in abundance. It is important to note that even the territorially based identities are not homogenous. Take the case of Kashmir. There are more than four regional identities within the state of Jammu and Kashmir: Kashmir, Jammu, the hill tribes and the Ladakh region. There are in Kashmir also more than four different religious identities: Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and the Sikhs. In Maharashtra, though the linguistic distinctiveness prevails within the region, there are demands of yet another identity of Vidarbha to be recognised. Interestingly these identities are never static. They often merge and melt with each other and provide a heady volatile mixture.

Indians are inclined to put themselves under the category of being a plural society, implying thereby that their diversities are not acute and they are merely a diverse people happily living under one nation state that is India. On the face of it, various governance directives and mechanizations employ tools that attempt to ensure that no particular community remains in a predominant position and that all diversities are amply secure. However, when we get a little closer we find that the picture is not so neat. Though there is representation of nearly all diverse groups at the centre, often this representation is not reasonable enough to provide for the aspirations of the nascent identities. Indian democracy is premised on a national belief in

pluralism, not the standard nationalist invocation of a shared history, a single language or an assimilationist culture. However this picture is currently undergoing a change. With histories being manipulated and levels of tolerance fast decreasing, anxieties of employment, combined with manipulations by the electoral elites, reactions such as Maharashtra for *Maratha Manush*, Assam for Assamese and a general divide along the length and breadth of the country against the largest minority, has challenged the popularly held belief that India is a truly plural multicultural country. The government has been supportive of the distinct cultural needs of minority communities in such wide range of areas as music and arts, festivals and traditional and religious attire in schools and army. However somewhere under the surface there has been a simmering that the majority religion, culture and the language of the majority language is almost hegemonistic. In the plural liberal democratic structure of the state there is a constant challenge of innovation, to accommodate the diversities that cry for recognition.

Institutional Design and Ethnic Conflict in Plural Societies

Realizing the limitations of the principle of self determination and the inadequacy of federalism to accommodate diversities of various kinds, we need to further explore the appropriate tools of governance that would protect and preserve the diversities as well as forge a system in place where no particular majority (or minority) gets in a position to dictate terms to the other (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972).⁸ In this work, the authors highlight that ethnic salience and ethnic outbidding undermine multiethnic cooperation and inevitably lead to nondemocratic, ethnically-exclusive states. We could consider some of the electoral innovations which have promised to do so.

Consociationalism

“Consociationalism” conceptualised by Arend Lijphart (Lijphart 1977, 2004, 2008) and others in the 1970s offers one of the most prominent alternatives to a majoritarian design of election based governance. Lijphart one of the first scholars to expatiate upon the concept of consociationalism argues that stable democracies in plural societies require power sharing arrangements. Power sharing in this case entails practices and institutions that may produce broad based governing coalitions based on major ethnic groups in society. Because the exclusive control of power by one majority group leaves little stake in the system for minority groups, an electoral system can be re-designed to encourage forging coalitions in divided societies where political parties break

along ethnic lines. The defining characteristics of consociationalism are as follows: Grand coalitions in parliament, proportionality rule for allocation of ministries at all levels, group autonomy, and minority veto. This approach helps the forging of a democratic polity wherein the ethnic groups are explicitly acknowledged, socially defined and integrated as pillars of civic institutions. Such power sharing is based upon a practical arrangement for accommodation and bargaining among political elites.

The concept gained much popularity in the early seventies when segments within post colonial states were threatening to obtain independence and world academics in the field of ethno- nationalism and conflict- management were challenged with the task of searching alternatives to monoculturism and assimilationism. Soon enough criticism was launched on the basis that this device reinforces the importance of ethnic cleavages, ends up in bargaining among political elites, makes no incentives for pan ethnic parties/ candidates making cross ethnic appeals (Horowitz 1985).⁹

They argue for an integrative approach that seeks to deal with ethnic conflict potential through fostering political arrangements that would lead to bridging/ transcending ethnic group differences. More recently Timothy Sisk has also argued in favour of structuring politics in such a way as to provide incentives for inter ethnic cooperation, creation of pre election coalitions between ethnic parties or broad economic or regional multi-ethnic parties based on interests that transcend ethnic identities.

Alternative vote system

The case for diverse electoral systems has also been made. It has been argued (Donald Horowitz, 2001) that certain methods of voting like the **A**lternative **V**ote **S**ystem (AVS) is the best electoral rule to foster voting patterns that will cross ethnic lines and will promote parties that have multi ethnic base. In contrast Andrew Reynolds and Ben Riley have argued that **S**ingle **T**ransferable **V**ote (STV) should be preferred to ensure just representation of ethnic pluralities as has been the case in Northern Ireland (Reynolds et al. 2005). After the Good Friday agreement of 1998 STV enabled the Northern Ireland voter to give their first vote to their own ethnic party. However their second vote would then go to the party that has been less aggressive against other groups. This encouraged Political parties to adopt tones that were moderate toward each other helping to alter the dynamics of a seemingly intractable conflict. Once elected, it is hoped that their policies too will be accommodative towards the ethnic groups other than their own to ensure that

they are voted back to power the next time. Of late, Fiji and Papua New Guinea have also adopted some variation of the same mechanism.

A central challenge of accommodating diversities in the current era is to promote practices that successfully regulate competing group claims within a democratic framework. The Newly emergent Democracies are ethnically plural societies. They face the twin challenge of opening up spaces for political competition and balancing the ethnic act. Often this results in wooing the diversities for electoral gains thereby heightening their insecurities in place of assuaging them. Thus it is natural to look for a **mix** of institutional mechanism to deal with the challenge of diverse societies.

Political Engineering within Parties

For instance there has been an emphasis on Political Engineering within parties (Benjamin and Riley). Although political parties are social phenomenon that remains beyond the scope of deliberate institutional design, it has been suggested that certain regulatory mechanisms can be introduced to ensure multi-ethnic party formation: (a) Have rules that require parties to demonstrate cross regional and or cross cultural appeal and composition as a precondition to be eligible to contest elections. (b) To ban ethnic parties. (c) To make it difficult for small parties to be registered. Examples from Turkey and Nigeria have been put across. In Nigeria for example, parties are by rule required to display federal character by including members from 2/3 of all states on their executive council. They are also required not to have name, motto and emblem that has regional or ethnic connotation. However it is common knowledge that formulation of multi-ethnic parties is a task that is extremely difficult to achieve. There are also suggestions as to have multi-ethnic constituencies: proactive *Gerrymandering* has been suggested to check on the extreme cases of monoethnic constituencies.

Administrative Mechanism

There is no denying the fact that many acts of omission/commission on behalf of the local administration are construed as deliberate to sideline or discriminate against the minorities. The general administration has to be refurbished and reoriented in tools of conflict resolution that involve concepts like active listening and patient hearing. The usual prejudices against communities other than their own run rampantly in the ranks that are often manifest in ugly ways. We have to acknowledge the police are far from 'diversity sensitive,' more so at the very ground level. To ensure a diversity friendly police it is helpful to have active recruitment policy that favours

diversity. Moreover, incentives linked to better public police relations need to be invented and implemented. Tools of effective public grievance mechanism, personnel management, improved internal administration, minimized corruption and clean politics might appear to be unrelated to issues concerning diversity but more often than not, act as a bulwark to preempt community recrimination based on ethnic identity.

There is yet another dimension to more inclusive administrative apparatus. This is of fairness. When minorities view a lack of representation in this apparatus their faith in the instruments of the state is shaken and also their belief in the fairness of the system undergoes a major challenge. For example, a state of almost no representation of Tarai-Madhesi people in the armed forces of Nepal until very recent history.¹⁰ Thus, proportional or nearly proportional representation is one way of keeping the diverse groups assuaged. The point however is to seek fundamental reforms or readjustments that would not generate painful feelings amongst the ethnic groups in the first place.

The states of South Asia have powerful resources at their disposal. Their control of investment and of the army, the great patronage at their disposal which is used to create interests devoted to the continuance of the state and their exclusive access to international support in the form of international aid, diplomatic pressure and even armed assistance, all these factors shift the balance in favour of the central state almost decisively.

However, with the exception of India none have tried to make best use of all these resources. India has created and maintained all India institutions in administration, economic planning, law, communication and military forces. It has also asserted the primacy of all India politics. But whereas other states of South Asia have desisted from making concessions to the regional forces, India has not done so. For example, in the formation of linguistic states, in devolution of powers in certain fields and in the languages of administration, though there has been a certain resistance or lethargy to recognize the legitimacy of such demands, she has usually come round. For instance, on grounds of economic efficiency the centre has resisted demands for the subdivision of existing states. Thus, she has accorded Statehood to regions only when it became absolutely unavoidable or when it has suited the electoral arrangements of the parties in power. Thus, much of instability and at times violence could have been avoided, had India adopted a more flexible policy of state reorganization.

What are available perhaps are no straight jacket solutions, for there are none, but solutions in keeping with the specificities of the situations which

are so varied. The various theories analysed earlier serve as useful framework to analyse the unfolding of the ethnonational phenomenon, thereby provide guidelines to the administering elites of avoiding practices that may result in either the creation or furthering of ethnic disaffection. For instance, it is now a generally agreed principle that assimilation is a tool will invariably fail if implemented for promoting nationalism amongst plural identities. And though, a certain amount of commonality has to be promoted for purposes of state building, every caution has to be taken to accord respectability to ethnic diversity. Similarly, federalism is better suited for territorially based ethnic communities. However, utmost caution has to be taken to provide safeguards for minorities within these territorial units. The tool that India adopted to ensure that the federal units, called states, remain neutral in the context of the religious discourse in the country was to identify region or language as the only basis of state formation. Though certain states were named after the ethnic identity of the majority community (e.g. Nagaland, Mizoland) most of them were named after the region (Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Arunachal, Jharkhand, Uttarakhand), language (Maharashtra, Gujarat, Punjab), or their traditional identity (Rajasthan, Bihar, Orissa). The states that were given names after the majority ethnic groups were done so in the wake of extreme threats to assuage secessionist tendencies. This was true in the case of Tamil Nadu, Nagaland or Mizoram and to a large extent Jammu and Kashmir. Special provisions were made to secure the diversity of the people under various constitutional stipulations. For instance, under certain sections of the Indian constitution there are provisions valid for states of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal and the entire Northeast of India, that no citizen of the country, other than belonging to the concerned state can own landed property in these states. This has been stipulated to secure the anxieties of the residents of these regions. There was also the very evident rule that never will there be a state based on religious identity.

Then, there is the Fundamental Rights regime under the Constitution of India according to which not only the basic rights of the citizens are secured against encroachments of the state, but also minority rights have been spelled out. There are categories of people identified as depressed under the various schedules as Schedule caste, or Tribe and affirmative action policies have been instituted to secure their rights to gain education, jobs, and also to protect them against any assault on their dignity. The minority communities too have been protected under special provisions.

However, as analysed earlier, there are no grand theories to explain this phenomenon in general terms. Similarly, the solutions too are varied. Each

‘people’ will have to invent their own special model that will suit the genius of their respective situations. Having said that, there are basic principles that have been followed by states that have been successful in managing their diversities. Newly emergent states will benefit a great deal in learning from their experience in not only picking up the ‘best practices’ but also in avoiding mistakes and blunders that these states have committed in managing their diversities.

Notes

1. The term ethnonationalism refers to a particular strain of nationalism that is marked by the desire of an ethnic community to have absolute authority over its own political, economic, and social affairs. Therefore, it denotes the pursuit of statehood on the part of an ethnic nation. Ethnonationalist movements signify the perception among members of a particular ethnic group that the group's interests are not being served under the present political arrangements <http://imej.wfu.edu/articles/1999/1/02/demo/Glossary/glossaryhtml/ethnonationalism.html>. In this paper however I use the term ethnonationalism in the context of ethnic groups demanding autonomy, federal structures, confederation etc.
2. Handlin Oscar (1952) spoke of an age of celebrating the immigrants and their successful incorporation in the mainstream of the socio-political life. Gunnar Myrdal (1944) too spoke of Afro-American status in America as a problematique. His suggestion to the Blacks therefore was it is to the advantage of American Negroes as individuals and as a group to become assimilated into American culture, to acquire the traits held in esteem by the dominant white Americans”: A thoughtful and effective critique of this simplistic developmental notion is by Cynthia Enloe (1973).
3. The more advanced and industrialized societies have been experiencing the rise of ethno-nationalism. The Basques and Catalans in Spain, South Tyroleans in Italy, Bretans and Corsicans in France, Walloons and Flemings in Belgium, Quebecois in Canada are all cases in point
4. The first belongs to, Althusser, Habermas, Poulantzas and O'Connor for whom modern state is a relatively autonomous force.
5. The case of Nepali-dominated southern Bhutan for a long time stood out prominently in this context.
6. According to Morris Jones ethno-nationalism strongly suggests aspirations set on independent statehood as the sole goal. However, as mentioned earlier, in the present paper I have used this term in a much wider context. It is inclusive of all ethnic groups which aspire for independence, autonomy *or* even for federal status.
7. In other states, bilingual educational systems have been accepted. In Western Europe too Belgium. Switzerland, Spain and Italy have had to face serious linguistic problems, just as in Canada. In Africa however the problem appears to be intractable as most of the population speaks one of the several vernaculars and the official language is the colonial one.

8. Indeed, two noted Public Choice scholars, Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle (1972) offer the clearest explication of why we ought to be pessimistic about the prospects for democracy in plural societies.
9. Critics like Donald Horowitz(1985) are concerned that these arrangements reinforce the importance of ethnic or religious cleavages.
10. This was pointed out by a deputy Prime Minister amidst a programme held in Kathmandu in 2012.

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LINGUISTIC PLURALISM IN NEPAL

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Abstract

This article presents the multilingual situation of Nepal and highlights the need to recognize and promote linguistic pluralism. It is divided into five parts. The first part defines language and linguistic pluralism, the second part discusses the plurality of languages, writing system, status and activities for linguistic development, the third part talks about the challenges against linguistic pluralism, the fourth part highlights the need of linguistic pluralism and the last part makes recommendations for the promotion of linguistic diversity.

Language and linguistic pluralism

Language is a system of communication which consists of a set of sounds and written symbols which are used by the people of a particular country or region for talking or writing. It is a fundamental component in all aspects of human life, activities, communications and the expressions of emotions. It is interrelated with culture because most of the components of a culture such as greetings, curses, praises, laws, literatures, songs, wisdom and prayers are expressed through it. It plays a central role in the exercise of cultural power. It is a powerful symbol of ethnicity, which makes a group distinct and unique. Likewise, it is an important component of cultural heritage and signifies kinship, group identity and solidarity. The loss of language would mean the loss of culture, identity, heritage, literary tradition, kinship, and so on.

Pluralism is the acknowledgement of diversity. It is a concept used in different ways for different issues. Religious pluralism accepts all religious paths as equally valid for promoting coexistence. Political pluralism permits the peaceful co-existence of different interests, convictions and life styles. Pluralism, in social sciences, is the framework of interaction in which social groups show sufficient respect for and understanding of each other, and as a result, they fruitfully coexist and interact without conflict or assimilation. Linguistic pluralism is the acceptance of linguistic diversity, a scenario where all people (minority or majority) have the right to speak their language in public and private domains without fear of condemnation. Such process is enforced through state policies to ensure the promotion and protection of these rights. In fact, it is a prerequisite for the foundation of social cohesion

which is characterized by inclusivity and respect for dialogue between members of the society.

Plurality of languages in Nepal

Number of languages: Although Nepal is a small Himalayan country lying between two large countries namely India and China to its south and north respectively, it accommodates a large number of languages. China, officially known as People's Republic of China, is the world's most populous country with a population of 1,347,350,000. It covers approximately 9.6 million square kilometres and is the world's fourth largest country by land area. However, according to Ethnologue (2009), there are 292 living languages and one language has no known speakers. India, officially known as Republic of India, is the seventh largest country by area. It is the second most populous country with a population of 1,210,193,422. Population census 1971 of Government of India lists over 1,652 individual languages whereas Ethnologue (2009) presents only 415 individual languages.

Bhutan spreads in an area of 38,354 square kilometres and has the population of 708,427 according to 2011 estimate. Ethnologue (2009) lists 25 individual languages in Bhutan. Dzongkha has been used as the national language and the language of government and education since 1971.

Similarly, Bangladesh runs in an area of 147,570 kilometres and has 149,772,364 populations. Ethnologue (2009) lists 42 individual languages there. Pakistan has an area of 796,095 square kilometres and has a population of 177,100,000. Ethnologue (2009) presents 72 individual languages there. Sri Lanka covers an area of 65,610 square miles. It has a population of 20,277,594 (2012 census) and 7 individual languages (Ethnologue 2009).

Nepal covers an area of 147,181 square kilometres and is the world's 93rd largest country by land mass and the 41st most populous country with the population of 27 million. It is a home to a larger number of languages than its neighbours are from the point of population size and geographical area. One cannot say with certainty how many languages are there in Nepal for lack of an extensive sociolinguistic survey. Different scholars and linguists have estimated different numbers of languages. Malla (1989) and Toba (1992) mention 70 languages while Ethnologue (2009) lists 126 languages. Population census (2001) identifies 92 languages, which are presented in Table 1 in order of their number of speakers.

Table 1: Population by Mother Tongue (Census 2001)

S.N.	Mother Tongue	Number	%	Cumulative
	<i>Total</i>	<i>22736934</i>	<i>100.00</i>	<i>100.00</i>
1	Nepali	11053255	48.61	48.61
2	Maithili	2797582	12.30	60.92
3	Bhojpuri	1712536	7.53	68.45
4	Tharu (Dagaura/Rana)	1331546	5.86	74.31
5	Tamang	1179145	5.19	79.49
6	Newar	825458	3.63	83.12
7	Magar	770116	3.39	86.51
8	Awadhi	560744	2.47	88.98
9	Bantawa	371056	1.63	90.61
10	Gurung	338925	1.49	92.10
11	Limbu	333633	1.47	93.57
12	Bajjika	237947	1.05	94.61
13	Urdu	174840	0.77	95.38
14	Rajbansi	129829	0.57	95.95
15	Sherpa	129771	0.57	96.52
16	Hindi	105765	0.47	96.99
17	Chamling	44093	0.19	97.18
18	Santhali	40260	0.18	97.36
19	Chepeng	36807	0.16	97.52
20	Danuwar	31849	0.14	97.66
21	Jhangar/ Dhangar	28615	0.13	97.79
22	Sunuwar	26611	0.12	97.90
23	Bangla	23602	0.10	98.01
24	Marwari (Rajsthani)	22637	0.10	98.11
25	Manjhi	21841	0.10	98.20
26	Thami	18991	0.08	98.29
27	Kulung	18686	0.08	98.37
28	Dhimal	17308	0.08	98.45
29	Angika	15892	0.07	98.52
30	Yakkha	14648	0.06	98.58

31	Thulung	14034	0.06	98.64
32	Sangpang	10810	0.05	98.69
33	Bhujel/ Khawas	10733	0.05	98.74
34	Darai	10210	0.04	98.78
35	Khaling	9288	0.04	98.82
36	Kumal	6533	0.03	98.85
37	Thakali	6441	0.03	98.88
38	Chhantyal/ Chhantel	5912	0.03	98.90
39	Nepali Sign Language	5743	0.03	98.93
40	Tibetan	5277	0.02	98.95
41	Dumi	5271	0.02	98.98
42	Jirel	4919	0.02	99.00
43	Wambule/ Umbule	4471	0.02	99.02
44	Puma	4310	0.02	99.04
45	Yholmo	3986	0.02	99.05
46	Nachhiring	3553	0.02	99.07
47	Dura	3397	0.01	99.08
48	Meche	3301	0.01	99.10
49	Pahari	2995	0.01	99.11
50	Lepcha/ Lapche	2826	0.01	99.13
51	Bote	2823	0.01	99.14
52	Bahing	2765	0.01	99.15
53	Koi/ Koyu	2641	0.01	99.16
54	Raji	2413	0.01	99.17
55	Hayu	1743	0.01	99.18
56	Byangshi	1734	0.01	99.19
57	Yamphu/ Yamphe	1722	0.01	99.19
58	Ghale	1649	0.01	99.20
59	Khariya	1575	0.01	99.21
60	Chhiling	1314	0.01	99.21
61	Lohorung	1207	0.01	99.22
62	Punjabi	1165	0.01	99.23
63	Chinese	1101	0.00	99.23

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64	English	1037	0.00	99.23
65	Mewahang	904	0.00	99.24
66	Sanskrit	823	0.00	99.24
67	Kaike	794	0.00	99.25
68	Raute	518	0.00	99.25
69	Kisan	489	0.00	99.25
70	Churaui	408	0.00	99.25
71	Baram/ Maramu	342	0.00	99.25
72	Tilung	310	0.00	99.25
73	Jero/ Jerung	271	0.00	99.26
74	Dungmali	221	0.00	99.26
75	Oriya	159	0.00	99.26
76	Lingkhim	97	0.00	99.26
77	Kusunda	87	0.00	99.26
78	Sindhi	72	0.00	99.26
79	Koche	54	0.00	99.26
80	Hariyanwi	33	0.00	99.26
81	Magahi	30	0.00	99.26
82	Sam	23	0.00	99.26
83	Kurmali	13	0.00	99.26
84	Kagate	10	0.00	99.26
85	Dzonkha	9	0.00	99.26
86	Kuki	9	0.00	99.26
87	Chhintang	8	0.00	99.26
88	Mizo	8	0.00	99.26
89	Nagamese	6	0.00	99.26
90	Lhomi	4	0.00	99.26
91	Assamise	3	0.00	99.26
92	Sadhani	2	0.00	99.26
93	Unknown Language	168340	0.74	100.00

Genetic affiliation: The 1971 census of India classifies the languages of India into five different families. They are: Indo-European, Dravidian, Austro-Asiatic, Tibeto-Burmese and Semito-Hermetic (GOI 1971). According to 1991 census, out of the total population, Indo-European (Indo-Aryan) has 75.28% speakers, Germanic has 0.02%, Dravidian has 22.53%, Austro-

Asiatic 1.13%, Tibeto-Burman 0.97% and Semito-Harmitic has 0.01% speakers. The Indian constitution identifies 22 'recognized languages.' The languages of Bangladesh belong to Indo-Aryan, Austro-Asiatic, Dravidian and Tibeto Burman families.

The languages of Nepal enumerated in the 2001 census belong to the four language families, viz. Indo-European, Sino-Tibetan, Austro-Asiatic, and Dravidian. Among them, Indo-European family of languages constitutes nearly 79.1%, Sino-Tibetan family 18.4%, Austro-Asiatic family less than 1% and Dravidian constitutes 0.13% of the total populations. Tibeto-Burman group of Sino-Tibetan family consists of about 57 languages.

Austro-Asiatic family of languages comprises Santhali of the northern Munda group and Khariya of the southern Munda group. Kusunda is a linguistic isolate. Jhangar is the single language of Dravidian family spoken in Nepal. It is called Jhangar in the east and Dhangar in the west of the Kosi river.

Writing system: Only a few of Nepal's indigenous languages have a writing system. These include Tibetan, Nepal Bhasa, Limbu and Lepcha. Tibetan and Sherpa are two of the Tibeto-Burman languages with the earliest written records (van Driem, 2001: 428). The Tibetan script was developed from the Gupta or Brahmi script which was employed for writing Sanskrit in the mid-seventh century.

Newar (or Nepal Bhasha) has an ancient written literary tradition. Newari script has been still in use since the 19th century despite some changes in the script with the passage of time. It had two variants: Ranjana and Bhujimol. Ranjana was in vogue from the 11th to 18th centuries while Bhujimol remained in use from the 11th till 17th centuries. From the Bhujimol script emerged a number of other scripts used for writing Nepal Bhasa. Now Nepal Bhasa is also written in Devanagri script. Limbu uses its own script called Sirijanga script. Lepcha is written in Rong script.

More recently, a subset of the Rai group of languages such as Bantawa, Thulung, Chamling, Khaling, Kulung and others has taken initiative to develop a practical and acceptable writing system to represent the sound system of its languages. Wambule has started to use Sirijanga script with some modifications. Tharu, Tamang and Gurung use the Devanagri script but some Gurung speakers advocate for the use of Roman script for their language. Magar is written in Akkha script.

Status of languages: Yadava and Turin (2005) categorize the indigenous languages in seven levels according to the level of endangerment. They are given below:

Safe languages (13): Newar, Limbu, Magar, Tharu, Tamang, Bantawa, Gurung, Rajbangsi, Tibetan, Sherpa, Khaling,¹ Kham and Nepali sign language are safe languages as they have inter-generational language transmission, a large number of speakers, a high rate of language retention, an increasing response to new domains such as seminars/meetings, computer fonts, printed or electronic media, e.g. newspaper, radio, television and film, development of materials for language education and literacy and use of mother tongue as the medium of instruction.

Almost safe languages (13): Chamling, Santhali, Chepang, Danuwar, Dhangar/Jhangar, Thangmi, Kulung, Dhimal, Yakkha, Thulung, Sangpang, Darai and Dolpo are almost safe languages because they lack a response to new domains of language use and media and have not developed materials for language education and literacy.

Potentially endangered languages (8): Kumal, Thakali, Chantyal, Dumi, Jirel, Athpariya, Mugali and Belhare are potentially endangered languages as they lack intergenerational language transmission and language use in education and media.

Endangered languages (22): Umbule, Puma, Yholmo, Naccherang, Dura, Meche, Pahari, Lepcha, Bote, Bahing, Koi, Raji, Hayu, Byangsi, Yamphu, Ghale, Khariya, Chhiling, Lohorung, Sunuwar, Majhi and Bhujel are endangered languages as they are spoken by only a few elderly and fewer adult people.

Seriously endangered languages (12): Mewahang, Kaike, Raute, Kisan, Chuarauti, Baram, Tilung, Jerung, Dungmali, Baragaunle, Nar-phu and Manangwa are seriously endangered languages because they are spoken by fewer than 500 speakers.

Moribund languages (7): Lingkhim, Kusunda, Koche, Sam, Kagate, Chhintang² and Lhomi are moribund languages as they are spoken by under 100 elderly speakers.

Extinct or nearly extinct languages: Byangsi, Chonkha, Longaba, Mugali, Sambya, Pongyong, Bungla, Chukwa, Hedangba, Waling and Khandung are extinct or nearly extinct languages. These languages are not spoken now. These facts show the critical situation of most languages in Nepal.

Activities for language development: Some attempts were made for the development of national languages after the restoration of multiparty democracy in 1990. Recommendation Commission for Formulating Policy for National Languages was formed by the government in 1993. Promotion of national languages and their use in local administration, primary education and media were the major objectives of the commission. As a result, the Curriculum Development Centre (CDC), Sanathimi has so far developed textbooks in 14 national languages to be taught as a paper in a mother tongue. Though these text books have some serious drawbacks such as not being able to fulfil the cultural requirements of the language communities in question since they are basically the translation of the existing Nepali textbooks, they are, nonetheless, a welcome initiative. In addition, Radio Nepal began broadcasting news in eight national languages such as Rai (Bantawa), Limbu, Gurung, Magar, Tamang, Bhojpuri, Awadhi and Tharu. Newari, which had been used for broadcasting news in addition to national media's principal language Nepali, was reinstated in 1990. In January 1993 Maithili was used for broadcasting news in Radio Nepal. Now, Radio Nepal broadcasts news in 19 different languages though for a short time. The Gorkha Patra Sansthan publishes articles written in mother tongues in their script and Nepal Pragya Pratisthan publishes the Bahubhasik Sayapatri which is a multilingual journal. The articles come out bilingual—both in the national language and its translation into Nepali.

Government of Nepal (GON) participated in different international forums like Jomtin Convention and Dakar Forum expressing its commitment to making quality primary education accessible to all children including children from indigenous and minority language groups. In pursuance of this commitment, one more goal was included for Nepal besides other six universal goals of Education for All (EFA) for ensuring the right of indigenous people and linguistic minorities to basic and primary education through mother tongue. To achieve the EFA/Nepal (2004-9) goals transitional multilingual education policy was endorsed. According to this policy, a child will acquire basic educational skills through the medium of his/her mother tongue and gradually switch over to a lingua franca/an official language so that s/he can “feel at home in the language in which the affairs of

government are carried on” and finally learn a foreign language (e.g. English) for broader communications and access to science and technology (Fishman 1968: 698).

Challenges against linguistic pluralism

Challenges against linguistic pluralism at the global level: There could be several factors for the disappearance of languages. They are: death of speakers, aggression or genocide of a group of people, assimilation and urbanization, language suicide and capitalist and cultural globalisation. Nettle and Romaine (2002) give the examples of the extinction of languages after the death of their last speakers. They record the death of Laura Somersal, one of the last speakers of Wappo, an indigenous language of California in 1990 and Tevlic Esenc, the last speaker of Ubykh, an indigenous language of the north western Caucasus in 1992. Crystal (2000:71) gives the example of 2,200 deaths and over 22,000 displacements in Papua New Guinea caused by a 7.1. (Richter) magnitude devastating earthquake. Further, he gives several such instances: one million deaths between 1845 and 1851 caused by Irish potato famine, some 22 million affected in 22 countries of south Africa in 1983-5 by drought, 90% of the indigenous population killed by the diseases of the first Europeans within 200 years of their arrival in the Americas, several indigenous communities exterminated in Columbia due to a mixture of aggressive circumstances including military conflict, and some 25,000 killed in El Salvador in 1932 by Salvadoran soldiers during peasant uprising. Similarly, exploitation of indigenous natural resources has serious effect on the local people as they are bound to leave their homeland for want of resources in order to sustain their livelihood.

When a culture is assimilated to a dominant culture, the former begins to lose its characters and its speakers adopt new behaviour and mores. Such cultural assimilation causes decline of languages. Dominance of a culture results from demographic submersion in which a large number of people arrive in the indigenous people's territory and swamp them as happened in Australia and North America in the course of colonization. One culture may exercise its influence over another through its initial military superiority or for economic reason and establish its language as standard or official language as it happened in Africa after the European entry.

Urbanisation produces cities which attract rural communities. Development of transport and communication facilitate their access to the cities where they come in contact with consumer society through the use of dominant language such as Spanish or Portuguese in South Africa, Swahili in

much of East Africa, Quechua and Aymara in the Andian countries and English everywhere. This consumer culture promotes homogeneity of dominant language through advertisements of goods and other programmes in television, which serves as cultural nerve gas to indigenous languages.

Nugi wa Thiongo (1986) shares his experience of incarceration and eventual exile when he chose to write in his native language Gikuyu. He calls it cultural bomb which annihilates people's belief in their names, in their languages, in their heritage of struggle, unity, capacities and ultimately in themselves, and compels them to identify with other peoples' languages as is the case in Africa.

People are not born with feelings of shame and lack of confidence in their language. Members of dominant culture stigmatize them in such terms as stupid, lazy and barbaric and their language as ignorant, backward, deformed, and inadequate or even a creation of the devil to use the version of some missionaries. Akira Yamamoto (1998:215) quotes the statement of a nineteenth century commissioner of Indian affairs in the USA: 'The instruction of the Indians in the vernacular is not only of no use to them, but is detrimental to the cause of their education and civilization.'

These negative attitudes are further reinforced by the introduction of practices which punish the use of the local language. Nungwa wa Thiong (1986:11) recalls his experience from his school days:

One of the most humiliating experiences was to be caught speaking Gikuyu in the vicinity of the school. The culprit was given corporal punishment –three to five strokes of the cane on the bare buttocks-or was made to carry a metal plate around the neck with inscriptions such as I AM STUPID or I AM A DONKEY. Sometimes, the culprits were fined money they could hardly afford.

Not only in relation to English, French, Spanish and Portuguese policies of suppression were common in Africa and Latin America. The Japanese suppressed Ainu in Japan. Indigenous languages were prohibited in missions and boarding schools. Welsh was also prohibited. Languages decline when positive attitudes are missing. Several governments in Africa would see linguistic diversity as a threat to national unity- to the task of building a nation because of well attested history of ethnic conflict caused by minority languages throughout the region.

However, in the case of Nepal linguistic pluralism has been threatened mostly by the repressive policy of the government.

Challenges against linguistic pluralism in Nepal

Direct repression of languages other than Nepali: Prithvi Narayan Shah annexed many principalities and independent states to the Gorkha kingdom, expanded it and made a huge Nepal. According to Whelpton (2008:40), "The 'unification' of Nepal by king Prithvi Narayan Shah of Gorkha and his successors in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century was in the first place a straightforward military conquest: there was certainly no demand for unity of the kind expressed by many Germans and Italians before German and Italian unification was achieved.' Then, he described his kingdom as an *asal* (real) Hindustan (Dibyopades) and imposed Hindu religion, Aryan culture and Khas language (his own religion, culture and language) upon the indigenous nationalities having distinct religion, culture and language. However, he did not fall behind making a popular statement that 'this country is the common flower garden of four *varnas* and thirty six castes.' Before the unification, the far Kirant or Limbuwan (the land of the Limbu) was an autonomous region ruled by the Limbu. After they negotiated with the Gorkha kingdom in 1774, they were united to them. The agreement entitled them to continue their traditional ownership of the land and practices of traditional culture and religion. However, very soon, the performance of Hindu culture to celebrate Dashain and worship Durga, one of the deities of the Hindu was made mandatory for them. Two Athpahariyas namely Ramlinghang and Ridama were hanged to death for not obeying the order to celebrate Dashain (Tumbahang 2011:22). The Limbu would sacrifice calf or bull to the deities to appease or please them but in April/May 1805 a year after his return from Banaras, Rana Bahadur Shah enforced a ban on cow slaughter ordering his district officers to subject the killer of a cow to capital punishment and confiscation of his property. The royal order to Bichari Hiranda Tiwari dated March 1806 against a low-caste tailor who was accused of killing a cow read 'Cut off flesh from his back, and put salt and condensed citrus juice on the wounds. Make him eat the flesh himself and kill him' (RRS X11.11:169). Similarly, the Royal order issued to the chief administrator of Salyan district in 1810 said: "Persons who commit the heinous crime of slaughtering oxen in Hindu land shall be flayed alive, impaled, or hanged upside down until they are dead. Their property shall be confiscated and members of their family enslaved." (They were forbidden by the state because the Hindu worshipped an oxen (X11.11.170). *Muluki Ain* of 1854 reduced capital punishment to life imprisonment and recent *Muluki Ain* stipulates 12 years' imprisonment for it. Therefore, Limbu priests would pronounce the name of a cow and sacrifice a buffalo or goat in its place.

Janga Bahadur Rana introduced Civil Code (*Muluki Ain*) that codified and standardized the existing diverse customs, laws and practices in the context of Hindu precepts and laws and enforced them upon all communities including non-Hindu communities. This code and its implementation reinforced the process of assimilation of diverse ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups in Nepal that had begun under King Jayasthiti Malla of Kathmandu. Until many years after the Nepal unification, the Limbu performed financial transaction through promissory note written in the Limbu language in Sirijanga script. In 1905, Rana Prime Minister Chandra Samser ordered that only documents in Nepali should be admissible in court cases. It made Nepali mandatory for a legal document. Afterwards, even reading and writing in Limbu were prohibited, which is revealed by the advice that read, "Let's not say that we read and write in Limbu. Gorkha king will kill us if he notices it", this was advice given by the conscious elderly people to the common ones. Many Limbu scholars fled the country for fear of being arrested. They went to Sikkim and continued teaching the language to the people there. The Chhantyal were forbidden to speak their mother tongue while working in the mine.

Whelpton (2008:49) says, "The formal declaration of Nepali as the official language was only made under Maharaja Chandra Shamser (1901-1921)" while Malla (1979:135) dates it to 1920. According to Shrestha (1999:87), "The language of the Newars 'Nepal Bhasa' began to be called 'Nevari' while the name 'Nepali' was used to replace 'Khaskura' or 'Gorkhali language'." The Rana rulers launched repression campaign against indigenous languages by imposing a ban on publications, sending writers and campaigners to jail for certain period of time, confiscating their property and even sentencing them to life imprisonment and capital punishment. In 1909, Nisthanada Vajracharya published a Nepal Bhasa book entitled **Ekavimsati Prajyapara**, a Buddhist text with Sanskrit slokas. He brought all printing materials from Calcutta and carried out all the printing works. But Nepal Bhasa publications were banned subsequently. Siddhidas Amatya wrote nearly 50 books and many poems in Nepal Bhasa that advocated against caste and gender discriminations. In 1912, Jagat Sundar Malla opened a Nepal Bhasa school in Bhaktapur. He was arrested and threatened to imprisonment for his activities. In 1913 Gorkha Bhasa Prakashini Samiti was formed for the development of Gorkha language. It marginalized other indigenous languages. In 1924, Yogbir Singh was fined for publishing a religious poem in Nepal Bhasa. In subsequent years, it was made illegal to sing hymn in Nepal Bhasa or to speak it on the telephone. Gellner (2008:5) says, "As part

of the construction of the new national identity, the dominant language, having been known as Gorkhali or colloquially as *Khas kura*, was renamed 'Nepali' in about 1933." In 1941 Sukraraj Shastri, writer of the first Nepal Bhasa grammar and of the textbooks for class 1 and class 2 children was hanged to death. Chittadhar Hridaya was jailed for six years, Siddhicharan Shrestha for 18 years, Dharma Datta Yami for 18 years and Phatte Bahadur Singh for life. In 1944, 8 monks were expelled from the country for teaching Theravada Buddhism in *Nepal Bhasa*. In 1946, they were allowed to return only due to international pressure.

Even after political change in 1951, Nepali alone was made the medium language of government, administration and schools and all languages including Nepal Bhasa lost their recognition from the government. In 1951, Radio Nepal began broadcasting news in Nepal Bhasa once a day. In 1958, Kathmandu municipality made a decision to accept applications and publish its major decisions in it in addition to Nepali language. In 1953, the government recognized it as spoken language and oriental language subject. Nepal Educational Council adopted it as an optional subject. Then, it was included in the course of study at the high school level in 1954, at the intermediate level in 1960 and bachelor level in 1962. In 1963, Kathmandu municipality's decision to recognize Nepal Bhasa in official work was revoked. In 1965, it was banned from being broadcast on Radio Nepal. Then, a protest movement was launched against this ban, which is known as 'Bais Salya Andolan'. The government suppressed it by imprisoning Buddhist monk Bhikshu Sudarshan and writers Mangal Man Shakya, Puspa Gopal Shakya and Shree Krishna Anu. The activists like Durga Lal Shrestha, Hitkar Bir Singh Kansakar and Mangal Man Shakya of Om Bahal were forced to remain underground. The New Education Plan introduced in 1971 disrupted the study of Nepal Bhasa. From 1977, it was introduced only at the Master's level, but it was not counted for promotion by the government.

Repressive educational policy: Even the governments formed after the introduction of democracy in 1950 continued the traditional language policy of suppressing indigenous languages and encouraging Nepali, the Khas language. This is evident from the following recommendations made by National Education Planning Commission (NEPC) 1956 for Nepal's language policy in education:

- (i) The medium of instruction should be the national language in primary, middle, and higher educational institutions, because any language which cannot be made lingua franca and which does not serve legal

proceedings in court should not find a place ... The use of national language can bring about equality among all classes of people, can be an anchor-sheet for Nepalese nationality, and can be the main instrument for promoting literature (NEPC 1956).

- (ii) No other language should be taught, even optionally in primary school because few children will need them, they would hinder the use of Nepali, parents would insist on their children taking them whether capable or not, time is needed for other more important and fundamental learning – there are not enough well-qualified teachers, and those who wish and need additional languages, can begin them in the 6th grade. (NEPC 1956:95)
- (iii) The study of a non-Nepali local tongue would mitigate against the effective development of Nepali...if the younger generation is taught to use Nepali as the basic language then other languages will gradually disappear, the greater the national strength and unity will result...Local dialects and tongues other than Nepali should be vanished [banished] from the playground as early as possible in the life of the child. (NEPC 1956)

The use of Nepali in education was further reinforced by K.I. Singh government in 1957 by prescribing Nepali as medium of instruction. According to Pathak and Upreti (2009), Nepal Tarai Congress led by Bedananda Jha led a huge mass gathering in the entire Tarai region against the Nepali language in education and Pahade or Khas Chauvinism and launched a 'Save Hindi' Campaign in 1957. It had a serious confrontation with Nepali Propoganda Assembly in Biratnagar. In February 1958, the representatives of All Nepal Save Hindi Committee appealed to the king for the withdrawal of the directives of government to teach in Nepali medium. But it was not heard. Instead, the case of Nepali was further reinforced.

In 1961, the National System of Education was introduced to further promote the use of only Nepali in administration, education and media in compliance with the Panchayat slogan 'one language, one dress, one country' (*eutaa bhasha, eutaa bhesh, eutaa desh*). Then, it was made compulsory to sing the national anthem at the beginning of each school day and to display the king's portrait in all school premises. The infrastructure existed to enforce such decrees. In addition, Nepali Company Act was passed in 1964 directing all companies to keep their records in English or Nepali. New Education System Plan (NESP) was introduced in 1971. One of its goals was 'harmonizing diverse multi-lingual traditions into a single nationhood (HMG 1971:2).

The goals of the NESP were:

to strengthen devotion to crown, country, national unity and the Panchayat System, to develop uniform traditions in education by bringing together various patterns under a single national policy, to limit the tradition of regional languages, to encourage financial and social mobility and to fulfil manpower requirements essential for national development.(MOE1971:1)

Therefore, the state published textbooks excluded the cultures, histories, and languages of Nepal's ethnic groups. According to Koing (1999), a nation state is characterised by civic and ethnic models. The first model is based on individual rights and the second one is focused on common historical origin and destiny, shared culture, mentality, custom and language. The model of nation state between post- unification era and pre-multiparty era was based on ethnicity, ie. Khas ethnicity and the nation adopted the ideal of mono-lingualism and policies of cultural homogenization to meet the functional requirements of bureaucracy and to achieve efficiency in public communication in a complex multilingual society.

Unfriendly Constitutional Provisions for Linguistic Pluralism: The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal from 1947 to 1962 did not recognize the multilingual situation. The constitution of the kingdom of Nepal 1947 proclaimed during the premiership of Padma Shamsher Rana and the Interim Constitution of 1950 promulgated after the overthrow of Rana regime did not make any provision to stop traditional practice of linguistic discrimination against indigenous languages. King Mahendra promulgated a constitution in 1962, which centralized political power in the royal palace and promoted mono-cultural nationalism: one language (Nepali), one religion (Hindu), one dress (Daura suruwal), and one culture (Hill Hindu). The Hindu identity of the nation was demonstrated through daily broadcast of ritual music and sermons on Radio Nepal, the government funding of Sanskrit schools and observance of public holidays on Hindu festivals.

In reaction to the suppression of indigenous people's linguistic rights, ethnic organizations like Kirat Yakthung Chumlung, Nepal Bhasa Mankah Khalah, Nepali Langhali Association, Nepal Tamang Ghedung and others were formed. They raised their voices for their linguistic rights. According to Bhattachan (1995:7), in 1990, the joint effort of different minority groups resulted in a new forum called Nepal Janajati Mahasangh (Federation of the Nationalities of Nepal), which began with the participation of 18

nationalities. It spoke loud and clear for the rights of ethnic groups to language among others.

In November, 1990, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal was promulgated. This constitution for the first time, recognized Nepal as a multilingual country declaring, in Article 4 of the constitution, Nepal as 'a multiethnic, multilingual, democratic, independent, indivisible, sovereign, Constitutional Hindu Monarchical Kingdom.' Article 6.1 mentioned that 'the Nepali language in the *Devnagari* script is the language of the nation of Nepal. The Nepali language shall be the official language.' Article 6.2 mentioned that 'all the languages spoken as the mother tongue in various parts of Nepal are the national languages of Nepal.' From these articles, it is clear that Nepali retained its dominant status as the 'language of the nation of Nepal' and the language to be used in all official state business, although other languages were granted a modicum of recognition as 'national languages. The linguistic interplay between declaring Nepali language in *Devnagari* script as the language of the nation and all other languages spoken as mother tongue in various parts of Nepal as the national languages of Nepal is indicative that the linguistic hierarchy of Nepali language over the national languages still remains. According to Upadhyaya (2011:121), 'the two linguistic terms used: 'the language of the nation' and 'national languages' reveal the hegemony of the language of dominant class, as one language takes the position of 'the language of the nation' with a determinative article 'the' and other languages become subordinate as, rhetorically speaking, the definition of 'national languages' is ambiguous.' He further says that the provision in Article 6.2 is 'a grand rhetorical construction that at once said everything but defined nothing.'

Article 18.1 says that 'each community residing within the kingdom of Nepal shall have the right to preserve and promote its language, script and culture.' Article 18.2 says that 'each community shall have the right to operate schools up to the primary level in its own mother tongue for imparting education to its children.' However, the commitment to do so by the governments that come to power is nowhere to be seen in constitutional documents. This is only a rhetoric used by constitution designers in order to balance the equation following 'assimilation-tolerance model' that in its law 'provides one language but provides room for other languages without any commitment to them.'

According to Part 1, Article 5 of The *Interim Constitution of Nepal* (2007), 'All languages spoken as the mother tongue in Nepal are the national languages of Nepal.' According to Article 5.2 of the constitution, 'The Nepali

Language in *Devnagari* script shall be the official language.' Article 5.3 states that 'Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (2), it shall not be deemed to have hindered to use the mother tongue in local bodies and offices. State shall translate the languages so used into an official language.' The provision of Article 5.1 of the Interim Constitution again assigns Nepali the status of a single official language, which is a clear sign of the continuation of the Panchayat era mentality.

Part 3, Article 17.1 of the Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007 states that 'Each community shall have the right to get basic education in their mother tongue as provided for in the law.' Article 17.2 says that 'Each community residing in Nepal shall have the right to preserve and promote its language, script, culture, cultural civility and heritage.' However, no law exists in Nepal to implement Article 17.1.

A comparison of Nepal's constitutional provisions of linguistic rights to those of neighbouring countries reveals the fact that in some cases Nepal is more liberal while in other cases more conservative than them. According to Article 343 (1) of the Indian constitution, Hindi written in *Devanagari* script shall be the 'official language' of the union. The reason for designating Hindi as the 'official language' and not the 'national language' is that not only Hindi but all regional languages are regarded as the national and not foreign languages. Sometimes, 22 languages listed in the eighth schedule are referred to, without legal standing, as the national languages of India. If this logic is to be accepted, only regional and scheduled languages are considered as national languages in India. In 1987, through the 13th amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka, Tamil was also decreed an official language of the state and the legal basis for parity between Sinhala and Tamil was clearly established by law. In addition, both languages were also defined as 'national languages' while recognizing English as the 'link language.' Ethnologue (2009) lists 25 individual languages in Bhutan, but only Dzongkha has been used as the national language and the language of government and education since 1971.

Similarly, Ethnologue (2009) lists 42 individual languages in Bangladesh, but only Bangla is defined as "state language of the Republic" according to Article 3 of the constitution of Bangladesh as adopted on 4 November 1972. It is the official and national language of Bangladesh. Ethnologue 2009 presents 72 individual languages of Pakistan. Article 251.1 of the constitution of Pakistan adopted on 10 April 1973 says that "the national language of Pakistan is Urdu, and arrangements shall be made for its being used for official and other purposes." Article 251.3 states that "the

English language may be used for official purposes" until the transition to Urdu is complete, and that provincial assemblies may 'by law prescribe measures for the teaching, promotion and use of a provincial language in addition to the national language.' But in Nepal all mother tongues are constitutionally recognized as 'national languages'. However, they are not used in administration.

Indian constitution stated that after the period of 15 years from the commencement of the constitution, i.e., from January 26, 1965 Hindi would be installed as the official language at the centre and that in the meantime, the English language would continue to be used for that purpose. However, Article 343 (3) authorises Parliament to provide by law for the continued use of the English language for such purposes as may be specified in the law even after the period.

Article 345 authorises a state to adopt, by making a law, any regional language or languages in use in the state, or Hindi, for its official purposes. The choice of the state is not limited to languages mentioned in the eighth schedule. Till such law is made, the English language is to continue to be the official language of the state. English is extensively used in business and administration and has the status of a 'subsidiary official language.' Parliamentary business may be conducted in either Hindi or English. The constitution permits a person who is unable to express himself in either Hindi or English, with the permission of the speaker of a relevant House, to address the House in the mother tongue. The constitution requires the authoritative texts of all laws including parliamentary enactments and statutory instruments to be in English. The constitution provides that all proceedings in the Supreme Court of India, the country's highest court and the High Court shall be in English.

In India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, English language enjoys higher status than the national languages, but in Nepal Nepali language is the sole official language. It may be because the former countries were colonized by the British for a long period of time and consequently they have been still influenced by the use of English in administration, education, parliamentary business, proceedings in the court and preparing laws whereas the latter one was never colonized and ever remained independent of external power.

According to Ministry of Education (1965:192), the Education Commission between 1964 and 1966 recommended the adoption of 'three language formula.' They were: (1) the mother tongue or regional language (2) the official language of the Union or the associate official language of the Union so long as it exists and (3) a modern Indian or foreign language not

covered under (1) and (2) and other than that used as the medium of instruction for secondary education all over the country. Nepal showed its commitment to practice multilingual education hardly a decade ago.

Conservative attitude of some Brahman bureaucrats towards linguistic pluralism: According to Nijamati Karmachari Kitab Khana (Personnel Registration Office (2006), 58.3% of the total government posts was occupied by the Bahuns. Neupane (2005) recorded 71.3% of the leadership positions in judiciary, executive, legislative, and constitutional bodies to have been held by Bahun, Chhetri, Thakuri and Sanyasi. Most officials were conservative and saw language diversity as an impediment to development and national unity. The conservative mindset of bureaucrats and high officials in constitutional bodies disturbed the implementation of even a few linguistic rights enshrined in the constitution.

The Supreme Court verdict of June 1, 1999 is a proof to this act. According to Shrestha (1999:97), Kathmandu Metropolitan City (KMC) passed a resolution and declared *Nepal Bhasa* an official language of the municipality in addition to Nepali on 24 July 1997. Rajbiraj Municipality, Janakpur Municipality and Dhanusha District Development Committee followed this suit by introducing Maithili as an additional official language. However, in response to the case filed against this move, the Supreme Court, on 18 March 1998, issued a stay order to KMC, Rajbiraj Municipality and Dhanusha District Development Committee asking them to refrain from using the local languages for official purposes until a final verdict would be made. Though according to the *Local Self-Governance Act* 1999, local governments had right to preserve and promote local languages, on June 1, 1999, the Supreme Court announced its final verdict and issued a *certiorari* meaning that the decision of these local bodies to use regional languages as an additional official means of communication was unconstitutional and illegal. Several public demonstrations and mass meetings were called to protest the verdict of the Supreme Court. Nepal Federation of Nationalities (NEFEN) organized a national conference on linguistic rights on March 16-17. It passed the following resolution:

...legal provisions be made to allow the use of all mother-tongues and the verdict of the court be declared void since it runs against the values of the present constitution of Nepal which recognizes all mother tongues as 'national languages' and the Local Autonomy Act [LSGA] which contains provisions for the use, preservation and promotion of mother-tongues by local bodies. (NEFEN2008:8)

In fact, the Supreme Court verdict has raised a serious concern among the mother tongue speakers about the implementation of the government's commitment to use national languages in administration. According to Yadava and Turin (2005:35), 'There is a widespread concern among ethnic activists and rural villagers alike that despite the legal provisions respecting their fundamental rights, an institutional inertia exists regarding the emotive issues of mother tongue education and the access of minority communities to positions in government and administration.' Even though their right is violated, the indigenous people rarely resort to legal means because they know that 'the machinery of government is still primarily controlled by 'high caste' groups who have held power for the last 250 years and have little incentive to change or relinquish control (Ibid)'. In reaction to the verdict of the Supreme Court, indigenous people observe June 1 as a black day.

Non-official status of languages other than Nepali: As mentioned earlier, though the Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007 recognizes all languages as national languages, it has recognized only Nepali written in *Devanagari* script as an official language. Until now, it is the medium of instruction in schools and campuses and the language used in Public Service Commission (PSC) examination and government offices. Therefore, non-Nepali speakers are gradually abandoning their mother tongues in favour of Nepali motivated by the job opportunity it may offer to them. Gellner (2008:20), too, shares similar opinion when he says:

'In the face of the erosion of many local languages, one point needs stressing. For many ordinary Nepalis today their local languages and traditions have no practical value, they often feel, a disadvantage in the highly competitive scramble for employment and survival.'

Need of linguistic pluralism: A country like Nepal greatly requires adopting the policy of linguistic pluralism to address issues of linguistic discrimination and resolve on-going conflict between the State and the indigenous people. It also needs to develop and promote indigenous languages to sustain linguistic plurality. The reasons why Nepal needs linguistic pluralism are discussed below:

Conflict resolution: The constitution of the kingdom of Nepal 1990 could not address the linguistic issue raised by the non-Nepali speakers. The recognition of these languages as 'national languages' without any provision

of their use in administration, court or PSC rendered them insignificant. The grievances of non-Nepali speakers developed due to the establishment of separate university for Sanskrit, a dead language not spoken by anybody in practical life, and allocation of good budget to it in spite of the admission of a few students there. In the case of living indigenous languages, the constitution provided them with the right to run classes up to the primary level but the government did not create separate vacancy for a language teacher. The Maoist party, in their 40-point demands, addressed the basic rights of indigenous people and their mother tongues arguing for local autonomy for ethnic communities where ethnic people were dominant and the provision of education in the mother tongue through secondary school. Indigenous people perceive the teaching of Sanskrit associated with issues such as caste, Hinduism and highly structured learning and see Sanskrit as the linguistic embodiment of hegemonic heritage of high caste Hindus. The Maoist launched anti-Sanskrit movement burning the Sanskrit textbooks to catch the sentiment and win support of the indigenous people. However, the main objective of the indigenous people was that government should give recognition and support to all mother tongues as it had accorded to Sanskrit. The Maoist capitalized on this issue and fought what they call 'people's war' for ten years with slogans of ethnic autonomy, right to self determination and linguistic right. It claimed over 12000 lives. Finally they embarked on parliamentary democracy through 12 point agreement with seven political parties.

Still the issue of language has not been settled in Nepal. Adibasi Janajati groups constitute 37.2% of the total population. They speak about 57 languages. Similarly, Madhesi groups comprise 14.8% of the total population. They are complaining that their languages have been discriminated against Nepali language making them of no use in the medium of instruction and administration. They are demanding that their languages be declared official language on a par with Nepali.

In Sri Lanka, Sinhali only language policy created dissent among the Tamil, who were compelled to fight for a linguistic right for decades nearly breaking the country into two independent states. Up to 1955, the Cylonese government was following a bilingual policy using Sinhalese and Tamil as its official languages, but in 1956 it decided to introduce the official Act No. 33 of 1956 which dictated that 'Sinhala language shall be the official language of Cylone and that if immediate implementation was impracticable, the language or languages currently in use may be continued until the necessary change is effected as early as possible before the expiry of the 31st December

1960.' The Tamil protested against that decision and launched continuous movement against the Sinhala only policy of the government. Consequently, the Cylone parliament passed the Tamil language (Special Provisions) Act in 1958, which accorded Tamil the status of an official language in the Northern and Eastern provinces without prejudice to the operation of Sinhala as the official language in those provinces. The movement did not stop, but continued more intensely than ever before. Then, in 1987, through the 13th amendment to the Constitution, Tamil was also decreed an official language of the state, and the legal basis for parity between Sinhala and Tamil was clearly established by law. In addition, both languages were also defined as 'national languages' while recognizing English as the 'link language.' Section 21 of the Constitution under the 16th amendment offers extensive provisions and rights for the language of administration to be available in both Sinhala and Tamil. In addition, Section 23 of the same amendment provides that the language of legislation will be Sinhala and Tamil while a translation of these legislative enactments and laws must be available in English. Further, Section 24 of the same amendment provides that the language of the courts in the country will be Sinhala and Tamil. In 1991, the ministry of Public Administration, Provincial Councils and Home Affairs issued a circular under the title, 'Implementation of the Official Languages Law–Trilingualization of Forms' and made the following directive: It was decided that forms of all government institutions should be made available in the three languages, Sinhala, Tamil and English printed in the same paper. All old forms not satisfying these criteria should be withdrawn. Secretaries of all Ministries and Provincial Councils should be responsible for implementing this decision.' Despite the constitutional and legal rights of the people to receive information and services from central and local government agencies in their own languages, this did not happen on a routine basis. If the linguistic right of the Tamil had been accepted in the beginning, Sri Lanka would not possibly have faced civil war that claimed the lives of thousands.

Diversity protection: Each language speaker describes their country in their own way. Nepal has 126 languages which describe it in 126 different ways. This plurality of description helps people understand the value, the benefit of pluralism not only in group, community, nation, State, but also in the world we live in. Therefore, preservation of linguistic diversity is essential for Nepalese people in particular and the entire humanity in general. This view is well expressed by Ivanov (1992) below as quoted in Crystal (2000:36):

Each language constitutes a certain model of the universe, a semiotic system of understanding the world, and if we have 4,000 different ways to describe the world, this makes us rich. We should be concerned about preserving languages just as we are about ecology.

In addition, there is plurality in religion: Hindu, Buddhism, Christianity, Kirat, Muslim and so on. According to 2001 census, Hinduism constitutes 80%, Buddhism 10.7%, Islam 4.2%, Kirat 3.6% and others 0.8% of the total population. They celebrate their own fair and festivals. These cultures are developed and transmitted through spoken and written languages. Language transmission break down through language death causes a serious loss of inherited knowledge. Languages cannot be replaced once they are dead. Below, opinions of some of the linguists are quoted to highlight the diversity protection need. Bernard (1992:82) says, "Any reduction of language diversity diminishes the adaptational strength of our species because it lowers the pool of knowledge from which we can draw."

Hale (1992:8) says, 'Just as the extinction of any animal species diminishes our world, so does the extinction of any language.'

Pogson (1998:4) as quoted in Crystal (2000:34) adopts a genetic analogy and says, 'Language diversity, like a gene pool, is essential for our species to thrive....If we are to prosper, we need the cross-fertilisation of thought that multilingualism gives us.'

Krauss (1992:8) says, "Surely, just as the extinction of any animal species diminishes our world, so does the extinction of any language. Surely we linguists know, and the general public can sense, that any language is a supreme achievement of a uniquely human collective genius, as divine and endless a mystery as a living organism. Should we mourn the loss of Eyak or Ubykh any less than the loss of the panda or California condor?"

Policy statement issued by the Linguistic Society of America in 1994 goes a step beyond analogy and says,

The loss to humankind of genetic diversity in the linguistic world is...arguably greater than even the loss of genetic diversity in the biological world, given that the structure of human language represents a considerable testimony to human intellectual achievement.

Identity expression: Smith (1986:22-31) makes a list of six characteristics to define an ethnic category. They are a collective name, a common myth of descent, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity. He does not enlist the criteria of a distinctive language, which according to Gellner (2008:14) is 'central to

many ethnic activists' efforts at mobilization in Nepal, as well as in much of South Asia and elsewhere.' A committee formed in March 1994 by Nepal Federation of Nationalities (NEFEN) also presented six criteria for an ethnic category and one of the criteria includes distinctive language. It read, 'The indigenous people refer to those communities which possess their own distinct and original lingual and cultural traditions

Government of Nepal, according to Nepal Gazette (2002) has identified 59 ethnic groups as indigenous nationalities and 57 of them have distinct languages. In addition, Hill and Madhesi caste groups have also their own language. The members of one community can be recognized on the basis of the language they speak. Crystal (2000:39), in this context, says,

Identity is what makes the members of a community recognizably the same. It is the summation of the characteristics which make it what it is and not something else- of 'us' vs 'them'.

Similarly, Dixon (1997:135) says, "A language is the emblem of its speakers." A Welsh proverb (as quoted in Crystal 2000:36) says, "A nation without a language is a nation without a heart."

Repositories of history: Nepal has a few languages with written tradition and many without it. Lots of information about their speakers can be gathered from the study of these languages. Therefore, they are repositories of history, ancestry, lineage or descent of the speakers and are called the pedigree of nations and archives of history.

Preservation of indigenous knowledge: Every language encodes a subset of human knowledge about agriculture, botany, medicine and ecology. According to Yadava and Turin (2005:27), Thangmi 'is a mine of unique indigenous terms for local flora and fauna which have medical and ritual value.' Kirat Yakthung Chumlung (2006) mentions about 300 botanical names in Limbu. Tumbahang (2011:225:27) describes the kind of roots and herbs to be used for the treatment of different diseases.

Conclusion

Languages of indigenous nationalities were suppressed from Prithi Narayan Shah's time until the end of the autocratic Panchayat System in 1990. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990 promulgated after the restoration of multiparty democracy and the Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007 also accorded Nepali language written in *Devangagri* script the status of 'official language' and but they did not accord the same status to indigenous

languages. Due to the repression of and discrimination against the indigenous languages by the state itself, many of them are at the stage of endangerment, and some of them have been extinct already. The identity of indigenous nationalities in Nepal is marked by their mother tongue. Therefore, the extinction of their mother tongue naturally follows the extinction of their ethnic identity and the fear of this loss compels them to fight for their linguistic right. Now, ethnic communities are fighting for identity and if the state continues to pursue policies of discrimination against their languages, it may lead to serious consequences. The state should create congenial environment for all languages to develop equally maintaining their distinct features promoting linguistic pluralism in multiculturalist framework that sees diversity as a 'boon' unlike the traditional conservative state that saw diversity as a curse for the unity and development of a nation.

Recommendation

Following recommendations are made for the development of linguistic pluralism in Nepal:

Establishment of Academy of languages: The process of homogenization has a serious effect on cultural and linguistic diversities of indigenous people, which is evident from the case of indigenous people of the Amazon in Brazil, the San and Khoi of South Africa and of Papua New Guinea. It deprives their progeny of inheriting intellectual heritage, learning unique understanding of life and transmitting them among the people. Therefore, there is a global movement to protect endangered languages. In Australia the Federation of Aboriginal and Torres Straits Islander Language, the national body for community based indigenous language programmes was established in 1991 with an objective to promote the maintenance, retrieval and revival of indigenous languages through community-based programmes. In the United States the Comanche Language and Cultural Preservation Committee was established in 1975 in order to restore indigenous languages through the arrangements of various activities such as conferences, advocacy and lobbying, documentation and traditional powwow. In addition, linguistic minorities are taking initiatives to open language schools and use their language in institutions such as church and youth clubs in order to maintain linguistic diversity and pluralism in the country. Similarly, Central Institute of Indian Languages was established in Mysore, India to work on different languages. Nepal also needs such kind of institute to document endangered languages, prepare orthography, and develop textbook, reference book, grammar and dictionary.

Constitutional recognition of indigenous languages as official language: These languages must be constitutionally recognized as official languages, and legal provisions must be made for their use in educational institutions, public service commission examination, and the courts. The government should implement this policy readily and effectively.

Learning in mother tongue facilitates learning of other languages such as Nepali, English etc.: Most parents believe that learning in mother tongue prevents their children from learning other languages like Nepali and English which open the avenues of job opportunity. Acquisition of knowledge only in mother tongue, they believe, does not get them anything. Such kind of thinking discourages people to learn their mother tongue and encourages them to abandon it in favour of opportunity languages. As a result, the number of its speakers dwindles, and eventually, its speakers will survive but with a new identity. The mindset of the parents should be changed by convincing them that learning of mother tongue facilitates the learning of other languages.

Paradigm shift from language shame to language prestige: Nepali language is a power language in Nepal. Therefore, it commands prestige. Most of the speakers of indigenous languages feel ashamed of speaking their languages in front of other language-speakers, particularly Nepali language speakers because it has been deep seated in their mind that their own language is a backward and illiterate language. This problem can be solved if educated and prestigious people of the concerned language communities speak in their mother tongue and send their children to mother tongue schools. It will effect paradigm-shift from language shame to language prestige.

Notes

1. Khaling has only 9,000 speakers and it cannot be considered a safe language.
2. 2001 census shows only 8 speakers of Chhintang, but Chhintang Puma Documentation Project (CPDP) reports 4,000 speakers of this language. It cannot be classified as a moribund language

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POLITICAL DOCTRINES AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES IN NEPAL

Mrigendra Bahadur Karki

Abstract

The Constituent Assembly (CA) of Nepal was dissolved on 27 May, 2012 without promulgating a new constitution. The Maoist¹ and identity parties² including collective identity groups³ were focused on 'federalism with identity and constitution with federalism.' This apart, there have emerged the notions of 'monism' and "pluralism" from the process of constitution drafting. How do these notions deal with collective identity? Whatever could be the theoretical standpoint of these philosophies, Nepali polity interacting with collective identities has tracked out a political process that is the traditional properties of political philosophies have been pushed to periphery and vice-versa. The Maoists analysed collective identity from the dialectical materialistic framework but now collective identity itself has been developed as a political ideology. The thought of Marxist, Leninist and Maoist (MLM) dialectical materialism employs a cycle of process of practice, knowledge, again practice and again knowledge to study change, motion, and transformation of the world. However, the Maoist party is yet to define its theory in the Nepali context particularly how ethnic and regional diversity can be accommodated. The paper has employed three sets of data – activist survey, Social Inclusion Research Fund (SIRF) Resource Centre's⁴ interactions and the CA election manifestos. The empirical evidences show that the philosophies of 'monism' and 'pluralism' are: i) the recent political discourses in Nepal, ii) not well defined, and iii) struggling to reify in the Nepali social fabric.

The CA, even though ninety percent of its work of drafting the constitution was completed,⁵ was dissolved on 27 May, 2012 without promulgating the long awaited new constitution. Consensus was not made on two issues: i) model of federalism and ii) form of government. To settle down (but unsuccessful) these contested issues, the political parties⁶ employed a give-and-take method⁷ following their political strength of 2008 CA election.⁸ The technique itself led to the wane of political philosophy. Similarly, Nepali academic discourses revolved round seminal, narrative and normative

ceaseless semantic flux from anthropological and academic activist perspectives (see Mishra and Gurung 2011).

However, in the post-1990s in low-risk-cost⁹ environment, collective identity proliferated in terms of cultural nationalism, regionalism, Dalit and others (see Gellner, Pfaff, and Whelpton 1997, Gellner and Karki 2008, Karki 2011, 2010, 2006, for how socio-politically these issues evolved). Since late 1990s, the Maoist polity charged the collective identity with core political properties that dominated the CA, government and public sphere.¹⁰ The collective identity¹¹ is being mobilized as a political ideology. To a great extent, this has blacked out the class polity. Nevertheless, the emergence of such issues is a global phenomenon (see Oommen 2010a and 2010b, Kuah-Pearce and Guiheux 2009, Tilly 2004, and 2005, Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2004, May, Madood, and Squire 2004, McAdam 1994, Larana, Johnston, and Gusfield 1994).

The Issues and Argument

The notion of pluralism generated a debate for its inclusion, as fundamental right, in the Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007.¹² Nevertheless, it created contention among the big parties who got divided into two conflicting poles. The Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist (UCPN (M))) refused to embrace pluralism in the new constitution. On the other hand, the second and third largest parties of CA, the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist and Leninist (CPN-UML) advocated for pluralism. For example, UCPN (M) leader Dev Prasad Gurung said, "Whether or not the new constitution is drafted, we never accept pluralism" (see also Vaidhya 2007 [2063], 2012). Contrary to this, NC leader Ram Chandra Paudel said his "party is determined to employ the principle of pluralism in the new constitution" (see also Giri 2010, Gyawali 2010, Oli-Sharma 2011, Lekhak 2011).

The mnemonic causation (systematic structural exclusion, alienation, discrimination etc.), perceived justice, equality, opportunity structure and threat under the evolved political process sparked collective identities into the 'crease of politics'.¹³ A tectonic pressure has grown up from social groups to the political parties to include their conflicting agenda in the new constitution even though the CA is dissolved. In such circumstance, some pertinent questions may arise: how did the Nepali political process evolve during the last three decades especially since the 1990s? And why did the CA fail to promulgate the new constitution?

The paper attempts to answer these questions,¹⁴ analysing the philosophical orientation of Nepali polity – monism, multiculturalism and pluralism – in relation to collective identity.¹⁵ A political process is in interaction between these three contending worldviews with reference to collective identity and its scales shift.¹⁶ Consequently, political parties, with unresolved oedipal conflict in conceptualizing identity, deviate from each other.¹⁷ The process has brought out new or formerly peripheral properties of political ideology to the core and pushed the core to circumference. The paper, therefore, argues that before *jana-andolan* II, the differences between the political parties and identity groups were hushed so that they could together remove the then regime. But now gradually the gap has been widening between these allies in relation to defining *loktantra*. Initially, the Maoist had owned the collective identity issues to recruit these groups in their camp. However, the Maoists were analysing the collective identity from the dialectical materialism perspective¹⁸ but now it has been developing as an ideology and the concerned groups are up to set up their own political party.¹⁹ The same is true in the case of all political ideologies. Whatsoever, it is a political process that is moving toward defining *loktantra*.

Research Design

A discourse on monism, multiculturalism and pluralism, in my knowledge, is a recent phenomenon except the university teaching-learning rituals putting Marxist and neo-Marxist against liberal democratic assumption in Nepal. Interestingly, for the political leaders, these notions received prominence during the process of constitution drafting. But in the religious texts and *sastra* (discussion/interaction), the concepts of *advaita* (unity or oneness), *dvaita* (dualism) and *dvaitadvaita* (fusion of *advaita* and *dvaita*) exist since the ancient period (see Dalal 2006, Vaidhya 2010, and Giri 2010). Similarly, moral monism can be traced out in the ancient Greek text (see Parekh 2000) that can be applied to any society. Also, the concepts of legal pluralism and linguistic pluralism prevail in Nepal.

To unfold the issue, the paper has employed three sets of data. First, it has employed activist²⁰ survey data set. It examines the first question how Nepali political process is evolving. This set of data is a product of a joint academic programme²¹ between the Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies (CNAS), Tribhuvan University (TU) and Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology, University of Oxford from 2003 to 2006.²² The fieldwork was carried out in Kathmandu, Kaski and Dhanusa districts of Nepal. The body of data, complementary to each other, comprises dozens of in-depth interviews,

biographies, autobiographies, archival sources and the 800 quantitative studies.

From December 2004 to April 2005, of 800 quantitative²³ interviews, fifty per cent (400) were surveyed from Kathmandu, and twenty five per cent (200) from Pokhara and Janakpur, the district headquarters of Kaski and Dhanusa districts respectively. A questionnaire schedule that contained 38 questions divided into four major parts (organizational, personal, familial and political ideology inclination) was used for the quantitative interview. Respondents were selected through 'snowball sampling' from several types of activist groups, namely political, ethnic, Dalit, religious, Madheshi, caste, women, social, and economic. Of the 200 respondents in each area outside Kathmandu, 50 respondents were from political parties, 30 from women's organizations, and 20 each from indigenous/nationalities, Dalit, economic, social, and religious activists. Within Kathmandu this number was doubled for each category (for more details see Gellner and Karki 2010).²⁴

The software "R" 2.9.1 programme²⁵ was used to develop correspondence analysis (see appendix 1). The data illustrate the micro mechanisms of social and political evolution of Nepal from activist recruitment perspective (see Karki 2010, 2011 for more elaboration). In the study, activist is a central unit of the analysis. This article compares two sociological variants – time and types – to discuss undercurrent social and political processes.

Second, Policy Discourse on Social Exclusion and Inclusion (PODCISESI), a collaborative programme between CNAS, TU and SIRF, Netherlands Development Organization SNV Nepal organized three one-day interaction programmes in Dharan, Dhanusa and Nepalganj on August 20, 23 and 26 respectively in 2011.²⁶ The author presented an issue paper on pluralism or monism in the context of federalism and inclusion in three resource centres (RCs) of SIRF/SNV Nepal.²⁷ Similarly, two interactions were organized in Kathmandu.²⁸ The political leaders, cultural nationalities, Dalits, civil society leaders, and students participated in the programmes. The results of these discussions are taken as the source of information for the paper.

Finally, the paper has examined twenty-five political parties²⁹ CA election manifestos of 2008 to know their standpoint on pluralism and monism (see appendix 2).³⁰ The parties were elected to the CA. Their perspectives were measured in terms of whether the theories were mentioned they simply remained silent?³¹ Two sets of data were generated from the study and they are discussed in the discourse on monism, multiculturalism and pluralism.

A Discourse on Monism and Pluralism in Nepal

As pluralism and monism are complex and high philosophies, they incubate quite different understandings and theories.³² However, the aim of the discussion here is neither the transplantation of Western theories (Oommen 2007) of pluralism, multiculturalism and monism nor an engagement only remotely with our historical hinterlands, nor remains biased to these theories; rather it is to explain the empirical data as discussed in the research design. Nevertheless, this article has discussed monism and pluralism doctrines. (See also Vaidhya 2010 and in this volume).

Political parties, as noted earlier, are highly divided on these issues. Except the then Maoist, eleven political parties favoured pluralism, the remaining thirteen remained silent. Interestingly, CPN-UML only mentioned *bahulta* (plurality) in its CA election manifesto.³³ Similarly, Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal accepted social and religious pluralism, but remained silent about political pluralism. The hierarchical ordering of collectivities, in the legal context, was set up by Jung Bahadur Rana in Nepal since the *muluki ain* (first civil code) of Nepal 1854. Though the Rana rulers legally fortified the collective identity, they acted highly discriminatorily. Similarly, King Mahendra too attempted to re-visit this discriminatory system employing an integrative model of polity declaring one nation, one language and one dress that subordinated the collective boundaries (Pffaf 2008).

Prachanda Path (PP) is the theoretical directive of UCPN (Maoist). The PP is the developed form of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist (MLM) philosophy in Nepali experiences (Vaidhya 2007 [2063 BS]). Moreover, PP can be employed to emancipate the contemporary world's proletariat according to the Maoist (Ibid.). There are various properties in the PP, but here I attempt to discuss only two of its main tenets (see Vaidhya 2007 [2063 BS]): i) protection, implementation and development (*rakshya, prayog and bikash* [of MLM]),³⁴ and ii) analysis and synthesis (*bislesan and samslesan*) in relation to collective identity. The UCPN-Maoist is philosophically bent on Mao Tse-tung's doctrine of "On Contradiction (the law of the unity of opposite)." It, according to Mao, is a methodology to analyse the world rather than a political theory.³⁵ This methodology can be employed in all categories across type, time and space. Thus, the struggle among political parties lies at the kernel of UCPN-Maoist theory³⁶ of the law of unity of opposites and the rest of the parties' worldview of democracy in changing social and political context of Nepal.

Mohan Vaidhya "Kiran" (2010, 2007 [2063 BS]) discusses monism (*advaitabad*),³⁷ dualism (*dvaitabad*), pluralism (*bahulbad*). He argues

pluralism is incomplete ideology which fails to unite the things and, promotes atomic individualism against a state and collectivities. Tracing out a trajectory of history of these notions, he adds it is a false principle that facilitates certain class (bourgeoisie) interest and liberty to rule general peoples (proletariat). Kiran believes that pluralism is a political ideology against the philosophy of dialectical materialism. It, therefore, could not be mentioned in the new constitution of Nepal as a state ideology.

While discussing monism, Kiran further draws distinction between: a) idealistic monism (*ekmanabad* or *metaphysic* (2007) and *adarsabad* (2010), and b) dialectical materialism. The idealistic monism, in his view, is supposed to be the single truth, and consequently rejects opposition or the other's existence. It has been employed by dictatorial kings, military rulers and autocratic rulers, but dialectic materialism facilitates the proletariats to remain engaged with their vision, mission and welfare. According to Kiran, dialectic materialism facilitates diversity and copes with it through the two-line struggle. The political space 'unity of opposition' (*biparitharuko ekatwa*) preserves the proletariats' rights. It is a science against the conception of individualism and elite autonomy.

Engaging with classical theory Kiran adds that an idealist (monist) focuses on consciousness (*chetana*) as prime thing to define the law of development of the universe, while a dialectical materialist, instead, believes that material (*padartha*) is central. A pluralist fails to point out the actual situation and ultimately supports the idealist. Similar to this argument, Pampha Bhusal (2011), leader of the then UCPN (Maoist), argues, 'multi-party,' 'multi-ism' and 'pluralism' are different notions. She adds, multi-phenomena can't co-exist in one point at one time. Thus the Maoist believes in the supremacy of one thing at one point of time (ibid.).

On the other hand, Pradeep Giri (2010) central committee member of NC differs from this school of thought. He argues it is 'a politics of difference' of the Maoist within the left political parties of Nepal, particularly with the CPN-UML. He further says even Karl Marx and Engels, abandoned the discourses which exclude the practical facet of human aspects. These communist leaders further explore the theory which helps the human amenities. He adds the ultimate debate of pluralism is an enlarged form of dialectical materialism. The fact that world class dictators of the twentieth century were monistic was not a coincidence. Giri further says whatever would there be in monism philosophy and discourse, it would end in a dictatorial rule. However, he concedes that unless the discussion of monism and pluralism is not linked with historical development, as Marx says these

are attached to ideological evolution, these discussions would not be functional. Manamohan Bhattra (2011), central committee member of NC, advocates for individual liberty and freedom in a liberal democracy. He questions the applicability of science, the way the communists employ it to strengthen their argument, to human feelings and emotions. Similarly, Ramesh Lekhak (2011) argues that Nepal's social diversity can only be preserved through the practice of pluralism.

Similarly, K.P. Oli (2011), one of the senior leaders of CPN-UML, favours pluralism in the developing Nepali social and political contexts. He argues political ideologies should be dynamic and contextual. All realities should be understood in the context of motion. Pradeep Gyawali (2010a), politburo member of CPN-UML, agrees with Kiran's argument at the point of evolution of the material world (*sansara*) and living world (*jivan-jagat*). However, he claims the meaning of monism could not be implied in politics. Pluralism is against the authoritarian and autocratic political ideology. Monism, whatever would be a typology, ultimately produces a dictator. He suspects that the Maoists are not accepting universal values and norms of multi-party democracy, for example, periodic election, and right to organize and form a new party. He says monism rejects fundamental attributes of liberal democracy.

Khanal (2010) engages with these issues through bifurcation of pluralism and monism. However, he ignores the evolution and internal distribution (development from one to two) of monism. Similarly, C.K Lal attempts to discuss, seminally, these concepts truncating various concepts. These discussions are leading into two broad traditions: a) political leaders, naturally, are developing their arguments focusing on remote history and abstract phenomena, b) academics or intellectuals are seminal. They are more concerned, as said earlier, on teaching-learning textbook rituals.

However, political leaders have realized that the discourse on pluralism and monism is necessary.³⁸ Two Nepali newspapers, *vichar vises* (2010) and *mulyankan* (2010), aptly initiated a discourse on these issues involving political leaders and intellectuals. The newspapers agree that apparently the issues are not the concerns of the commoners, yet they make significant political impact on their lives. Besides, insufficient academic discussion and deficient public interactions on these issues have impelled the members of political parties to remain divided.

Moreover, an accessible diminutive academic discourse is seminal rather than empirical. Thus, this article attempts to demonstrate the current trend of Nepali politics and ideological shifting employing eight hundred activists'

recruitment perspective by way of the software “R” 2.9.1 programme to build up mosaic plots³⁹ (see Karki 2010 for more elaboration). The paper argues, Nepali society has been producing new ideologies⁴⁰ – for example caste, ethnicity, region, religion, Dalit, and women – beyond political 'ism' since the 1990s and the trend is increasing particularly post-2008.

Parties' Election Manifesto

All parties have accepted the rational of plural identities and the necessity for becoming inclusive in the state power structure.⁴¹ However, in their conceptualisation of these identities the parties differ each-other and this is reflected across the political doctrines – the monism, multiculturalism and pluralism.⁴² dela Porta and Diani (2004:68) aptly say philosophy provides the ‘cognitive apparatus’ that gives individuals/collectivities a space to orient themselves in the world. This toolkit consists of multiplicity of cultural and ideational elements which include beliefs, ceremonies, artistic forms and informal practices such as languages, conversations, stories, daily rituals (Swidler 1986:273) across different societies and territories.

The same stands true for Nepal. The cultural nationalities⁴³ fight for single-identity form of federalism, and the Madheshi political parties advocate for regional identity in the new constitution. Dalit, women, religious and minority groups’ voices for rights and freedom have highly surfaced. Since the indigenous nationalities and Madhesi people share more than fifty per cent in the national population count and are robustly transformed into political units, the conventional political parties are simply left to vacillation. In this context, the concepts of monism (dialectical materialism) and pluralism are struggling hard to justify their implementation.

The UCPN (M) was erected on the philosophy of MLM – the dialectical materialism.⁴⁴ Contrary to it NC, CPN UML including Tarai Madesh Parties advocate for pluralism based constitution. However, between them, they differ in the conceptualization of these philosophies. Most importantly, indigenous nationality groups and recently emerged regional parties, for example Tarai Madhes parties, claim multiculturalism is syncretic pluralism,⁴⁵ thus they envision multicultural constitution. Cultural and legal pluralism are well accepted by the political parties, however political pluralism is highly contested by the UCPN (M).

Even though the concept of 'dialectical materialism' was implicit in the distinction Engels drew between the metaphysical mechanical materialism of the eighteenth century and the modern materialism that arose in the wake of the critique of German idealism. But the phrase dialectical materialism, a

stream of monism, was first used by Plekhanov to distinguish the Marxist approach to the socio-historical process, which focuses on human needs and the means and methods of their satisfaction, from the teleological view of history in Hegelian idealism (Cheah 2010).

On the other hand, there are some inherent deficiencies in these philosophies to practically address emerging issues (see discussion and conclusion of the paper). Because, first, the embedded nature and form of these emerging issues accede to some distinct constitutive properties rather than to how and when these philosophies – monism, pluralism and multiculturalism – propose to deal with. Second, the time consciousness is a great impact on these issues.

Evolving Political Process

Nepal – a locus of political tumult – is a seething cauldron of significant, robust and rapid changes in its recent history. Nevertheless, tectonic political alterations – autocratic Rana rule, multiparty polity with kingship, partyless Panchayat regime, constitutional monarchical multiparty system, and abolition of monarchy – have emerged since 1950. In the conduit of these political transformations, Nepal is enduring rapid and massive social and cultural shifting. The shifting has produced different social milieus. The periodisation, the existence or manifestation of political and social ideologies, is framed on the key political and social durations in this paper. Initially, identity issue was confined to protecting social groups' language, culture and rituals. It was non-political entity in nature.⁴⁶


The following correspondence analysis, from activists' recruitment perspective, exemplifies that before 1979 time period, the political ideologies were holding identity groups' sentiment (see Karki 2011 for more discussion). Identities, then, were inseparable properties of the political ideologies especially during the high-risk cost environment.⁴⁷ Consistent with the result of correspondence analysis, an activist shared his experience relative to a question: since when are you involved in the indigenous nationalities movements? He said,

My party (political) president gave me this responsibility. Actually, I had an image or expectation that under the political ideology with which I am involved all these identity issues would be solved. But post-1990 polity, properly, failed to address these issues, therefore, various identity organizations emerged, consequently our party decided to introduce this (indigenous nationalities) department, as one of the front organizations, to recruit indigenous nationalities people.

Head, Indigenous Nationalities Department of a National Political Party

Correspondence analysis

Figure: 1 Periodisations and types of activist



Eigen Values: Ca summary

Dimension1	0.06500	mjca Dimention1	0.250000
Dimention 2	0.002747	Dimention 2	0.250000

Post-1990, various currents of activism and movement gained a significant advancement including the 'recognition' (self, social, and political) of traditionally subordinate groups including Dalit, women, indigenous nationalities, and formation of other organizations. Consequently, political parties became compelled to endorse the new identities formally in their agenda and introduce new departments (ethnic, Dalit, social issues) in the structure of their organization. Now, all political parties have set up these departments as part of their integral wings.

Before political movement, the ethnic, Dalit, and regional movements were supposed as communal activism. For example, accusations of being *Bagiyan*, *Gath-gaddi Taakne*, *Rajdrohi*, *Rastradrohi*, *Adhaharmi*, *Arastriya Tattwa*, *Gobar*, *Kharani*, *Kulakshini*, *Sampradayik*, and *Kshettriyabadi*

could be tagged on any oppositional activist in different political regimes. It is interesting to note that the same political activists are now in their party's front organizations and central committees however, they acted hesitant to reveal the continuation of their involvement in and commitment to independent social and ethnic concerns. The parties' new departments paved gateway to develop intra-party networks that promoted the mobilization and advancement of identity activism.

Activists discovered the notion of identity other than political banner. The political activists in the period of 1991-2005 found negative weak association. After 1990, Nepali constitutions opened up opportunities for all forms of activism. The suppressed voices came out individually and collectively, especially in organizational form (see Gellner and Karki 2008). The Maoist insurgency brought up the identity issue into the centre polity. The rise of cultural nationalism, regionalism, Dalit, and women appeared as powerful force in the public sphere. Weigert, Teitge, and Teitge (1986) argue that 'by the 1980s, identity had become a stock technical term in sociology and a widespread social label. However, until 1940, it was unknown.' It is also true that in Nepal identity groups came actively at the same period of time through conflict based experiences with the state despite non-political agenda of identity; for example ritual, ethnic and language. However, for its ownership democracy provided a vital role.

How Collective Identity Reified

Tharu Kalyan Karini Shabha, Langhalee Pariwar Sangh (now Nepal Magar Sangh), and Thakali Sewa Samiti were formed to reform themselves in line with self-reform within the communities, ultimately leading to the process of Sanskritisation.

In the case of the TKKS it was dominated by Tharu landlords who hoped to use it to reform the customs of their caste fellows (for example, child marriage, excessive expenditure at weddings, alcohol consumption). Individually they often went further in a Sanskritizing direction, for example, by adopting vegetarianism and/or Vaishnavism. They were also encouraged to form a national organisation both by the example of such caste associations over the border in India, with which they had close ties....

Gellner and Karki (2008:108).

Also, the organizations were dedicated to preserve and protect traditional cultural properties through non-political means. However, the time period 1980-1990 was politically liberal compared to earlier political phases. As a result of the mass student protest against the Panchayat system in the spring

of 1979, the national referendum was held on May 2, 1980. The reformed Panchayat system won the election securing 54.7 percent of the valid votes over the multiparty system (Shaha 1990). Nevertheless, the referendum campaign generated a new social and political milieu. The political parties and their members became visible. Similarly, collectively, people started resistance against bad-governance. For example, one ex-British army man shared his experience how they formed their community organisation in Kathmandu.

We British army people, actually, little know about the administrative procedures of Nepal. The government officials "*sarkari adhikari*" always exploit us. We faced difficulties even in getting citizenship, land registration, connecting electricity, drinking water, telephone etc. We started to live in Kathmandu when British Camp was set up in Lalitpur. Mr Man Bahadur Gurung's, an employee in the British Camp, brother died. We found no person for *malami* (funeral procession) in Kathmandu... That event really hurt us. During that time a limited number of Gurungs were living in Kathmandu. So, especially on the *lahures'* (British army-men) initiation we set up a branch office of Tamu Bauddha Arghaun Sadan Pokhara, because in Panchyat period ethnic organization was banned. However later we established Tamu Bauddha Sewa Samiti post-1990.

Yogendra Gurung

Noticeably, same type of story was shared by another ethnic activist.⁴⁸

I am the first person to come to Kathmandu from the Tokpegola community and anyone who moved to or visited Kathmandu before was supposed to be a wealthy, *thulo manchhe* [big man]. One of the villagers belonging to the Tokpegola community came after a while but I was quite busy with my business; I had opened a carpet factory, therefore we did not have frequent contact. Unfortunately, his wife suffered from a brain tumor and he failed to contact me. So our neighbouring community Olangchunge, who were living and doing business in Kathmandu, helped them, but after many days of care in the hospital, she did not improve. So they stopped caring for her. Then her husband brought her back to a room in Dhalko where she died. The Newar house owner pressured them immediately to take away the dead body but the husband had not contacted anybody about a funeral procession. So he asked his brother-in-law, though he also belonged to the community other than outside the Tokpegola. Anyway, they carried the dead body on a motorcycle, putting it in the middle between two people like a cooking gas cylinder, wrapping it in a huge jute bag [*bora*]. They rested three times on the way to a crematory for cremation. That became an anecdote within our neighboring

communities. During our participation in any function like a funeral procession, marriage, and cultural activity, that event became the song [*geet*]; a satirical story about how Tokpegola lived in Kathmandu, about how we bury dead bodies. They [members of other community] used to laugh at us, talking about the cremation, and that used to pinch me and give a heat to me [humiliate me].

Later, many Tokpegola members came to Kathmandu saying “If Pabitra could survive in Kathmandu why not I?” On 1999 (VS 2056), in my initiation, we introduced *Tokpegola Samaj Sewa Samiti*, (Tokpegola Society Helping Committee), targeting the enhancement of mutual understanding, helping each other, and the organization of Tokpegola community members who are living in Kathmandu. At the same time, *janajati vidheyak* was passed by the parliament and consequently our community was also listed among the 59 ethnic communities.

An Executive Member, NEFIN

These cases support the result of correspondence analysis. Similarly, the high caste group activists too, set up their clan/community organizations to resist cultural modernization. This activism is for status quo. Remarkably, caste group motivation to initiate their community organisation was different than ethnic organizations. The caste groups had then no-political grievances. These groups have been controlling politics and administrative power since the formation of modern state. However, the organizations managed and survived through the Panchyat years by keeping a low profile (Gellner and Karki 2008). Likewise, Sharma (1996) has found similar stories in India from the Nepali communities.

Collective identity to political ideology

The correspondence analysis presents that various types of activism e.g. ethnic, Dalit, women, social groups are visible since the post 1990. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990 had guaranteed freedom to association, speech, opinion and expression.⁴⁹ In the low-risk-cost environment various collective identity groups emerged and launched their activities. This locus of interaction spawned collective identity ideology interacting with (mis)governance and the political deficiency to incorporate or justify the collectively raised grievances e.g. historical marginalisation, unequal representation on state mechanism and political leadership etc. (see Karki 2011). The collective identities became alternatives to the political parties mediating peoples' interest and the state e.g. Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN). In such social and political interaction process, the collective identity has itself transformed into a new agency that

is reifying an identity ideology. However, the concept ideology has been conceived variously across the countries for example in Japan the term ideology is understood as to left (communist) inclination. The following case interestingly expresses how *jatiya* identity arrays shifting of voting pattern over political ideology.

Mr Keshav Dhungana, the CPN-UML the CA candidate from Sarlahi district constituency no 5, visited Laxmi Raya who was the former elected Chief of Shekhauna VDC from his party. Mr Raya welcomed his party's candidate offering with *lassi* (yoghurtshake), yoghurt, sweets etc. Despite high hospitality, he said to Dhungana *kamred! beti a bhot dusara jat me nahi deba* (in Maithili language) (comrade! I don't give the hand of daughter (for marriage) and do not caste a vote to the "other" castes).

The Kantipur Daily (March 27, 2008)

Similarly, the same paper reports that Rewanta Jha, he is also the CA candidate of the ULM from Rautahat 2, says 'traveling into from north to southern region *jatiya* (caste, ethnicity) politics dominates over class polity'. Accordingly, Binod Gupta observes in the confluence of the Maoist polity and impact of Indian states Uttar Pradesh and Bihar politics, a high *jatiya* polity is emerging in the tarai region. Beyond tarai, the Maoist negotiated with all ethnic groups of Nepal since late 1990s.

A glimpse on the Maoist and Khambuwan negotiation

Khambuwan, as politically claimed, is an ethno-territory of Rai people under the Kirat region (see Khambu 2000). The region includes Limbu, Sunuwar and Yakha areas too. The Khambuwan Rastiya Morcha (KRM) was set up on August 21, 1992 in the leadership of Gopal Khambu and the KRM followed by underground bombing on three Sanskrit schools of Khambuwan region to initiate armed insurgency since July 22, 1997 (Ibid.). Since the 1990 Constitution of Nepal rejected *jatiya* (ethnic) self-rule and self-determination, according to Khambu, the KRM set to fight against it (ibid.). Similarly, KRM had professed anti-Bahun/Chhettri rhetoric (Subedi 2012).

The Maoist initiated dialogue twice with KRM in the leadership of Baburam Bhattarai on April 23, and December 1, 1998, who rejected the existence of two armed combatants (the Maoist and the KRM). However, meetings with Puspa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda on August 6, and September 10, 2000 settled down the dispute (see Khambu 2000). Having several levels of dialogues between the Maoist and KRM finally negotiation was made on April 6, 2000. It is known as *akhibhuin* (a place of

Sankhuwasabha district) negotiation. In the negotiation Limbuwan National Liberation Front (LNLf) led by Bhakta Bahadur Kandangba also joined in the dialogue and the negotiation made between the Maoist and Kirat Janawadi Morcha (KJM) a joint front of Rai and Limbu that became the Maoist front organisation (see Subedi 2012 and Roka 2012).

The dialogue was initiated to form separate armed combatant groups for a collaborative armed struggle to overthrow the then regime between the Maoist and KRM. Interestingly, the Maoist itself developed own ideological stances, for example, ethnic autonomy, right of self-determination and special rights to the ethnic groups, according to Kirati, thus he joined the Maoist in Prachanda's formal (verbal) invitation (Khambu 2000). However, the Maoist had envisioned seven nationalities of Nepal before the formation of the Maoist party itself, their areas include Kirat, Kochila, Mithila, Newa, Magar, Abadh and Tharu. Until then, the Maoist policies were not linked *jat* and *barga* (ethnicity and class) each other according to Muma Ram Khanal, ex-politburo member of the Maoist. In Paush 2053 BS (December 1996 or January 1997) the Maoist's Lakhnau (India) politburo meeting formed new *jatiya* policy, Ram Bahadur Thapa alias *Badal* was appointed the coordinator but he declined to hold the post (Bhattarai nd). Similarly, in 1998 the Maoists' Phariyabad's (India) fourth extended central committee meeting formally decided to initiate *adhar elaka* (base area) according to Bhattarai (nd). Following to this decision in the same year, the Maoist, in Rolpa's Kureli, announced central government in the leadership of Baburam Bhattarai and declared *mukti morcha* (emancipation front) according to Mumaram Khanal.

But, the conflict emerged on the issue of *jatiya mukti* (ethnic emancipation) shortly after the central working committee or Prachanda did not appoint Mr Kirati to the post of politburo member of the Maoist party (Subedi 2012). Similarly, Mr Kirati raised serious questions to the Maoist policy deficits in relation to ethnic emancipation (Khambu 2000):

- i. ethnic self-rule
- ii. preservation of ethnic boundaries through intra-group marriage
- iii. leadership and representation of the respective ethnic groups in polity, front and armed forces within their political territory,
- iv. priority of alliance to ethnic and regional forces,
- v. MLM policy implementation on ethnic issues e.g. right to self determination.

The central committee, according to Khambu, was predominated by the Brahmins, one caste group, thus *bahunbad* (Brahmanism) prevails in the

Maoist policy. A Brahmin member accused Khambu of his group demanding *jatiya mukti* under the doctrines of Maoism (Ibid.). Consequently, Khambu resigned the Maoist party and re-organized KJM as a new political party named "Kirat Workers Party" on November 3, 2000. However, Kirati and his followers rejoined the Maoist party after the successful dialogue held on Surunga, Jhapa in 2003. After this negotiation, Gopal Khambu baptized himself Kirati (see Subedi 2012).


Discussion

The debate monism vs pluralism, and these notions (monism and pluralism) vs multiculturalism have inter-connectivity and share common aim. These doctrines have common destinations which are democracy, liberty, and rights. However, to define and meet these common goals there exists a range of differences as well. All political parties and collective groups, according to their CA election manifesto, have a consensus to preserve Nepali diversity and respect differences. While the multiculturalists (collective identity groups) suppose that identity is a permanent entity. It is hard and unchangeable. Consequently, they demand negotiations in the polity across the various ethnic identities and the new constitution on the ground of collective identity. However, Vaidhya (2012) differs with current Nepali academic conceptualisation of the notion "ethnic group" and he proposes 'national.' The Prime Minister and vice president of the UCPN (Maoist) Baburam Bhattari also uses 'national' instead of 'ethnic group' to address the identity issue of Nepali indigenous nationalities (see Nagarik News 2009).

Most importantly, indigenous people of Nepal believe that Nepali state compelled them to transform their cultural properties. Thus, the identity polity emerged, and now in democracy they demand revitalisation of their "real identity." This argument has posed a question which label of identification of their history is the real one? Similar question arises, where an individual and collectivities could be stamped out with their own real ethnic identity, such as Gopal "Khambu" or Gopal "Kirati" as discussed above. How do we conceptualise Limbu, Rai, Sunuwar and Yakkha. All these are Kiratis and now they secure separate identity.

The proposed Federal Socialist Party, the dissident leaders of indigenous nationalities and Madheshi of CPN-UML, NC and of other parties' have formed, has owned 'federal socialism' as the main guiding principle (see Republica 2012). The Marxist philosophy is its ideological foundation, however it, according to Ajambar Kangmang Rai one of the founders of the party, has redefined the philosophy of Marx in Nepali context, e.g.

'federalism for ethnic emancipation and socialism for class emancipation.' The ethnicity and class are two variants to be addressed in Nepal, thus to emancipate the ethnic people from the Hindu caste-based disparity, and the single-identity-federalism is the only way out, according to Rai. Similarly, the socialism philosophy addresses the class polity (Ibid.).



The dialectical materialism, a branch of monism, is the philosophical method of MLM which stands against monolithicism, pluralism, and other types of eclecticism (Vaidhya 2007 and 2012). The principle of materialist dialectic is the unity of the opposites. The philosophy identifies that all subjective and objective boundaries are dynamic, and that it should be understood in its motion (see Tse-tung 1967, Vaidhya 2007 and 2012). Here a serious flaw emerges in the MLM philosophy and the UCPN (Maoist) policies to deal with the collective identity that is whether the collective identities are permanent or keep changing. According to the MLM, they are not permanent, if so, how could the collective boundaries, e.g. ethnicity be the unit of the state restructuring. However, Vaidhya (2012) uses the term "national" instead of "ethnic." Nationality itself is a developmental labelling from tribe to ethnic and ethnic to nationalities (Ibid.). Contemporary sociological and anthropological theories have also shown that ethnic identities are fluid, manipulatable, and contested. According to Gellner (2011) the identity 'Tamang' emerged only in the early 20th century and the identity 'Chhantyel'

crystallised only after 1990. Others are emerging even now. Manangis decided to be Gurungs and many have changed their surname in order to facilitate recruitment into the British Gurkhas (see also Tilly 2005, Fisher 2001 for theory of ethnic fluidity).

Moreover, the UCPN (Maoist) and multiculturalists have been advocating for the ethnic federalism with self-determination, rights to self-rule to promote, preserve identity, and diversity. Here, the aspiration of ethnic and regional groups and the spirit of multiculturalism overlap each-other. However, there is significant theoretical interface between these standpoints to address:

...new pluralism (multiculturalism) exploits a label to which it has no rightful claim. This is cheating with words. In fact, the new pluralists are antipluralists. Cultural pluralism seeks a richer, cross-fertilized common culture. The multiculturalism that prevails today seeks cultural separation, a closed and sterile tribalisation of culture. It thus turns out to be, I repeat, an antipluralistic type of multiculturalism.

Giovanni Sartori (1997:4)

In case of pluralism, we have to discuss more in Nepali context because the CPN-UML advocates for pluralism in current political context, however, it accepts monism as its philosophical orientation – being a Marxist. Thus, UML has mentioned plurality not pluralism in its CA manifesto. The Nepali congress has been advocating for pluralism. However, it has yet to be defined what would be the unit of analysis – individual or collective – and how these two units would be managed in the constitution. How collective and individual rights and duties would be negotiated in the liberal democracy.

Notes

1. The paper is indifferent with the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), Communist party of Nepal-Maoist and Nepal Communist Party of Nepal Maoist in their philosophical doctrine.
2. I have defined Madhesi parties and other parties who have included cultural nationalism in their agenda are identity parties in this paper.
3. Primarily Indigenous nationalities groups are included in this category except Kshetry, Brahman, Dasnami etc. groups who have been opposing identity based new constitution.
4. SIRF is a program run by Norwegian Embassy's financial support and set up under the Netherlands Development organization office in Kathmandu since 2005.
5. Dr Ram Baran Yadav, the President of Nepal, blames four political parties - Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (UCPN Maoist), Nepali Congress (NC), Communist Party of Nepal (UML) and Samyukta Loktantric Madhesi

Morcha (SLMM) - are responsible for not to promulgate a new constitution despite ninety percent work of constitution drafting was finished (see the Kathmandu Post July 22, 2012).

6. Here, the CA and political parties are used as interchangeable in the context of constitution drafting process.
7. Puspa Kamal Dahal, Chairperson of UCPN (Maoist) favored *akhanda* (undivided) Chitawan undivided Chitawan, his home district, in state restricting while the Maoist were in favor of single identity based federalism. Similarly, Ex-Premiums Sher Bahadur Deuba and Lokendra Bahadur Chand led *akhanda sudur paschimaanchal* (Undivided Far-Western Region) movement.
8. UCPN Maoist was advocating for a single identity based federalism and direct elected president model while Nepali congress was in favor of parliamentary model of government and multiple identity based federalism. Similarly, CPN UML has proposed direct elected prime minister and non-ethnic federal model.
9. I picked up this concept from McAdam (1986) to indicate the level of perceived threat and damage getting involved in the oppositional activism across the polity (see Karki 2006 for more details)
10. Post-2006, Nepal became secular country, the election method revisited and employed mixed method – the first-past-the-post and proportional representative consequently, now Nepal got first Madhesi President, Vice-President along with 63 per cent of Madhesi member-cabinet.
11. Here, identity refers to a collective particularly ethnic, regional and traditional for example Dalit.
12. Ramesh Lekhak, who was a member of Interim Constitution Drafting Committee 2006, says (an interaction held with him in March 2012) the Maoist representatives were divided in this issue.
13. Recently in Nepal, political parties are evolving through social movements i.e. Madhesi Janadhikar Forum a Madhes based social organization developed as political party post-2006 and secured fourth position in the CA election of 2008.
14. From several perspectives, one could explore the response of these questions for example role of civil society, quality of leadership, potency of Nepali state, role and capacity of Nepali academia etc.
15. Three perspectives prevail to deal with the emergent in this issue: i) single identity federalism, ii) multiple identity federalism, and iii) non-ethnic federalism.
16. I borrowed this concept of "scales shift" from McAdam et al. (2001). Here I have used this notion in terms of a concept development from both horizontal and vertical augmentation.
17. Political parties have been explicitly expressing their position in the discussion on the new constitution drafting. The Maoist is advocating for the multiparty system while in the leadership of Nepali Congress most of the parties are lobbying for multiparty polity with the guarantee of pluralism in the new constitution. Similarly, most of the proposed names and boundaries of the federal states of Nepal are demarcated following the identity (ethnic) attributes.

18. The Maoists have been appointing ethnically altered chief in the ethnic appealing provinces.
19. Even though since 1950 the regional parties were set up, the momentum of their activities scope was not at the present level. Post-the CA dissolution, the indigenous nationalities members of Nepal have proposed Social Democratic Pluri-National Party.
20. An activist is a person who, intentionally and voluntarily, engages full time or part time in at least one organization with firm end-goals, whether those be halting or changing extant authority of whatever its form: culture, institution, group etc.
21. The programme was entitled "The Impact of Activism in Nepal: An Anthropological and Historical Study."
22. This study is made possible by the generous grant (F/08 599/B (2003-2006)), provided by Leverhulme Foundation, UK.
23. I greatly appreciate the GP programme Kwansei Gakuin University, which has been providing me invaluable training in the software "R". Similarly, I would like to express my debt to Akira Furukawa, Yasuto Nakano and Kwansei Gakuin GP programme team for their academic guidance to produce quantitative result.
24. The respondents, for quantitative analysis, were members of both executive and working committee, and of a formal or informal organization. Although organizational membership may not always be an essential component to be an activist (Gellner and Karki 2010). Since there is no recognized official list of activists, snowball sampling method was employed to select the respondents.
25. I greatly appreciate the GP programme Kwansei Gakuin University, Japan. I received training in the software "R". Similarly, I would like to express my debt to Akira Furukawa, Yasuto Nakano and Kwansei Gakuin GP programme team for their academic guidance to produce quantitative result. R, free software under the terms of the Free Software Foundation's GNU General Public License in source code form, is a language and environment for statistical computing and graphics. It provides a wide variety of statistical (linear and nonlinear modeling, classical statistical tests, time-series analysis, classification, clustering...) and graphical techniques, and is highly extensible. R provides an open source route to participation in that activity. One of R's strengths is the ease with which well-designed publication-quality plots can be produced, including mathematical symbols and formulae where needed. Great care has been taken over the defaults for the minor design choices in graphics, but the user retains full control.
26. These three places are SIRF regional centres of its total six regional centres. Lecture series is one of the roles of PODCISESI.
27. SIRF/SNV Nepal has set up six Regional Centres outside Kathmandu in Dharan, Janakpur, Birganj, Pokhara, Nepalganj and Dhangadi collages.
28. I am grateful to Mohan Vaidhaya alias Kiran, Pampha Bhusal, Manamonhan Bhattarai, Ramesh Lekhak, KP Sharma Oli, Shankar Pokhrel, Jitendra Deo and other CA members, senior political party leaders of various political parties, civil society leader, university faculties, intellectuals, cultural nationalists, Dalit activists etc. for their participation and contribution in the interactions.

29. Total 25 political parties succeeded to get elected in CA. However, post-the CA election these parties have been splintered in different time periods.
30. I am indebted to Mr Shiva Kumar Yadava, a colleague of CNAS, who helped me gathering these CA manifestos.
31. The concepts of silence and illiteracy are different, however, the author has not surveyed them.
32. Monism and pluralism doctrines are not homogenous intellectual current, and it is possible to distinguish within each a multiplicity of concerns which can't altogether be assimilated. Similarly, individual scholars often borrow concepts and insights from several theories. I borrowed these conceptions from Porta and Diani (2004:3), however they have used these concepts in social movement studies.
33. Whatever in the manifesto, the CPN-UML has accepted pluralism since the 1990s in its political doctrine.
34. Puspa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda for the first time used the term Maoism instead of Maoist perspective in Nepali communist history (see Vaidhya 2007:208).
35. An interaction held with Muma Ram Khanal on 2nd April, 2012.
36. See also Nagarik (2009) Baburam Bhattarai says the Maoist philosophically believes in monism, thus, does not accept pluralism, however, it is dedicated to multiparty democracy.
37. The dvaita is destitute of duality, having no duplicate, however, it is closely related to religious belief: identity of Brahma or of the Paramatman or supreme soul with the Jivatman or human soul (see A Sanskrit English Dictionary written by M.Monier-Williams: 2005).
38. For example Mohan Vaidya ((alias Kiran) 2010, 2012) and Pampha Bhusal (2011) of UCPN Maoist (2010); Pradeep Giri (2010) and Manamohan Bhattarai (2011) of NC; and K.P. Oli (2010) and Pradeep Gyawali (2010a, 2010b) of CPN-UML, Jinendra Deo 2012.
39. A mosaic plot is a graphical display that allows examining the relationship among two or more categorical variables – frequency data and discrete data. It, proposed by Hartigan and Kleiner represents the counts in a contingency table directly by tiles whose area is proportional to the cell frequency and developed – at present form – by Friendly, is a graphical method for visualizing an n-way contingency table and for building modes to account for the associations among its variables (Friendly 1994). The frequencies in a contingency table are portrayed as a collection of rectangular proportional “tiles” the area are coloured and shaded to portray the residuals from a specified log-linear model. See Friendly 1994 for more details.
40. Here the notion 'ideology' denotes the original concept of it: a study of idea rather than political 'ism' (see Karki 2010 and 2011) for more discussion.
41. The preamble of the Interim Constitution of Nepal put the movements in the centre – to restructure the country progressively for the resolution of class, ethnic, regional, and gender related problems prevalent in the country in keeping with

people's mandate and aspiration expressed frequently in various historical struggles and movements long before 1951 [2007 BS] in favor of democracy, peace and progression.

42. Nepal is a country of caste/ethnic minorities: the single largest caste group the Kshetry (Chettri) constitutes 15.80 per cent followed by the Brahman 12.74 per cent. Nepal housed more than 100 caste/ethnic groups and 90 languages, see 2001 census report.
43. Indigenous nationalities members of CA formed a caucus and advocated for their collective rights. On November 2, 2008 the CA members of indigenous nationalities formed "Indigenous Nationalities Caucus" (see Kantipur 17 Kartik, 2065).
44. See Nagarik 2009 to access Baburam Bhattarai's philosophical stance on Monism and Vaidhya 2007.
45. Based on personal interaction with Mr Dambar Chemjong on August 5th, 2012.
46. Until forth national convention of Nepal Federation of Nationalities (NEFEN), now Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities, (NEFIN) had declared that members of this community should take off her/his shoes to enter its meeting but the thing changed over the time.
47. I have borrowed the concept of high-risk-cost activism from Doug McAdam (1986).
48. This story has also appeared in my previous article (see Karki 2006:61-62).
49. Premier Sher Bahadur Deuba's cabinet set up three commissions in 2002: National Foundation for Development of Indigenous Nationalities (Nepal), Dalit Commission, and National Women Commission of Nepal.

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Appendix 1
Correspondence analysis

It is a technique, originated in the 1930s, that results in the display of data from a contingency table in a scatter diagram that includes points representing row categories and points representing column categories. If row points are positioned near each other in the diagram then this implies that the patterns of counts along those rows are very similar. The same applies for groups of column points. If a row point and a column point are positioned close to one another then this implies a positive association between the two. The calculations involved resemble those for principal components analysis (Oxford dictionary of statistics: 94).

Appendix 2

Political parties and their position on pluralism

S. N	Name of the Political Parties	Pluralism			Remarks
		Yes	No	Silent	
1	Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)		✓		
2	Nepali Congress	✓			
3	Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist)			✓	Now favors Pluralism
4	Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum, Nepal			✓	
5	Tarai-Madhes Democratic Party			✓	
6	Sadbhavana Party	✓			
7	Rastriya Prajatantra Party	✓			
8	Communist Party of Nepal (United)			✓	
9	Rastriya Prajatantra Party (Nepal)	✓			Religious, Cultural and Social Pluralism
10	Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist)			✓	
11	Samyukta Janamorchha			✓	Merged with the Maoist
12	Nepal Workers Peasants Party			✓	
13	Rastriya Janamorchha			✓	
14	Rastriya Janshakti Party	✓			
15	Communist Party of Nepal (Unified)	✓			
16	Nepal Sadbhawana Party (Anandidevi)	✓			
17	Nepali Janata Dal			✓	
18	Sanghiya Loktantrik Rastriya Manch			✓	
19	Rastriya Janamukti Party			✓	
20	Chure Bhawar Rastriya Ekta Party Nepal	✓			
21	Dalit Janajati Party	✓			Party Constitution
22	Nepal Loktantrik Samajbadi Dal			✓	
23	Nepal Parivar Dal	✓			
24	Samajbadi Prajatantrik Janata Party, Nepal	✓			
25	Nepa Rastriya Party			✓	
	Total	11	1	13	